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Abstract
In many cases, risks that threaten successful project completion can be mitigated (or eliminated) with a proper contingency allocation strategy and exacerbated by an improper one.
Yet, despite this importance, there is a dearth of research on the cost contingency allocation
problem in academic literature. This thesis looks at the cost contingency allocation problem from two different perspectives and two distinct solutions are introduced: a stochastic
linear programming model that addresses a short term strategy and convex-concave utility
model that provides a long-term planning solution.
The project manager’s ability to approve random requests for contingency is dependent
on several constraints, including the amount of funding that is available and the current
contingency balance. The stochastic short-term contingency allocation model developed in
this thesis delivers, to the decision maker, a single allocation strategy (feasible under all
potential futures) where uncertainty is specified via a well-chosen set of scenario paths for
the future. Comparison of the model’s solution to that of a typical myopic period-by-period
approach shows that the model’s solution is superior to that of the standard practice.
This short-term model is then extended to develop a long range contingency allocation
plan under the concept of expected utility theory. The hypothesis that the ‘risk-seeking’
and ‘risk-averse’ behaviors modeled by convex and concave utility functions are those exhibited by a project is substantiated by actual project data. These data show that the ‘riskseeking’ behavior that is an asset at the beginning of a project could lead to over-allocation
of contingency early in a project and jeopardize completion if a ‘risk-averse’ behavior is not
adopted by the project once the designs and specific project details have been more firmly
established. A novel, additive project utility function comprised of performance, scope and
schedule utility functions is introduced and the convex-concave utility-based contingency
allocation model introduced provides a long term contingency allocation plan that maximizes this utility. Both developed models are empirically validated using data from two
Department of Energy projects.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
In this chapter, ‘the good, the bad and the ugly’ of project management are introduced.
An appreciation for the degree to which projects and project management have permeated
today’s society and an understanding of the difficulties associated with managing projects
are necessary to grasp the context in which this research is based and to see the significance
of its contributions.

1.1

History

Project management has been practiced for many many centuries. The pyramids and the
Roman aqueducts are frequently mentioned as prominent examples of some of the first
projects [64, 114]. In its simplest form, managing a project is the act of solving a fully
constrained planning system. This view was first formalized by Henry L. Gantt [145].
In its current form, project management became popularized after World War II. In the
1950’s, the first papers on project management techniques were published and the Program
Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) was applied to military electronics projects [98]. In
the 1960’s, papers on scheduling, project planning and critical path analysis were being
published. In response to this interest, professional societies in both the U.S. and Europe
were developed. In the U.S., the Project Management Institute (PMI) was created in
1969. As with its European counterpart, the International Project Management Association (IPMA), PMI established principles and guidelines for project managers [103,114,159].
Today, PMI’s membership is a global community with over 206,000 members from 125
countries representing virtually every major industry including, aerospace, automotive,
business management, construction, engineering, financial services, information technology,
pharmaceuticals, health care, and telecommunications [113]. PMI’s Project Management
Professional (PMP c ) certification is the preeminent professional credential for individuals associated with project management with over 120,000 certifications awarded through
June 2005 [115]. And interest in the field continues. PMI’s website (www.pmi.org) lists 30
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graduate schools in the United States and another 31 outside the United States that offer
advanced degrees in project management.
While there are many reasons for this continued interest, a major contributor is simply a change in the way companies and organizations are doing business [38, 81]. The
globalization of the economy has resulted in greater worldwide interest in the concepts of
project management. In 2001, PMI estimated that approximately $2.3 trillion was spent
in the U.S. public and private sectors on projects, nearly 25% of the nation’s GDP at the
time [114]. The shoe company, Nike, now manages footwear projects and Coca-Cola is
no longer a soft drink manufacturer, but rather is a manager of a collection of individual
projects [38]. The World Bank’s Articles of Agreement (adopted in 1944) require that
economic development efforts are managed as projects, stipulating that [11]
“loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special circumstances,
be for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction or development.”
And, as recently as January 2006, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that
will require that the Council of Ministers take into account the level of project management
skills and the qualifications of applicants when selecting projects that will benefit from EU
funding [116].
The World Bank’s definition of a project as [11]
“a discrete package of investments, policy measures and institutional and other
actions designed to achieve a specific development objective (or set of objectives) within a designated period”
suggests that innovations in project management techniques could extend to other domains, from financial optimization to strategic and organizational management. This idea
is echoed by Shenhar [140] who suggests that project management is the method by which
organizations move technology to product development. In this context, projects represent
the achievement of organizational goals and thus have become one of the most common
types of temporary organizations.
One might wonder why the concept of managing by projects has so much appeal. The
answer lies in the definition of a project. According to PMBOK (Project Management
Book of Knowledge) [113], a project is “a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a
unique product or service.” It is distinguished from a program (or on-going operation)
by two key characteristics: it has a defined goal or objective and it has a finite time
[9, 81, 113]. Generally, a project also has a fixed cost ceiling as well. Since financial
constraints apply to every organizational activity, this characteristic does not distinguish
projects from other activities. However, the uniqueness of the deliverable does; a project
attempts to accomplish that which has not yet been done. Therefore, it is not hard to see
that, by managing work as a formal project, an organization can better focus its assets
2

of time and resources. Kerzner [81] notes that companies that use project management
continue to do so because ‘it works’. Additionally, he cites numerous benefits gained by the
synergy between project management systems and other organizational systems, such as
risk and quality management. In fact, he claims that the companies that can be categorized
as excellent companies are those that integrate the five main management processes of:
1. Project management
2. Total quality management
3. Concurrent engineering
4. Risk management
5. Change management

1.2

Headlines

The preceding information might lead one to believe that project management results in
successful projects. Surprisingly, that may not be the case and one is hard pressed to find
project success stories. In fact, the projects one reads about (as well as those that aren’t as
publicized) are likely to be failures in that they fail to deliver, are overspent and/or finish
late [31, 59].

1.2.1

What is a Successful Project?

Before continuing, it is necessary to understand what ‘successful’ means in this context.
It turns out that the lack of a precise definition of success causes many projects to be
described as failures. Typically, project success is defined as meeting cost, schedule and
performance targets [165].
Imagine for a moment that one is building a house. This is a project. At the beginning
of construction, the decision is made to add a deck and a guest bedroom. This will result
in a higher cost and a longer construction period. Despite these impacts, the project
sponsor (the home owner) decides that this change is well worth the increased cost and
the extended duration. Not only do these new features make the house more comfortable,
they enhance its resale value. Imagine that the house is completed on time and within
budget (with respect to the new budget and the revised schedule) and that the home
owner is quite satisfied with the revised house, the higher cost and the later finish date.
However, when viewed from the traditional perspective, this project would most likely be
categorized as a failure. The fact that the project deliverables changed after construction
had begun and that the definition of on-time completion had been redefined would not
have been considered in this evaluation [165]. From this example, one can see that the
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most important project criterion might not be that it finishes on time and within budget
but rather that it satisfies the customer.
Baker et al [30] keyed on this idea, questioning why some projects are considered failures
even though they were completed on time and within budget and satisfactorily met all
technical specifications and others are perceived as successful even though they finished
late and over budget. After researching 650 projects, they suggested that a project should
be considered a success if:
“the project meets the technical specifications and/or mission to be performed,
and if there is a high level of satisfaction concerning the project outcome among:
key people in the parent organization, key people in the client organization, key
people on the project team and key users or clientele of the project effort.”
Kerzner [81] also notes this multi-dimensionality but adds that, in addition to cost,
time, quality and customer acceptance, the willingness of the customer to be used as a
reference should be added to the mix. Nonetheless, in spite of the lack of a crisp definition,
it is clear that the delivery of a satisfactory product, on time and within budget are clear
attributes of success.

1.2.2

What is the Reality?

Nearly twenty years ago, Morris and Hough wrote ‘The Anatomy of Major Projects’, in
which they stated [103]
“Curiously, despite the enormous attention project management and analysis
have received over the years, the track record of projects is fundamentally
poor, particularly for the larger and more difficult ones. Overruns are common.
Many projects appear as failures, particularly in the public view. Projects
are often completed late or over budget, do not perform in the way expected,
involve severe strain on participating institutions or are canceled prior to their
completion after the expenditure of considerable sums of money.”
Morris and Hough followed this rather depressing statement with a table in which they
summarized all the publicly available project overrun data (approximately 30 projects at
that time) [103]. Unfortunately, the last two decades have not resulted in improvement
and project failures still make headlines. Typically, those that make the headlines are
those that are publicly funded. This can be attributed to the fact that these projects are
sponsored by the taxpayer and thus, are highly visible.
In July 1993, more than 75% of the DOE’s Superconducting Super Collider (SSC)
project’s contingency reserve had been allocated but less than 15% of the project had
been completed. One year later, when the project’s total estimate climbed from an initial
value of $5.9 billion to about $15 billion, Congress cancelled the project. In 1982, the
DOE thought that a nuclear waste repository would cost about $1 billion. By 1986 it was
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estimated at $8.9 billion and by 1989, the estimate had risen to $25.7 billion. In 1988,
the RAND Corporation examined 52 civilian projects ranging from $500 million to greater
than $10 billion. The average growth in costs upon completion over estimates made at
the detailed engineering phase was 88% and the total cost overruns amounted to over $30
billion [36]. The ’Big Dig’ in Boston, proposed at $2.2 billion in 1985, was three years
behind (and not yet complete) when it was estimated at $14.1 billion. The last off-ramp
opened January 13, 2006, completing the project at an estimated total cost of $14.7 billion,
$12 billion over the original budget and 8 years late.
Within the DOE, these concerns resulted in an increased focus on project management.
Unfortunately, reforms and increased oversight did not result in dramatic changes and, in
March 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said “We found no indication
of improved performance”. They based these conclusions on the evaluation of cost and
schedule changes to 16 projects. These projects were first evaluated in 1996 and again in
2001. Not only did they not see any improvement, the GAO suggested that the problem
had worsened since the initiation of reforms in 1994. Investigators discovered an increase
in the proportion of projects experiencing cost increases of more than double the initial
estimates or schedule delays of five years or more. As an example, the estimated cost of the
National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Lab jumped from $2.1 billion
to $3.3 billion and the scheduled completion date extended six years. Gregory Friedman,
the Energy Department’s Inspector General issued the following chilling statement: [97]
“Failure of the department to effectively manage certain aspects of its contract
operations has lead to excessive expenditure of funds, use of taxpayer funds for
purposes not intended, wasteful management practices and excessive project
costs.”
The preceding discussion might lead one to believe that public sector projects are
more prone to failure. This is not true. In their comparison of public and private sector
projects, Baker et al [30] found that there were no significant differences in project cost
and schedule overruns. The difficulties associated with defining and meeting goals and
technical requirements of projects were also the same in both sectors. Additionally, Baker
et al dispelled many of the common preconceptions of public sector projects as being
inefficient, ineffective and staffed by employees who are neither motivated nor rewarded.
It is appropriate to close this section with a headline from the June 5, 2005 Economist
[38] that asked: “Companies are increasingly keen on projects. Why, when so many fail?”
This is, indeed a quandary and one that Morris and Hough [103] state particularly well.
“After all”, they note, “if the stated task of project management is to accomplish a project to technical specification, in budget, on schedule, then despite
all the thousands of papers, hundreds of books and years of discussion, project
management is patently not performing adequately.”
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1.3

Contributors to Project Failure

While each project (and the problems associated with it) is unique, practitioners generally
agree on a set of common causes to explain project failures. These causes cover every
dimension of the project and, once the reader makes it through the list, it might seem
miraculous that any project succeeds. The focus of this thesis, contingency allocation, is
not explicitly identified in this set of common causes. However, it is only in the context
of project failures that one can develop a full appreciation for the importance of good
contingency management. One will see that a project’s contingency can be used to mitigate
or even avert many of these common causes. Hence, ensuring that it is applied appropriately
might be the only hedge a project has against failure.

1.3.1

Schedule

Major projects generally require several years to complete. During that period, dramatic
changes can occur in prices, in government as well as in technical innovation. Morris
and Hough [103] note that, during this long period, ‘almost everything’ can change. Of
course, the underlying cause here is that the planned schedule did not accurately depict the
unknown future. The question as to why the schedules are so different from what actually
occurred is a heavily researched area which is more appropriately discussed in detail in a
later section.

1.3.2

Cost

Reports of cost overruns reveal causes that are typically outside the scope of concern of
traditional project management. These factors include price escalation due to fiscal inflation or resource scarcity, government or client induced changes, increased order quantities,
increased safety requirements and interest or land acquisition charges. In short, many
projects overrun because of circumstances ‘external’ to the project [103]. Williams [165]
described the results of a review of major projects (those with a cost greater than $500M)
which showed that regulatory problems were the main cause of cost overruns. These observations are consistent with the long duration aspect of major projects and are supported by
the Standish Group data [84] which indicated that longer duration and higher cost projects
are likely to have greater variability (in final cost and schedule completion).
However, one of the reasons these external influences have such a dramatic influence
is that projects do not include a sufficient contingency or reserve budget. Pendar [108]
comments that, while the existence of a reserve is an acknowledgment of the uncertainty
in projects, there is little guidance (in the PMBOK or any other formally accepted publication) that suggests how a ‘sufficient’ budget might be developed. In fact, publication
in this area appears restricted to the cost engineering community [14, 37, 73, 151]. In the
case of public projects, including contingency is even more difficult since politicians are
reluctant to approve expensive projects. Additionally, in competitive bid situations, it is
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extremely difficult for the government to admit that its estimate has ‘fat’ in it [103]. In his
discussion of the 10 best practices of any cost estimate, Uppal [151] does not even mention
the establishment of an appropriate contingency reserve. In contrast, Bent [14] notes that
the overall quality of an estimate is ‘defined’ by the amount of contingency in the estimate.
Dillon et al [36] summarize all these findings quite nicely, suggesting that projects
overrun for the following reasons:
1. Cost estimates are often made in an environment of advocacy with pressures to
produces low, can-do estimates.
2. Cost estimates typically reflect what reasonable costs should be, not what they could
be considering all types of uncertainties.
3. Uncertainties are accounted for by adding contingencies (typically 2-50%) of the
capital costs. However, these contingencies rarely cover extraordinary events, such
as major technical or regulatory problems.
4. Attempts to incorporate uncertainties in cost estimates using probability distributions are often influenced by biases in human judgment.

1.3.3

New Technology

A project delivers a unique product or service. Frequently, a project attempts to deliver
state-of-the-art technology that has never been done before. As a result, it is extremely
difficult to determine a cost estimate and schedule for technical innovation, most of which
is not clearly defined at the outset. Many studies, in particular those performed by the
RAND Corporation, highlight the fact that technical uncertainty increases the probability
that a project will finish over budget [6, 103].

1.3.4

Concurrency

Concurrency occurs when production or manufacturing begins before design is completed.
This is generally the response to pressure to deliver the product and is an attempt to
recover schedule slippage [103, 161]. However, Cochran et al [31] suggest this practice only
increases the likelihood of both cost and schedule overruns. They advise project managers
to recognize that the term development applies all the way through completion of final
design. They emphasize that prototype production is not production and that each phase
of a development process should be complete before another begins.

1.3.5

Scope Creep

Scope creep is caused when features or functions are added to project. Recall the new deck
and guest bedroom. These additions increase cost and consume time (possibly delaying the
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project schedule) and thus are often cited as a cause of project failure. In some projects, it
is extremely difficult to have a complete definition of project scope before it is executed [81]
and thus, it is difficult to identify scope creep. This leads to the problem of unclear goals
or objectives.

1.3.6

Lack of Explicit Objectives

Turner and Cochrane [149] suggest that the traditional assumption that a project has well
defined objectives (as well as an understood method by which these objectives can be met)
is not always valid (at least at the start of a project). They describe 4 types of projects as
follows:
Type 1: Goals and the methods for achieving them are clear (e.g. engineering
projects)
Type 2: Goals are clear but the methods are not (e.g. product development)
Type 3: Goals are not well defined but the methods are (e.g. software development
projects)
Type 4: Neither the goals nor the methods are well defined (e.g. organizational
development projects)
Software development projects are particularly problematic. The fundamental challenge in these projects is ‘freezing’ the requirements. The goals are uncertain since users’
requirements are difficult to specify and typically change once a prototype is evaluated [159].
Project management of software projects is also a heavily researched field [79, 169].

1.3.7

Political Will

Political will is used to describe the impact that politics can have on a project. As an
example, this can occur through funding, sponsorship and legislation of fiscal, safety, employment or other matters. Political considerations are particularly important in projects
that affect or are in the public domain and political sponsorship is viewed by many as
one of the single most critical ‘success’ factors for such projects. Even though political and
bureaucratic influences can reduce the efficiency with which projects are managed, political
backing can ‘make or break’ a project [5, 103]. In their review of the construction of the
Alaska Pipeline, Cochran et al [31] quoted one observer’s description of the pipeline as:
“a monument to man’s dedication to achieve, in spite of almost unbelievable
obstacles, intervention and bureaucratic entanglement.”
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1.3.8

People

Projects are managed and performed by people. Poor leadership and communication, as
well as a lack of teamwork and trust are often cited as culprits in project failures. Without
trust, problems are not raised to management until it is too late and project managers
and project sponsors simply do the paperwork [81]. The Standish Group study concluded
that the primary cause of the declining project success rates between 1977 and 2000 was
insufficiently collaborative working relations (due to lack of trust) [80]. Poor leadership
results in behavioral issues such as low morale and a lack of commitment [81].
Communication plays heavily in this context [6, 105]. Lack of timely and focused communication has been cited as one of the biggest reasons for the failure of many projects
[133]. Poor communication results in ignorance of what the other project teams are doing as well as the inability to react quickly to sudden changes in the project environment [6, 46, 103].

1.4
1.4.1

Focus of this Thesis
Motivation

The motivation for this work is a consequence of years of project work within the Department of Energy (DOE) community. Unlike the private sector in which the company funds
new product development, DOE projects are funded by the public with DOE acting as an
agent for the public trust. In this case, the government has a responsibility to oversee the
expenditure of those funds and one way of doing so is via the use of external (or independent) auditors. Establishment and management of cost and time (schedule) contingency
are routinely scrutinized during these reviews.
Therefore, the central theme throughout this thesis is that of contingency management.
The core issue is how to best incorporate an uncertain future into current period decisions
regarding cost and time contingency. With the potential exception of the vulnerability
to external audit committees, these issues are not unique to the DOE community and
rather, the same types of issues and questions are faced in all project environments. This
commonality will be seen throughout the following chapters. The detailed data analysis
will be focused on DOE projects only because that data is readily accessible.
It would be very presumptuous to even suggest that this thesis proposes solutions to
problems that have not been solved in over 40 years of disciplined project management
attention. Rather, the primary reason for providing the background material in the previous pages was to set the context in which the contingency allocation problem exists and to
allow one to appreciate the impact that the successful application of management science
techniques could have on the very important and very challenging world of projects. Other
researchers have also encouraged management science contributions in this area. Liberatore and Titus [86] defined ‘project management’ as the activities of screening, selecting,

9

evaluating, budgeting and controlling R&D projects. They noted that most of the management science effort had been directed toward the project selection aspect and suggested
that management scientists should consider
“conducting and reporting more situation-specific case studies on the application of project management techniques in R&D environments and participating
in the development of decision support systems for R&D management, especially for multi-project planning and control.”
Gillespie and Gear [52] stated that
“it would seem essential for management scientists to develop scientifically
based model-building procedures in the area of R&D modeling in order to
successfully present quantitatively based procedures to scientists and engineers
who are trained to be objective and critical.”
Starr [145] claims that, with a few exceptions, planning relates to a class of models that
is least familiar in practice to management scientists. Hespos [62] notes that the project
management problem is really one of sequential decision making in which there are a series
of interrelated decisions that occur at different points in time. Not only can modeling assist
in the planning process, it can enable senior management and project management teams
to learn from experience. Models can also help managers understand see how various
factors can combine and result in disaster [159]. This dissertation will show how it is
possible to transfer, in a practical and useful way, the techniques of stochastic mathematical
programming to the project management community.

1.4.2

Organization and Objectives

This thesis focuses on the project execution phase in which cost-neutral risk mitigation
efforts have failed and problems can be solved only by the use of contingency dollars. This
contingency allocation dilemma is a double-edged sword. Hoarding contingency as a hedge
against an uncertain future is no better than free distribution of this reserve; the former
represents a failure to take advantage of economy of scale procurements or recent technical
innovations while the latter leaves scope elimination as the only way to cover estimate
shortfalls or realized risks. The research in the following chapters focuses on the problem
of a project manager who, faced with an uncertain future, must decide which requests for
contingency can be funded in a particular period. Requests for contingency arrive randomly
and the amount that the manager can allocate in a particular period is constrained by a
number of factors, including the amount of contingency reserve remaining, the amount of
work remaining and the amount of funding available; many of these factors are dependent
on decisions that were made in prior periods and thus, on history. Each approval depletes
the contingency reserve and hence, approval of a request ‘now’ could result in the manager’s
inability to approve a more urgent (or more important) request at some time in the future.
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While all projects have a process by which requests for contingency are submitted and
vetted as valid, the problem of which to approve when is particularly vexing.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins with an introduction to management science models in general in order to emphasize those elements critical to a ‘good’
model. In this context, ‘good’ is defined by attributes such as ‘implementable’, ‘practical’
and ‘easily understood’. After highlighting some of the difficulties associated with modeling
projects, a sample of the models currently in use in the Project Management community
is introduced. This is followed by an overview of existing management science models
that interface (or could interface), directly or indirectly, with the project environment. It
would be an impossible task to review all the existing literature. Therefore, the scope
of this review is restricted to three particular types of models that are the most closely
related to the work in this thesis; those that address the project selection problem, those
that explore the most likely finish date of a project and those that apply utility theory to
projects (or project-like activities). These are appropriately separated into three sections,
Project Selection Models (Section 2.3.1), Schedule Models (Section 2.3.2) and Utility Models (Section 2.3.3). Despite its importance to project managers, contingency management
is scarcely represented in literature and thus, in Chapter 2, there are only a few direct references to this topic. To be fair, it is certainly true that the difference between a project’s
planned finish and its most likely (or expected) finish can be interpreted as the amount of
schedule contingency required. Research in this expected finish area is rather thoroughly
covered in Schedule Models (Section 2.3.2). The chapter concludes with a discussion of
implementation issues associated with these models (Section 2.3.4).
The next two chapters introduce the original research that comprises the body of this
thesis. Each chapter views the contingency allocation problem from a different perspective.
In both cases, however, these approaches and perspectives possess a key attribute that
is absent from most of those discussed in Chapter 2: credibility with project managers
on actual projects. Hence, the research in this thesis has both academic and practical
relevance. In some sense, this work falls into the realm of policy analysis. Using the words
of Morgan and Henrion [102],
“Policy analysis often involves the development of models for which empirical
validation is difficult or impossible. For example, models may be required to
forecast the implication of decision for years and sometimes decades into the
future. If at all possible, direct testing of the predictive validity of such models
often cannot be carried out until long after the analysis is required. Models
can sometimes be calibrated against historical data but there is no guarantee
that past relationships will continue to hold in the future. If a policy model
is intended not only to forecast but also to produce decision recommendations,
then the problem of validation becomes even stickier.”
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To be even more specific, Morgan and Henrion [102] classify the motivation behind quantitative policy-focused research. The work in this thesis actually fits well with two of the
motivations identified. They are as follows:
1. To develop insight and understanding that will be useful to one or several policy
makers who are faced with making decisions on a specific well defined set of policy
issues or options. In this case, insight and understanding are the objective.
2. Because it is not clear what else to do and the political reality of the situation requires
that one do something.
In Chapter 3, the contingency allocation challenge is addressed by a linear utility model.
This model provides a near-term optimal allocation strategy under conditions of uncertainty. The optimal solution presented is feasible across all envisioned futures, thus providing an allocation plan that is feasible no matter which of many potential futures actually
occurs. However, this strict feasibility requirement results in a conservative plan that can
satisfy even the ‘worst’ case. Since conservative decisions may not be desired, a range of
solutions is provided, allowing the project manager to chose from an array of allocation
plans. The solution that allocates the largest amount of contingency is one that is feasible
only in an ‘average’ sense and can be considered as the most aggressive plan. While the
most conservative solution could leave unallocated contingency on the table at the end of
the project, the most aggressive solution could jeopardize the project manager’s ability to
respond to a real requirement in the future. In the empirical data analysis, the random
parameters of actual costs, commitments and contingency requests (both in magnitude and
in frequency) are bundled in distinct scenario paths. The model’s results are compared to
that of a naive, myopic approach (which is the contingency allocation rule most commonly
observed in actual project management practice). Using a rolling horizon approach, this
model can be periodically updated to generate near term allocation plans that incorporate
the most recent historical data as well as historical trends.
In Chapter 4, the convex and concave attributes of a project are the basis for a model
that is generated from the perspective of expected utility theory. Empirical data analysis
shows that the ‘risk-seeking’ and ‘risk-averse’ behaviors modeled by utility functions can
be directly correlated to a project’s use of contingency over time. These data show that
the ‘risk-seeking’ behavior that is an asset early in a project’s lifespan can lead to overallocation of contingency early in a project and jeopardize completion if a ‘risk-averse’
behavior is not adopted by the project once the designs and specific project details have
been more firmly established. A project utility function is described in terms of the key
attributes of project success and a long range contingency allocation plan is developed that
maximizes this utility. In contrast to the linear utility model presented in Chapter 3, the
convex-concave utility-based model formulated in this section offers a long term allocation
plan in which the decision periods are in years and the forecasted contingency requests
are based upon the data in a project’s risk register. This allocation plan is compared to a
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risk-neutral linear decision formulation (that maximizes total contingency allocated) and
the results show that an allocation plan based upon a project’s utility is superior to that
generated via the linear rule.
In Chapter 5, the contributions of the two different types of models are summarized.
Some general observations are discussed and avenues of future work are suggested. It is
hoped that this thesis can provide a bridge by which the two disciplines of management
science and project management can see and then understand the great synergies that they
offer to each other.
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Chapter 2

Literature Review - Current
Modeling Solutions and Their
Drawbacks
This chapter begins with an introduction to models. Some of the attributes of a ‘good’
model are discussed, setting the foundation for the discussion of models that other researchers have proposed to address project funding and project scheduling problems. Since
it is not possible to ‘truly’ quantify the uncertainty involved in project management problems, the development of ‘exact’ solutions is neither helpful nor necessary [26, 35, 110, 132].
The effort to develop ‘exact’ solutions results in large stochastic models that become intractable when applied to real project management problems. In many cases, the existing
models are not applied in practice because the assumptions involved result in output that
lacks credibility with project managers [159]. Therefore, the work in this thesis is focused
on generating valid and implementable models that provide ‘good’ solutions.

2.1
2.1.1

Choice of Models
Management Science Models

Management science can be described as the application of scientific method to decision
making [3]. Models are comprised of a set of features that the model builder selected to
form a simplified representation of the world and also achieve the model’s objective. It is
important to recognize that there is no guarantee that these abstract formulations are even
valid [111, 159]. Yet, in a more positive vein, Jewell [70] notes that “The great growth of
the OR profession has come from the ability to construct interesting models of real-world
phenomena and to use the solutions to resolve actual problems.”
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Designing a good model is not easy in that it needs to satisfy, simultaneously, the
competing requirements of realism and generality. A model must incorporate enough detail
to properly represent the problem being solved yet, at the same time, be simple enough
so that it does not require input or information that is not available (or not available
accurately). Not only must it be empirically valid, it must appropriately address the
decision-maker’s need [143,158,159]. Proudlove et al [120] comment that, in the context of
‘intelligent’ decision support systems, the shortcomings of OR-type mathematical models
are widely criticized, in large part because the models demand reliable data from a fluid
and dynamic real world.
The uncertainties associated with a project’s schedule and cost make it difficult to
design ’good’ project management models. Pich et al [110] suggest that task scheduling
and risk management models are sufficient only when they contain ‘adequate’ information
about the states of the world. Inadequacy, in this context, results when events (or impacts)
are unknown or are impossible to estimate because the interaction of the variables is not
understood. The latter is what they describe as complexity. Diekmann and Featherman [35]
observe that model accuracy is a function of model complexity. They evaluated three
alternative methods used to obtain uncertainty assessments for a cost-risk analysis and
found that the comfort with which project personnel can make the needed uncertainty
estimates has little bearing on the quality of the estimates.

2.2

Models Used in the Management of Projects

Project management involves the allocation of resources (time, money, people) to achieve
an objective. It spans many dimensions and includes risk management, personnel management, resource allocation and activity scheduling. Most of the project management models
that are in use are those that focus on risk management and project scheduling. This thesis
explores the allocation of contingency resources, providing models that contribute to risk
management from a resource allocation perspective.
Scheduling has been defined as the process of finding an assignment of resources and
times for activities so as to optimize goals (such as cost or work in process) and aims
to satisfy constraints (such as resource availability and precedence relationships) [120].
Project planning networks are studied in an effort to determine when the project’s key
milestones may be completed (that is, how much are they likely to be late). The results of
these analyses tell the manager which activities are worthy of worry [164].
A schedule is nothing more than a directed acyclic graph with nodes and arcs. In a k
node graph, node 0 would represent the project start and the last node, possibly the k th ,
would designate the project finish. A project will take as long as the longest path in the
schedule. This longest path is referred to as the critical path. Clearly, if anything goes
wrong on this path, then the project will finish late. A project have may other paths that
are nearly as long as the longest path. These too could cause the project to finish late if
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Figure 2.1: Schedule Sample
something went wrong. As an illustrative example, refer to the very simple schedule shown
in Figure 2.1. In the project illustrated, there are 8 activities and 5 nodes (not including
project start and project finish). The project duration of 19 days is driven by the longest
path which can be described as the sequence of activities P1 = (A(S,2) , A(2,3) , A(3,5) , A(5,F ) )).
This is the critical path of the project. However, there is another path with a duration
of 18 days, the path P2 = (A(S,2) , A(2,4) , A(4,F ) ). If A(2,4) or A(4,F ) ) are delayed by more
than one day, path P2 could easily become the critical path. Thus, P2 would be considered
a near-critical path. For completeness, the third path has a duration of 17 days and is
P3 = (A(S,1) , A(1,3) , A(3,5) , A(5,F ) ). A delay in A(S,1) or A(1,3) of more than 2 days could
cause P3 to become critical. The difference between a path’s total duration and the total
duration of the project is called float. In this example, path P1 has zero float. If the
delay on a path exceeds its total float, the activity becomes critical. Criticality is easy
to understand in deterministic network. However, the analysis of project failures suggests
that the networks are anything but deterministic.
A(S,2) is a predecessor to A(2,3) as well as A(2,4) ; A(1,3) is a successor of A(S,1) . These
relationships are referred to as precedence or logical relationships. These relationships
are also referred to as finish-to-start relationships, meaning that the predecessor activity
must finish before the successor activity can begin. There are four different types of these
relationships. Finish-to-finish means that one activity cannot finish until the other one
does; start-to-start means the activities can both start at the same time and start-to-finish
means that the successor cannot finish until the predecessor starts [113].
The critical path just described was derived by a very simplistic Critical Path Method
(CPM). CPM is officially defined (by PMI) as a network analysis technique used to predict project duration by analyzing which sequence of activities (which path) has the least
amount of schedule flexibility (the least amount of float) [113]. The schedule depicted in
Figure 2.1 is commonly referred to as a PERT network or diagram. PERT (The Program Evaluation and Review Technique) is defined as an event-oriented network analysis
technique used to estimate program duration when there is uncertainty in the individual
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duration estimates. The PERT model uses optimistic, most likely and pessimistic estimates of task duration or cost to estimate the mean and standard deviation for each task.
The PERT method assumes that the difference between the optimistic and pessimistic estimates is some multiple of the standard deviation. The method then applies the square
root of the sum of the squares of the differences to estimate the standard deviation of the
sum (either the length of the project or its total cost) [84, 113]. Leach and PMI [84, 113]
claim that a commonly accepted mean activity time of an activity j, µj is that from the
beta distribution, calculated as
µj =

Oj + 4M Lj + Pj
6

(2.1)

where Oj , Pj and M Lj stand for the optimistic (O), pessimistic (P ) and most likely
(M L) durations for activity j. Thus, PERT applies the critical path method (CPM) using
durations that are computed by a weighted average of optimistic, pessimistic and most
likely duration estimates. For the example in Figure 2.1, PERT requires the assignment of
three duration estimates to each of the 8 individual activities.
In Monte Carlo analysis, a random sample of each of these estimates is selected and,
through a large number of simulations, a distribution of the project’s duration and a most
likely finish date is generated. Success of PERT in project scheduling gave rise to GERT
which adds stochastic flexibility to network modeling [86]. GERT (Graphical Evaluation
and Review Technique) and Systems Dynamics models allow for non sequential activities
such as loops and conditional branches. This technique allows for probabilistic or logical
relationships that may or may not occur [113].

2.3

Management Science Resource Allocation Models

In their surveys of management science models, both Jewell [70] and Liberatore and Titus [86] noted that most models related to project management are those on the selection
and budgeting of R&D projects and the resource loading problem. The project selection
or budgeting problem and the resource loading problem are very similar, both focusing on
the assignment of resources. Neither of these solutions specifically address the contingency
allocation problem. However, since the contingency reserve can be considered a resource,
these types of models are the ones most similar to the research in this thesis. The Project
Selection Models section (Section 2.3.1) introduces some of the R&D project selection solutions that have been proposed. These models fall into the prescriptive category and are,
in general, linear programs. Models that address schedule durations are briefly introduced
in the Schedule Models section (Section 2.3.2). Typically, these descriptive models require
assumptions regarding distributions which are then used to simulate likely futures. Utilitybased models proposed for use in project management applications are described in the

17

Utility Model section (Section 2.3.3). Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 are most relevant to the linear utility model presented in Chapter 3 while Section 2.3.3 applies to the convex-concave
utility model introduced in Chapter 4.

2.3.1

Project Selection Models

In the project selection (or project funding) problem, a number of potential projects compete for a fixed amount of funding (that is not sufficient to fund all of them). At the time
of the decision, it is not known which projects will succeed and which will fail. Based
on some criteria, a manager selects a subset of these for inclusion in the project portfolio. Moore [101] classifies these types of models into four categories. Scoring models
compute an overall project score based on ratings assigned subjectively based on some
decision criteria. Economic models base the rankings on an economic criteria such as net
worth or rate or return. Constrained optimization models optimize an economic objective function based on resource or other constraints. Risk analysis models are based on
simulation analysis against multiple criteria. Linear, piece-wise linear, non-linear, integer,
quadratic and stochastic approaches have all been examined. In general, these models
either maximize the expected net return or the expected utility to the organization (the
latter being a method by which uncertainty is included). The expansion of interest in this
area (largely in the 60’s and 70’s) naturally lead to a myriad of statistical evaluations of
these methods in an effort to determine their ‘real’ value and utility to project managers
[52, 62, 91, 92, 101, 142, 143, 156].
Typically, project selection or project funding decisions are binary. In this zero-one
approach, a project is either funded or not funded; partial funding is not permitted. Hence,
the organization’s total budget may not be allocated to projects and rather, a portion is
held in reserve for a future period [142]. Other researchers, such as Lockett and Gear [91],
prefer continuous (between 0 and 1) decision variables that allow the selection of fractional
projects. They argue that, in this way, all the project’s resources are used optimally (while,
in the binary approach, some resources are not used at all).
Decision trees are one of the most common methods by which uncertainty is captured in
these models [93]. However, since the use of decision trees increases the size of the models,
researchers seek methods by which to minimize model complexity. As an example, Lockett
and Gear [92] developed an approach that combined simulation with linear programming
and the use of heuristics. In doing so, they (knowingly) sacrificed optimality in favor of a
‘good’ solution to a real problem. In their approach, 100 simulations of project portfolios
were generated and the mean value of each decision variable (over all 100 simulations) was
calculated. These mean values were ranked and those projects with the highest ranks were
selected.
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2.3.2

Schedule Models

Schedule models address sequential, sometimes resource constrained, problems. These
types of models have a great deal of value in production and job queuing applications.
From the project scheduling perspective, project managers want to know when the project
is likely to finish and which activities are most likely to impact that date [165].
Since this thesis focuses on cost contingency and addresses schedule contingency only in
terms of its contribution to a project’s utility, only a relevant summary of the large volume
of work in this area is included in this section. Herroelen and Leus [61] prepared a concise
summary of the different types of models and approaches being used in the scheduling
under uncertainty environment and Graves [53] looks at techniques used in production
scheduling problems. Elmaghraby [41] notes that
“It is universally recognized that the scheduling of activities and the timing
of resource acquisition and allocation are among the most important functions
of management. Technically speaking, the scheduling of activities related by
arbitrary precedence relations subject to resource availabilities is an NP-hard
problem. This means that the prospect of finding an algorithm that resolves
the problem optimally (under any criterion) and runs in ‘reasonable’ time is
almost nil.”
In the schedule context, distributions are commonly used to incorporate uncertainty and
the output is dependent on the distribution selected. The problem with this approach is
that the precise distribution is unknown.
Distribution-based Models
Williams [163] discusses the number and choice of distributions used in modeling schedule
risk. The beta distribution, he argues, has been shown to have no empirical validity [159].
Williams suggests that, to define an activity-duration distribution, 5 parameters are required:
1. a parameter expressing position
2. a parameter expressing spread
3. a parameter expressing skew
4. a minimum (could be 0)
5. a maximum (could be ∞)
Bowers [19] suggests that the triangular distribution is the preferred choice while PMI [84,
113] argues that the beta distribution most appropriately describes activity durations.
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Wiley et al [157] articulate a multi-project program planning model which aims to
establish program and project parameters based upon a set of constraints (such as funding and personnel availability). In their model, they assume that activity durations are
“normal” and constant and thus they do not incorporate uncertainty.
Leach [84], in his work on establishing appropriate cost and schedule buffers (contingency or reserves), appeals to the central limit theorem and assumes normally distributed
activities. He claims that the central limit theorem ensures that the distribution at the
end of a path will approach the normal distribution as the number of the tasks in the path
increases, regardless of the distribution of the duration of each of the tasks in the path. He
suggests that the project buffer should be no less that 25% of the total task duration along
the critical path. But, that number is the result of estimates for variation and bias for
which, as he even admits, “there is not a firm technical basis for some of the estimates”.
He also says that “there is no theoretical method to sum the various biases” and then
proceeds to sum them up anyway.
Gutierrez and Paul [57] claim that, if the project is very large (and there are many
subprojects parsed out in pieces), then the central limit theorem suggests that, in the end,
the durations can be represented by normally distributed random variables.
Burt [22] suggests that the time to process an activity (the duration) is represented by
a probability function of its processing time. Burt assumed two types of distributions, a
uniform distribution and a triangular distribution.
Tavares et al [148] propose a model which explores a project’s risk as a function of the
uncertainty of the duration of each activity and the cost of each activity. By assuming a
lognormal distribution of durations (in order to exploit the convenient properties of that
distribution which include a fixed lower bound corresponding to a minimal feasible duration
and an unbounded upper bound), they present a stochastic model of the project network.
Britney [20] suggests the use of Bayesian point estimates for activity durations. In
his approach, he assumes that the individual activity duration times are approximated by
‘suitable’ beta distributions and that optimistic (a), pessimistic (b) and most likely (m)
duration estimates can be obtained for each activity. Additionally he assumes that per
unit loss parameters of Ku and Ko (u and o represent ‘under’ and ‘over’ estimates) are also
known.
Scenario-based Models
Pollack-Johnson and Liberatore [117] propose a scenario approach in which the uncertain
project network is expressed through a set of network scenarios, each having a specified
probability of occurrence and an expected duration. The project’s critical path is then
calculated as sum of the probabilities of the scenarios times their critical path length.
Herroelen and Leus [60] look at a generally stable schedule (e.g. job scheduling) and
then evaluate scenarios that could occur as the result of some kind of disruption. Their
objective function is to minimize the expected weighted deviation between the planned
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start and the actual start of an activity. This is much along the lines of airport gate
scheduling in which wait times or gate times are minimized.
Other Approaches
Elmaghraby [42] and Williams [164] describe approaches based on the critical path of the
project, using criticality and cruciality indexes to model schedules. Criticality describes
the frequency with which an activity appears on a project’s critical path. Cruciality refers
to the correlation between the activity duration and the total project duration [162, 164].
Elmaghraby [42] confesses, though, that managers do not necessarily pay attention to an
activity that is assigned a high criticality since it is based on probabilistic considerations
that are far from management’s view of things and, often, the measure runs counter to
management’s expectations.
Hartmann and Kolisch [58] and Proudlove et al [120] offer summaries of more different
approaches including simulated annealing, neural networks, tabu searches, genetic algorithms and fuzzy logic. Lova et al [94] discuss the use of a multi criteria heuristic method
in the problem of resource allocation in multiple projects. Burt [22] states that the determination of an optimal decision strategy by analytic methods is extremely complex and
thus he applies heuristic rules. Milatovic and Badiru [99] create a resource-activity mapping scheme that assigns the most qualified resources to activities and considers resources
preferences and availabilities in both crisp and fuzzy forms.
Liberatore [85] takes a fuzzy logic approach to critical path analysis and suggests that
it may be suitable in those situations where past data is either unavailable or not relevant,
when the definition of the activity is not clear or when the notion of the activity’s completion is vague. Shipley et al [141] suggest fuzzy logic as a solution to overcome ignorance
regarding probabilities. Fuzzy set theory could be particularly useful in the case of new
projects for which there is no statistical information available from which to base the development or assumption of a probability distribution. Even when statistical information
is available, Shipley et al [141] note that the future may be so different as to make development of probabilities difficult. Carr and Tah [24] apply fuzzy associations to identify
the relationships between risk sources and the consequences on project performance. The
total effect (or impact) of a risk is defined as the fuzzy union of fuzzy sets where each
set represents an individual effect. Herroelen and Leus [61] caution that while fuzzy logic
solutions, in general, reject the idea of assigning probabilities, they require the assignment
of membership functions which may be no easier to determine.

2.3.3

Utility Models

The application of utility theory to project management is not a well researched area.
Piney [112] applied utility theory to risk management and notes (in talking about a project
manager’s goal to make a profit for the corporation) that:
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“it is in the project manager’s interest to focus on actions that will limit the
chance of budget overruns, even at the expense of abandoning the opportunity
for larger potential gains.”
Jørgensen and Wallace [71] claim that most project managers are risk–averse and that,
given a portfolio of projects, managers will prefer a portfolio that has lower variation, even
at the expense of a slightly higher expected cost. However, they claim that, according to
financial theory, managers should act as if they were risk neutral and that diversification
should be the concern of the owners (project sponsors).
Multi-attribute Models
Most decisions involve choices among options that are not easily comparable. Morgan
and Henrion [102] comment that it may be possible, in some rare occasion, to normalize
the attributes associated with these options to an equivalent scale and then sum these
to get a total value. However, in most cases, normalization of attributes is not possible
and they suggest that multi-attribute utility theory is one way to resolve this problem. In
their approach, a utility function is specified that evaluates the outcomes in terms of all
their important attributes and then the alternative with the maximum utility is selected.
Keefer [74] explored this idea as well, defining a set of measures of effectiveness or attributes,
R = (R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn ), which indicate the extent to which the different objectives of the
decision problem are met by any specific outcome. If the axioms of rational choice are met,
then the decision maker selects the value of x which maximizes his expected utility
Z
U(r)f (r|x)dr
(2.2)
R

where r = (r1 , r2 , . . . , rn ) represents a specific value of R, f is the decision maker’s probability density function over R, given the value of x, and U is his utility function. This
approach was applied in a budgeting model where a manager is required to allocate an annual budget to various departments within an organization. While quite a bit of effort was
required to elicit the f , U and R values, the author’s model was successfully implemented
in the product engineering department of a major corporation.
Bard [10] applied multi-attribute utility theory in his model for selecting interrelated
R&D projects in the face of uncertainty. He commented that the success of this type of
approach hinges on reasonably accurate determinations of probability distributions and
utility functions.
AHP Models
Riggs et al [124] claim that:
“In many project management situations, the intent is not to maximize profit
but rather to maximize some subjective preference for achieving technical/performance
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Table 2.1: Project Status on Completion
Success
Failure
T
T’
performance ≥ specification performance ≤ specification
C
C’
cost ≤ budget
cost ≥ budget
S
S’
time ≤ schedule
time ≥ schedule
criteria, staying within cost/budget limitations, and meeting schedule milestones.”
They define a project in terms of these three attributes, as U(T, C, S), where T, C and
S represent achievement of the technical, cost and schedule objectives and T’, S’ and C’
represent failure to meet them. These utility functions represent the decision maker’s
project success preferences in a risk context and hence, U(T, C, S) = 1 represents complete
success and U(T 0 , C 0 , S 0 ) = 0 represents utter failure. This utility is defined by the project’s
status at completion as per Table 2.1 and is used as a guide in decision making. When
the project manager is faced with a decision (e.g. a choice of design options), the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used to quantify the importance of the cost, schedule and
technical risks associated with each option. Once a decision tree has been constructed to
compare the possible outcomes of the options being evaluated and probability values have
been assigned to each branch, the terminal nodes in the decision tree are assigned the AHP
weights. The path leading to the maximum AHP weight is then selected. In their work,
Riggs et al do not address the utility independence condition that is a prerequisite to the
use of additive utility functions.

2.3.4

Scarce Implementation of Existing Models

It seems pretty clear that management scientists have done their part in developing models
that address project management problems. Yet, use of these models hasn’t really ‘caught
on’ in practice. Jewell [70] comments on the divergence between theory and application,
stating
“Practitioners regularly rage at the mathematical ‘overkill’ in the pages of journals and yearn for the good old days when a simple model could explicate an
observed phenomenon; in rebuttal, researchers point to the trivial level of many
of the applications papers...and the universal lack of sponsorship by industry
of meaningful research programmes.”
Liberatore and Titus [86] summarized the research done in project management models but noted that, since the late 1960’s, no empirical studies on the use of quantitative
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techniques for R&D project management had been reported. Since the results of earlier
studies were not favorable (revealing that most organizations eschewed the elaborate R&D
project selection models and preferred to make their determination based on financial metrics alone), they performed another survey to see if attitudes had changed. No significant
differences were found.
Williams [159] echoes these findings, noting that, while progress has been made in the
academic setting, none of these advances are used in practice. He suggests that project
plans with uncertainty are much too complex to analyze using analytical methods [163].
DeMeyer et al [34] studied 16 projects to determine why the generally accepted principles of the use of decision milestones to anticipate outcomes, the use of risk management
to prevent disasters and the use sequential iteration to make sure everyone is making the
desired product, did not work. They concluded that there are different types of uncertainty
and that each type needs to be addressed in a different way.
Unrealistic Output
Burt [22] suggests that managers do not use (or believe) the results of network planning
models because those models fail to recognize, simultaneously, three realities faced by
project managers: uncertainty in activity durations, allocation of resources to competing
requirements and dynamic decision making. In response to these issues, Schonberger [135]
suggests that the project manager should continue to use the traditional critical path
analysis but, view the results subjectively, understanding that project lateness will be
associated with the variability of activity durations and the number of distinct paths within
the schedule network. He suggests that managers have a difficult time understanding what
to do with simulated network data and claims that the reason that critical path method
is used in lieu of more complex methods (such as Monte Carlo simulation) is that, even
though it is always wrong, it is inexpensive and easy to understand.
Gutierrez and Kouvelis [56] state that, while a deterministic critical path analysis fails
to account for activity time variability and underestimates the total project duration,
conventional approaches are still the most popular. Pollack-Johnson [117] notes that a
recent survey of project management professionals found that nearly 70% used CPM but
only 17% used probabilistic analysis and/or simulation. Williams [160] also agrees with
these observations, proposing that modeling of management actions within the context of
Monte Carlo simulation should be accomplished by coding a set of decision rules and then
modeling the consequences.
Pich et al [110] sum up this problem by noting that, while there are a number of
different approaches that incorporate uncertainty into project management planning (risk
management, PERT, GERT and CPM), “no conceptual model currently exists that enables
project managers to understand why different approaches exist, which one to chose and
when.”

24

Lack of Data
Liberatore and Titus [86] argue that the organizational context in which R&D resource
allocation occurs must be considered by management scientists in the development of appropriate methods. For example, the availability and reliability of data, the level of detail
for the statement of project goals, the time horizon for project activity, the criteria for
successful project completion and the structure of the R&D and supporting groups, among
other factors, are quite different in the ‘R’ and ‘D’ environments.
Lockett and Gear [91] look at a number of problems associated with applying mathematical programming models to R&D project selection. The problems they saw were:
• the effects of future opportunities on the optimal allocation process
• consideration of the decision-maker’s trade off between profit maximization and risk
minimization
• inclusion of project versions which require R&D resources beyond the planning period
specified
They claim that it is often stated that the value of a model is based on the availability
of accurate data. They note that the value of the mathematical programming method
they described rested on the ability to represent and analyze complex R&D solutions in a
consistent manner and on their demand for systematic methods of planning and evaluating
individual projects. They claim:
“Decisions made on the basis of poor and biased estimates are likely to be bad
with or without a model. But, the incorporation of a model leads to consistency
of both data inputs and of decisions.”
In his commentary regarding ORSA’s 1971 report entitled ‘Guidelines for the Practice
of Operations Research’, Wagner [153] recommends that the Guidelines recognize ‘the full
impact of limited and inaccurate data’. Carpio et al [23] point out that the lack of concern
for the biases is inherent in problem analysis. They cite the requirement to use surrogates
for real data (e.g. the GNP for wealth) and argue that these surrogates can “take on a life
of their own if we place too much emphasis on the quantitative side of science”.
Model Complexity
Chapman [26] notes that, in management science, there is a long tradition of employing
models of real management decision situations to understand the key features of a decision
and guide subsequent decision making. A management science approach emphasizes the
importance of analyzing the robustness of the assumptions used in the model. Models
which attempt to mirror reality in every detail are not appropriate or feasible but at the
same time, excessive reduction in complexity must be avoided if the model is not to obscure
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issues or produce misleading inferences. What is needed is a model that captures all the
key features of the decision context yet ignores details which do not matter. Simplicity can
be incorporated by
• restricting the number of variables (establishing a boundary)
• quantifying simple relationships between variables (e.g. hypothesizing linear relationships)
• limiting the amount of uncertainty
• assuming a well defined objective
• aggregating variables with common or shared characteristics
Williams [159] claims that models do not account for the systemic, holistic effects
that are present in complex projects and thus cannot reproduce the effect that the whole
is more than the sum of the parts. Wahlström [154] notes that if models can validly
represent reality, then they can be used to predict and minimize risks. However, since they
are simplifications of reality, then they are only valid under specific conditions. Therefore,
there is a danger in mis-interpreting the information because the model being used may
not be applicable to the problem being addressed.

2.3.5

Uncertainty in Project Management

Morgan and Henrion [102] observe that there may be uncertainty about uncertainty. They
note that there are types of uncertainty as well as sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty
can arise from incomplete information or from conflicting information; from linguistic imprecision or from measurements of variability; from the structure of a problem or from a
characteristic of a problem. They claim that people may be uncertain about their degree
of uncertainty. Typically, probability is used as a measure of uncertainty. In the project
context, uncertainty is captured under the umbrella of risk management.
Risk Management
In some sense, one could argue that risk management is the closest thing that exists to a
contingency allocation strategy. Morris and Hough [103] claimed that dealing with uncertainty is the essence of project management and that a successful project could be defined
as one that successfully managed risk. According to Frank T. Anbari (Project ManagerTechnical Systems for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation of Amtrak) [81]:
“By definition, projects are risky endeavors. They aim to create new and unique
products, services and processes that did not exist in the past. Therefore, careful management of project risk is imperative to repeatable success. Quantitative
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methods play an important role in risk management. There is no substitute for
profound knowledge of these tools.”
Risk analysis consists of estimating the probability distribution of each factor that
could impact a decision and then simulating possible combinations to determine a range of
outcomes to which probabilities can be assigned [62]. Therefore, risk analysis methodologies
are approaches which explicitly incorporate the ignorance and lack of certainty of the
planners [82]. The broader realm of risk management incorporates the risk analysis results
in a set of decisions or a strategy that defines an organization’s response to individual
risks. This response can span the range of ‘ignore’ to ‘eliminate’. In between these two
extremes are a number of options by which the impact of identified risks can be reduced
[7, 8, 24, 25, 100, 108, 110, 113, 123, 148, 159, 165].
Typically, the initial contingency reserve for a project is determined via a project risk
analysis [159]. This analysis incorporates uncertainty associated with the confidence one
has in the estimate as well as uncertainty associated with the future. Saaty [132] notes that
risk analysis in not analogous to a game of chance but rather it is a complex real-world
setting that can be managed with intelligence, creativity and prior planning. He claims
that these are the aspects that must be emphasized, not the mathematical estimation of
the probabilities of things that can go wrong.
The Challenge of Probability Assignments
Decision trees are customarily used to capture uncertainty. A decision tree is a chronological
ordering of choices (or decisions or events) and each combination of decision and chance
event has an outcome. Each decision point (or event point) is represented by a node. The
branches that emanate from the nodes represent the different choices that can be made
at that decision node. The number of branches is dictated by the number of outcomes
possible at the event (or decision). Decision tree nodes can also represent chance events.
Each of the branches from these chance nodes are assigned probability values that represent
the likelihood of that random event resulting in that particular outcome. The sum of
the probability values assigned to the branches associated with a single node must equal
1 [62,122]. However, in many cases (such as the problem at hand), the distributions are not
known and hence and it is difficult to know what probability values should be assigned to
each branch (see [77,122,130,132,144,166]). Additionally, applying a decision tree approach
to a stochastic multi-stage decision problem results in a large decision tree with a large
number of branches, each of which requires a probability assignment. Hespos [62] states
that: “To make this approach practical, it is necessary to limit the number of branches
emanating from change event nodes to a small number.” Saaty [132] cautions that:
“We can get probabilities from our mind by pretending that we understand the
situation and by doing reasoning analogous to things we really do understand.
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Our probabilities are not determined experimentally and we lack the knowledge even to simulate them for catastrophic events that we think (or hope)
have low probability of occurrence. It is a process of self-hypnosis when we
convince ourselves and others that we have the right probabilities because they
appear to be so natural, given our sensibly sounding causal explanations. We
should be especially wary of such explanations and our proclivity to estimate
probabilities.”
Pendar [108] contends that probability theory cannot deal with important aspects of
project uncertainty and cannot explain some important aspects of observed project management practice. Some of the problems he identifies are:
1. Probability theory is based on the assumption of randomness whereas projects deal
with consciously planned human actions that are generally not random.
2. Projects are unique and this reduces the relevance and reliability of statistical aggregates derived from probability-based analysis.
3. Probability assumes future states are known and definable.
Pidd [111] highlights this dilemma in a slightly different way. He defines a risky decision
as one in which it is possible to know the probabilities of different events. An uncertain
decision is one in which these probabilities cannot be known at all. He claims that, “If we
are really unable to make any estimates of probability, then it would be more honest to make
all events equally probable.” He argues that, because the events are non-repeatable, there
is no empirical way of checking the values assigned to the probabilities and thus cautions
that models must be used and interpreted with care. Abbas [1] concurs, attributing this
observation to Laplace’s “Principle of Insufficient Reason” which says that, unless there
is information that suggests something else, we should assign equal probabilities to all
outcomes.
These concerns are validated by empirical research which has shown that people are not
very good at assigning probability values. Experimental results show that individuals are
wrong more than 10% of the time and often up to 50% of the time [84]. Machina [96] claims
that “there is extensive evidence that when individuals have to estimate probabilities, they
make systematic mistakes in doing so.”
Spetzler and Von Holstein [144] (as well as Tyversky and Kahneman [150]) describe
this difficulty in the following way:
“People seem to assess uncertainty in a manner similar to the way they assess distance. They use intuitive assessment procedures that are often based
on cues of limited reliability and validity. Generally, these procedures produce
reasonable answers. For example, an automobile driver can generally estimate
distance accurately enough to avoid accidents..... however, over-reliance on certain models creates systematic bias...it is well known that people consistently
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overestimate the distance of a remote object when visibility is poor and underestimate the distance when the sky is clear. This bias is because they rely on
the haziness of an object as a cue as to its distance.”
There is another, possibly problematic, issue associated with the interpretation of probability values. The use of explicit percentages might imply a precision (or knowledge) that
does not exist. Beyth-Marom [16] postulates that the use of numerical probabilities may
be resisted because people believe that the precise value chosen must be defended by an explicit derivation. Wallsten et al [155] note that a committee of the U.S. National Research
Council wrote (in regard to formal risk assessments) that there is an:
“important responsibility not to use numbers, which convey the impression of
precision, when the understanding of relationships is indeed less secure. Thus,
while quantitative risk assessment facilitates comparison, such comparison may
be illusory or misleading if the use of precise numbers is unjustified.”
Wallsten et al [155] suggest that a second reason for not using probability numbers is
that most people feel that they understand words better than numbers. They conducted
several experiments in which people were asked to look at a number of nonnumerical terms,
such as doubtful, probable, slight chance and very likely and then assign a probability range
to these terms. They noted that, while individuals may be internally consistent, there is
a wide variability between different individuals. In a similar exercise, Beyth-Marom [16]
asked the members of a professional forecasting organization to assign probability values
to 30 verbal expressions. Her results are consistent with those of Wallsten, showing great
variability across different individuals but good internal consistency within individuals.
She found that the 30 verbal expressions fell within 6 ranges. The results are shown in
Table 2.2. From this table, one can see that large ranges are associated with these verbal
expressions. As an example, the term ‘likely’ carries with it a probability range of 40% to
80%.
These data show that the use of verbal expressions of uncertainty is not a suitable
alternative to the use of numerical values. Beyth-Marom [16] claims that, since probabilities
are subjective, the same set of reasons causing one person to assign a value of 20% may
cause another to estimate the probability at 50%. Therefore, not only is it difficult to
assign uncertainty values, it is even difficult to name ranges of values in a consistent way.
It is not surprising, then, that quantitative methods by which to more accurately assign
probabilities to unknowns are of fundamental interest (see [77, 122, 130, 132, 144, 166]).

2.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, difficulties associated with modeling in the project management environment were discussed. The review of existing research included examples of project selection,
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Table 2.2: Probability Ranges of Verbal Expressions
Range
Expressions
I (10-35%)
-poor chance
-very low chance
-not likely
II (10-40%)
-low chance
-small chance
-doubtful
III (25-65%)
-it could be
-may
-there is a chance
-one must consider
-perhaps
-not inevitable
IV (40-80%)
-reasonable chance
-one should assume
-it seems to me
-non-negligible
-it seems
-likely
-reasonable to assume
-one can expect
-possible
V (70-90%)
-close to certain
-high chance
VI (70-100%) -certain
-very high chance
-nearly certain
-most likely
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project scheduling and project utility models. Even though there are no known models
that evaluate contingency allocation, these are the types of models that address (or could
address) project management problems. Justification and community support for the use
of management science models in project management has been provided and concerns
associated with probability and distribution assignments were articulated.
Attributes of successful models were identified in order that a method by which to
evaluate the merit of the work in this thesis can be provided. The characteristics most
relevant to the research in the next two chapters are shown below and the models that are
proposed satisfy these criteria. The desired model must:
1. address a real problem
2. be understood by the Project Managers
3. not require information that is not available
4. minimize requirement for probability assignments
5. provide a reasonable solution in a reasonable time
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Chapter 3

Chapter 1: A Short-Term
Contingency Allocation Stochastic
Programming Model
Uncertainty models, using either decision trees or scenario-based approaches, frequently
offer a large number of solutions, all of which are optimal for a particular future state. The
‘time now’ decision remains unanswered [92,93,125]. In this chapter, a linear utility model
based on stochastic optimization that offers a single, ‘here-and-now’ solution, optimal over
all future states, is introduced.

3.1

Introduction

A stochastic linear model is a model in which the parameters (coefficients and right hand
sides) are unknown. In some applications, these uncertain parameters are described by
a known distribution; in other cases, the distributions are unknown. In a scenario-based
stochastic optimization model, uncertainty is captured by distinct scenarios and the set
of all the individual scenarios is intended to represent the future. The solution responds
to the presence of uncertainty by seeking an ‘average’ solution that optimizes an expected
value objective and that may not be optimal under any given scenario. This approach assumes that the expectation can be determined and that the error associated with replacing
the random variables by their expected values is not large. If the error is large, then a
solution that is optimal in an average sense could be catastrophic from an implementation
standpoint [17, 32].
The sequential decision-making aspect of these stochastic programs results in multistage
problems that can be solved by decomposition approaches in which the original problem
is separated into a series of small problems (one for each stage). The solution from one
period is forwarded to the next period and a parameter from the next period (such as
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price) is sent back to the previous period. The decision maker makes a decision ‘hereand-now’. After some random events occur, the decision maker makes another decision
(‘wait-and-see’). The set of ‘wait-and-see’ solutions becomes the long range plan [32, 136].
The first stage decisions (‘here-and-now’) are determined based upon known (non-random)
information. The general multi-stage case, using a reduction of the problem to an equivalent
deterministic linear program almost always, even for three stages, becomes intractable [18,
32, 40, 69, 136].
The general form of a stochastic two-stage problem is
max cx + Eω [Q(y, ω)]
x

(3.1)

Subject to:
Ax = b

(3.2)

x≥0

(3.3)

where
Q(y, ω) = max c(ω)y

(3.4)

y

Subject to:
V (ω)x + W (ω)y = h(ω)

(3.5)

y≥0

(3.6)

where ω represents the random events of the second stage. The ‘here-and-now’ decision
is x; the ‘wait-and-see’ decision is y. In the multi-stage case (e.g. t stages), there is a yt
decision and a ωt event for each stage t. In the contingency allocation model presented in
this chapter, the random variables are bundled into scenarios ω̃ t , there is no deterministic
decision in the first stage and the decision variables are specific to a particular period and
to a particular contingency request.
In order for the reader to understand the model, an introduction to specific terminology
as it relates to a project baseline is required. Since the model being proposed was applied to
a Department of Energy (DOE) project, terminology as it relates to this specific application
is also explained. The random variables and decision variables are discussed and the
generalized uncertainty model is presented. This discussion is followed by a description of
the detailed model and definition of the model’s constraints. The model’s optimal decision
strategy is analyzed against actual data. A range of optimal solutions that represent the
difference between adaptive and nonadaptive decision policies are evaluated.

3.1.1

Contingency Requests

At project conception, an original baseline estimate and schedule is created, founded primarily on experiences from comparable projects and research results to date. This estimate
is evaluated in terms of its uncertainty and a contingency value is assigned commensurate
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Figure 3.1: Contingency Flow Diagram
with the degree to which the technology has already been developed and tested. The baseline estimate is referred to as the Budget at Completion (BAC). In DOE terminology, the
sum of the BAC and the estimated contingency reserve is known as the Total Project Cost
(TPC). The TPC value becomes the Congressional authorization amount if the DOE and
the U.S. Government approve the project. Once approved, this total is nearly inviolate
and subsequent requests for increases could threaten the project’s existence. When the
original baseline estimate is insufficient, the difference between the original estimate and
the current estimate is covered by a draw against the contingency reserve. Within the
DOE community, the rate of contingency use, relative to the work remaining, is a measure
of project performance.
Typically, contingency is allocated to individual requests via a formal ‘change control’
procedure. This process begins with a request that details the reason the contingency
is desired and quantifies the dollar amount required. Once vetted through an approval
process, the request is accepted and the unallocated contingency reserve is decreased by
this amount. Since this request represents work that was not in the baseline (or that was
in the baseline at an under-stated value), approval of the request adds additional work
to the project and thus increases the project’s BAC. This flow is graphically described in
Figure 3.1. Notice that the remaining work is timephased. Since few projects (both public
and private sector) are fully funded at inception, one must be able to forecast the funding
required for each period. In the DOE community, this periodicity is annually.
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3.1.2

The Contingency Allocation Problem

In a deterministic world, the requests for contingency that will arrive in period t are
known. Suppose that n different requests for contingency are received at time t. The
project manager’s objective in period t is to approve those requests that have (or result
in) the greatest benefit to the organization. Approved contingency requests deplete the
contingency reserve and each decision is irreversible. Those requests that are not approved
join the pool of future requests. This problem then, can be modeled as a standard multiperiod integer ‘knapsack’ problem in which, for each period, the capacity of the knapsack
is defined as the amount of contingency reserve available and those contingency requests
with the greatest benefit are selected until there is no remaining capacity [167].
This deterministic assumption, however, is not valid. The requests for contingency that
will arrive at period t are not known in period t − 1 (or in any prior period). Additionally, the decisions made in the current period are influenced by the decisions made in all
prior periods. Hence, this is similar to problems that evaluate investment alternatives for
inclusion in an optimal portfolio.

3.1.3

Earned Value Management Terminology

Earned value management (EVM) is the process in which a project is analyzed in terms of
its performance data. The project plan is compared with what was accomplished, relative
to what was actually spent. One outcome of this process is the Estimate at Completion
(EAC) which utilizes monthly project performance data as a means by which to forecast
the end state of the project and answers the question: “In the end, how much will my
project cost based on how well it is performing right now?”(see [29, 49, 106, 113, 170]). The
difference between the EAC and the BAC is the amount of contingency that will need to
be allocated if the current trend continues. Therefore, the EAC is the result of a forecasted
contingency allocation. However, it provides only a single number, not a time-phased
allocation. The general form for the EAC is as follows:
EAC = ACW P +

BAC − BCW P
index

(3.7)

where ACWP (Actual Cost of Work Performed) and BCWP (Budgeted Cost of Work
Performed) represent cumulative actual cost and work performed values to date. BCWP is
calculated by evaluating what work has been done and then translating that into a dollar
value. In general, this is done by multiplying the percent complete of an activity by the
value of that activity.
The BAC is comprised of incremental values for each month. These incremental values
are referred to as the BCWS (Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled) and the sum of the
incremental BCWS values over the life of the project equals the BAC. ACWP, BCWP and
BCWS can represent either cumulative or incremental values, depending on the context; in

35

Table 3.1: Abbreviations Used in this Chapter
Abbreviation Description
ACWP
Actual Cost of Work Performed
BAC
Budget at Completion
BCWS
Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled
BCWP
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed
CPI
Cost Performance Index
DOE
Department of Energy
EAC
Estimate at Completion
ETC
Estimate to Completion
EVM
Earned Value Management
SPI
Schedule Performance Index
TPC
Total Project Cost
Equation 3.7, cumulative values are utilized. A complete explanation of these (and other
project management terms) can be found in The PMBOK Guide published by the Project
Management Institute [113] and Table 3.1 provides a consolidated list of those used in this
chapter.
There are at least 11 generally accepted ways of calculating the index term in the
denominator of Equation 3.7 but they all utilize normalized values of the project’s cost
and schedule variances [106]. The cost performance index (CPI) is calculated as
BCW P
ACW P
and the schedule performance index (SPI) as
CP I =

SP I =

BCW P
BCW S

(3.8)

(3.9)

A CPI (Equation 3.8) or SPI (Equation 3.9) less than 1 suggests poor performance.
As an example, a CPI less than 1 will occur when the work that has been accomplished
has a value that is less than the amount of money that was spent. Indexes equal to 1
indicate perfect performance and suggest the situation where BAC = EAC and indexes
greater than 1 indicate superior performance. These indexes can represent cumulative or
incremental (monthly) values depending on whether cumulative or incremental values of
ACWP, BCWP and BCWS values are utilized. One can see that if these indexes (Equations 3.8 and 3.9) are less than 1, then the EAC (as forecasted by Equation 3.7) will be
greater than the BAC and a demand for contingency is likely if the trend does not change.
Since the EAC calculation in Equation 3.7 is dependent on the stability of the performance indexes, it is not a good indicator of the final project cost if the project’s performance
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is highly variable [88, 147, 170]. Therefore, other methods which combine this performance
information with data from other project management systems, such as the change control
and risk management systems, are also used. Change management focuses on the adverse
effects of scope creep, increased costs and delayed schedules. As risks are realized, changes
occur which can result in requests for contingency. These changes also give rise to a new
suite of additional, albeit different, risks [81, 147]. However, independent of the way in
which the EAC is calculated, not only is its accuracy questioned (see [29, 44]), it does not
answer the particular question being asked here. The EAC provides an estimate of what
the project will cost once it is completed. While it provides an estimate of how much
contingency will need to be allocated by the time the project is finished, it does not offer
any guidance as to what a manager should do now.
The contingency reserve is a limited resource that, once allocated, cannot be recovered
without difficulty. Allocation of this contingency to the ‘right’ requests is of paramount
importance; allocation of contingency to the ‘wrong’ requests could jeopardize the success
of the project. Therefore, the project manager would like to know what contingency dollars
might be required in each future period and, given that information, determine a feasible
allocation plan that maximizes the benefit gained from these allocations. In essence, what
is desired is a time-phased EAC, from which an optimal contingency allocation strategy
can be determined.

3.2

Uncertainty Model

A contingency allocation plan must provide optimal decisions for each time period t in
the T period planning horizon. Therefore, the decisions and the random parameters that
describe the uncertain future are distinct for each period t where t = 1, 2, . . . , T . These
random variables are characterized into two classes. The first class (the primary random
variables) represents the multiple attributes of future contingency requests. The second
class (the secondary random variables) represents the project state as described by the
EVM attributes of ACWP, BCWP and BCWS introduced earlier, as well as the dollar
value of financial commitments on hand at the end of each period. Random variables are
denoted with a tilde in which a random variable that takes the value r is distinguished as
r̃.
Primary Random Variables
Each contingency request in a particular period t can be described by a priority and an
amount. The total number of contingency requests received in each period t is dependent
on both the priority and the period.
• Priority

37

All requests for contingency do not have the same urgency or importance. Three priority levels are utilized to distinguish between ‘essential’ (1), ‘moderately important’
(2) and ‘nice to have’ (3) requests. Typically, the managerial policy is to prohibit
‘lower’ priority requests from being funded before all ‘higher level’ requests have been
addressed within a given period of time. These priority assignments could reflect the
request’s contribution to the project’s utility.
• Amount
All contingency requests are not for the same dollar amount. Let α̃i t denote the dollars requested in period t by a priority i request where i = 1, 2, 3 and t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
Typically, all requests of the same priority, for a fixed period t, have (roughly) the
same magnitude. Additionally, since requests for contingency are generally not returns to the contingency reserve, α̃i t > 0.
• Number of requests
The number (or count) of different priority requests received in each period t is also
t
random. Let f˜i , where i = 1, 2, 3, indicate, for a particular period t, the maximum
number of priority 1, 2 and 3 requests that will be received. Due to the evolutionary
t
nature of a project, the distribution of f˜i is dependent on the length of the planning
horizon, the state of the project at time t = 0 (that is, how much progress has been
made on the project thus far) and historical data regarding the number of contingency
requests that arrive in each period. That is, the arrival of contingency requests in
period t is temporally related to the number that have arrived in prior periods.
These prior periods could be prior to t = 1, the start of the planning problem (they
are historical data). In practice, when a project is just beginning, there is a high
degree of uncertainty and one can expect the number of contingency requests that
arrive in each subsequent period to be nondecreasing over time. Consider this period
of design and uncertainty as Phase 1. Uncertainty is reduced by the finalization
of design activities, award of contracts for equipment and physical progress on the
project. As the uncertainty diminishes, one will observe that the arrival frequency of
requests tends to assume a nonincreasing profile. Denote this second period as Phase
t
2. If the planning horizon includes periods in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, then f˜i
is comprised of both types of distributions, a nondecreasing distribution in Phase 1
and a nonincreasing distribution in Phase 2.
The collection of primary random variables is denoted by PRV, where, for a T period
planning horizon,
n
o
t
P RV = α̃i t , f˜i
for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T and i = 1, 2, 3.
(3.10)
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Thus, a given contingency request is identified by the triple (t, i, j) where t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
i = 1, 2, 3, and j = 1, 2, . . . , f˜it and the dollar request associated with this triple is α̃it , fixed
for any j.
Contingency requests also possess the following properties, based upon typical project
experience.
Property (P1) Expiration Date
Requests are not perishable and have no ‘expiration date’. That is, a request can
be funded at any point in the future at its originally requested value without any
inflationary effects, even if the request lingers for some time in the system. In certain
cases, this assumption may not be entirely valid since some contingency requests
must be funded immediately (e.g. hurricane damage requires immediate repair) and
some requests have a finite opportunity window (e.g. options on existing contracts
may expire).
Property (P2) Lifetime
The contingency requests that are approved at time t are assumed to be realized in
the project’s baseline (the BCWS profile) at time t + t for a fixed and known offset
t > 0. Once a request is approved, there is some amount of time (t) that passes
before this new approved work is accomplished and actual costs for it are incurred.
As mentioned with Figure 3.1, this distinction is important for projects that are not
fully funded at inception since the decision to approve a contingency request must
consider the amount of funding that is available until the next increment of funding
is received.
Property (P3) Independence
Each contingency request is the result of an event. These events are related to
deliberate design changes, errors in the original estimate and/or ‘Acts of God’ that
could not have been anticipated. With the exception of systematic errors in all
estimates, these events are independent and the requests that arise from these events
are independent. As an example, assume a design change has been made that requires
contingency. The contingency request will include all costs for all activities impacted
by this design change. Typically, there will be no other requests that occur because
this design change has occurred. Similarly, the submission of a contingency request
to address hurricane damage is not dependent on any prior request for hurricane
t
t
repair activities. Hence, the pair (α̃i t , f˜i ) is independent of the j th pair (α̃i t , f˜j )
t
for j 6= i, i, j = 1, 2, 3. However, no assumptions are made with regard to (α˜it , f˜i )
t+1
being independent of (α̃i t+1 , f˜i ) and, indeed, as per the previous discussion of the
t+1
t
frequency distribution, f˜i
may be dependent on f˜i .
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Secondary Random Variables
The secondary random variables define the project state at some time period t, t =
1, 2, . . . , T . The project state is described by the following components.
• Actual Total Costs (Ãt )
The actual total costs (ACW P ) incurred in period t for the work that was accomplished in period t is denoted by the univariate random variable Ãt , t = 1, 2 . . . , T .
• Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (P˜t )
The univariate random variable P˜t is the dollar value of the work that was performed in period t. The relationship between the work done (BCWP) and the work
planned (BCWS) indicates how well the project is doing in terms of its schedule.
The relationship between BCWP and the actual cost of work performed (ACWP) is
a measure of a project’s cost efficiency. If Ãt > P˜t , then the value of the work (in
terms of its earned value) is less than the amount of money spent to accomplish it.
Hence, if Ãt > P˜t and if project cost accounting is performed using P˜t instead of
Ãt , it would underestimate the extent to which funding has already been consumed
(by actual total costs) and provide an unrealistic allocation strategy. Therefore, in
order to determine a realistic and conservative allocation strategy, Ãt replaces P̃ t to
represent the work that was performed in period t, t = 1, 2 . . . , T .
The univariate random variable C̃ t represents the dollar value of the financial commitments that exist at the end of period t, t = 1, 2 . . . , T . Financial obligations (or
commitments) represent outstanding contractual commitments to vendors. As such,
they obligate (or tie up) funds. The commitments represent work that will occur
sometime in the future. As an example, if the project had to buy several pieces of
equipment, those items do not appear instantaneously. The commitment is initiated
when the contract or purchase order is awarded to the vendor. At some time in the
future (in the project’s BCWS), these items are planned to be received.
Ãt and C̃ t are temporally dependent. A purchase order or contract for services is either
in Ãt or in C̃ t but not in both. As an example, suppose C̃ t includes a particular commitment for an item valued at δ and suppose that that item is received in period t. Then, the
actual costs in period t, At , will be increased by δ and the dollar value of commitments on
hand at the end of period t will be decreased by δ.
n
o
Thus, the set of secondary random variables, SRV, is Ãt , C̃ t for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
The collection of random parameters over the decision horizon of T periods is denoted
by ω̃ where
n
o
(3.11)
ω̃ = α̃1t , α̃2t , α̃3t , f˜1t , f˜2t , f˜3t , Ãt , C̃ t : t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
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If a segment of ω̃ at period t is described by ζ̃ t , then, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
n
o
ζ̃ t = α̃1t , . . . , C̃ t
n
o
ω̃ = ζ̃ 1 , . . . , ζ̃ T

(3.13)

ζ̃ t ∈ <8 and ω̃ ∈ <8T

(3.14)

(3.12)

n
o
where a t period evolution of random variables is described as ω̃ t = ζ̃ 1 , . . . , ζ̃ t and that
for T periods is denoted by ω̃ T ≡ ω̃.
Since some of the random variables are temporally dependent, ζ t and ζ t+1 are not
independent. Property (P3) addressed the temporal dependence of f˜it . Additionally, the
actual costs (Ãt+1 ) and commitments (C̃ t+1 ) in period t + 1 are dependent on the project
plan as well as what actually occurred in period t, that is, Ãt and C̃ t .
The random vector ω̃ t , for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , belongs to the conditional probability space
described by (Ωt (ω̃ t−1 ), Qt (ω̃ t−1 ), F t (ω̃ t−1 )). Ωt is set of subsets of events in Qt and F t is
the distribution function, given ω̃ t−1 . The domain of ζ̃ t is Ξt and the domain of all possible
realizations of ω̃ t up to time t is Qt , which is the joint domain of ζ˜1 , ζ˜2 , . . . , ζ˜t . Note that
the segment ζ t is conditional on ζ t−1 and hence, its conditional distribution can be denoted
by f (ζ t |ζ t−1 , ζ t−2 , . . . , ζ 1 ).

3.3
3.3.1

Contingency Allocation Model (CA Model)
Decision Strategy

A given contingency request, which is the triple (t, i, j), is either funded or not funded in
t as
the current time period t. This allocation decision is denoted by the binary variable zij
follows:

1 if request (t, i, j) is approved
t
zij
=
(3.15)
0 otherwise.
t depends on the t observed realizations (ζ 1 , ζ 2 , . . . , ζ t )
However, notice that the decision zij
thus far and must account for the uncertainties of contingency requests of the future. This
t ≡ z t (ζ 1 , ζ 2 , . . . , ζ t ) and it is not adapted to
allocation decision is non-anticipative, i.e.,zij
ij
any specific set of realizations of the future, (ζ t+1 , ζ t+2 , . . . , ζ T ). Accordingly, the total
contingency dollars approved in period t under historical scenario ω̃ t can be described as
t

t

t

x (ω̃ ) =

t

3 fX
i (ω̃ )
X
i=1 j=1
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t
αit (ω̃ t )zij
(ω̃ t )

(3.16)

and the total contingency dollars allocated through time t along a t-period scenario ω̃ t is
t

t

R (ω̃ ) =

t
X

xτ (ω̃ τ ).

(3.17)

τ =1

Thus, Rt (ω̃ t ) is a random variable.
The allocation decisions xt at time t must satisfy certain budget and policy constraints
period-by-period. Furthermore, the funding approval decision z t must satisfy priority and
other considerations. These constraints define the dynamical aspects of the decisions and
they can be generically represented as the following system of constraints at period t.

U t xt (ω̃ t ) = ht (ζ̃ t ) − V t xt−1 (ω̃ t−1 )


t t t t
t
t
t−1 t
t
t t−1
≡A
G (ω̃ )z (ω̃ ) = g(ω̃ ), ω̃ ≡ (ω̃ , ζ̃ ), ζ̃ ∈ Ξ (ω̃ )


t
t
x ≥ 0, zij binary
where Ξt (ω̃ t−1 ) is the conditional probability domain of ζ̃ t . Note the dynamic nature of
the decisions, xt and z t , which depend on the decisions xt−1 at period t − 1 as well as the
current random variable ζ̃ t .
In a perfect world, there is sufficient contingency to approve all contingency requests.
In the real world, the best one can hope to do is to approve the largest possible number
of the ‘right’ requests. That is, given a fixed contingency reserve, one wants to allocate as
much contingency as possible, given that the requests to which this contingency is being
assigned are the ‘right’ ones. Therefore, the objective of the contingency allocation problem
is to maximize the total contingency allocation, given certain conditions specified by the
constraint set and, under the risk-neutral decision making criterion, this can be written as


Ψt (ω̃ t−1 ) = max Eζ˜t |ω̃t−1 xt (ω̃ t ) + Ψt+1 (ω̃ t )
xt , z t

Subject to: A

(3.18)
(3.19)

where Eζ˜t |ω̃t−1 [·] represents the mathematical expectation over ζ˜t , given ω̃ t−1 . This model
is a multi-period stochastic linear programming model. Such models have been vastly
addressed in literature. As an example, there are many practical applications, such as
fleet planning for airlines or building of power stations and transmission of utilities, in
which a schedule of future capacities (or demands) is required now. In many of these
cases, it takes a long time and a substantial outlay of resources before one is able to
meet these future demands (or capacities). If one waits until the requirements are known
for certain, then customers will have to wait a long time for their demands to be met.
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Other applications include asset allocation in financial planning of investment portfolios
and production problems with random cost coefficients [4,32,33,39,40,43,89]. Measurability
of the optimal value functions and the solution procedures can be found in literature (see,
for example [78, 130, 134, 168]).
The complete, T -period formulation is called the CA Model and is written as


CA Model: Ψ1 = max Eω̃ RT (ω̃ T )

(3.20)

xt , z t

Subject to:
U t xt (ω̃ t ) = ht (ζ̃ t ) − V t xt−1 (ω̃ t−1 )
t

t

t

t

t

t

t
zij

binary, t = 1, 2, . . . , T

G (ω̃ )z (ω̃ ) = g(ω̃ ), ω̃ ≡ (ω̃
t

x ≥ 0,

t−1

(3.21)
t

t

t

, ζ ) ζ ∈ Ξ (ω̃

t−1

)

(3.22)
(3.23)

This CA Model (3.20-3.23) yields an adaptive allocation strategy, adapted to the information process (i.e. realizations of the contingency request arrival process). This adaptive
process does not specify, at the outset, what allocations would be made in the future.
Project managers are challenged with determining an optimal decision strategy (without
the advantage of hindsight) that is comprised of individual contingency allocation decisions
in each period. At period t=0 (now), the manager must have an allocation strategy for
all future periods. Therefore, this is a planning problem requiring a nonadaptive decision policy. Nonadaptive decision policies, however, can be too restrictive given the future
uncertainty, unless the quality of such a policy is established.
The time phased contingency allocation strategy delivered serves as the framework in
which the actual contingency allocation decisions are made and provides insight into how
the contingency budget depletes over time. This is not intended to be an operational
solution and, when operational conditions deviate significantly from those in the model,
the model can be re-run with updated information (i.e. a rolling-horizon implementation).
One desires a ‘here-and-now’ aggregated policy y t that hedges against all of the uncertain
futures. Such problems have been addressed under policy aggregation to preserve nonanticipativity in dynamic decision making under uncertainty [39,125] and these types of planning
decision strategies commonly occur in other applications [40, 52, 70]. These decision rules
fall into the heavily researched category of zero-order or ∆0 rules [27,28,40,51,89,109]. The
selection of the ∆0 rule reduces the computational complexity by allowing the multi-stage
problem to be collapsed to a single stage problem. Accordingly, this model will search for a
∆0 policy that maximizes the contingency allocation and satisfies the future, in an average
sense, at time t = 0.
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3.3.2

Model Under ∆0 -Policy

The objective here is to establish a feasible ∆0 -policy that is derived as the expectation of
an adaptive policy of the stochastic program. Therefore, the ∆0 -policy is set such that


y t = EQt xt (ω̃ t )
(3.24)
where Qt is the domain of ω̃ t . The ∆0 -policy must be feasible in the decision problem
under all events in the future, i.e.
U t y t = ht (ζ̃ t ) − V t y t−1 ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T
Moreover, since Rt (ω̃ t ) =

t
X

(3.25)

xτ (ω̃ τ ), taking the expectation on both sides yields

τ =1

E

Qτ

t
 t t t  X
R (x (ω̃) ) =
EQτ [xτ (ω̃ τ )]

(3.26)

τ =1

=

t
X

yτ

(3.27)

τ =1

The pure ∆0 model (that is, a model that seeks maximization of the contingency
allocation only from the ∆0 -policy) can be described by
∆0
t
0
D0 Model: Ψ∆
t = max y + Ψt+1

(3.28)

xt , z t

Subject to:


y t − EQt xt (ω̃)t ) = 0
t t

t

t

(3.29)

t t−1

U y = h (ζ̃ ) − V y
t t

t

t

t

t t−1

U x (ω̃ ) = h (ζ̃ ) − V x

(3.30)

)
Gt (ω̃ t )z t (ω̃ t ) = g(ω̃ t ), ω̃ t ∈ Qt , ζ˜t ∈ Ξt
t

x ≥ 0,

and Ψ1∆0 equals
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t
zij

(ω̃

t−1

binary, t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(3.31)
(3.32)
(3.33)

0
Ψ∆
1 = max

xt , z t

T
X

yt

(3.34)

t=1

Subject to:


y t − EQt xt (ω̃)t ) = 0
t t

t

t

(3.35)

t t−1

U y = h (ζ̃ ) − V y
t t

t

t

t

t t−1

U x (ω̃ ) = h (ζ̃ ) − V x

(3.36)

)
Gt (ω̃ t )z t (ω̃ t ) = g(ω̃ t ), ω̃ t ∈ Qt , ζ˜t ∈ Ξt
t

x ≥ 0,

t
zij

(ω̃

t−1

binary, t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(3.37)
(3.38)
(3.39)

Note that, under the D0 Model, y t is required to be feasible under all realizations of
0
ω̃ t . Then, Ψ1 ≥ Ψ∆
1 due to the reduced feasible region that resulted from the inclusion of
Constraint 3.36. Additionally, if xt is feasible in the pure D0 Model, then it is feasible in
0
the CA Model with the same objective function value such that Ψ1 = Ψ∆
1 .
The operational penalties associated with over-allocation of contingency are severe.
These decisions are irreversible and, once contingency is allocated, it cannot be recovered.
If a high priority request is received and cannot be approved (because lower priority requests
were approved in prior periods), the manager may be forced to implement staff or scopereducing measures to permit the request to be approved. Therefore, the project manager
t (ω̃ t )’s)
may prefer a solution feasible under all futures over a detailed solution (that is, the zij
t
that is feasible only in one particular future (historical scenario ω̃ ) or an average solution y t
which may not be feasible on any individual realized scenario. Conversely, recall that there
is a penalty associated with under-allocation of contingency. Hence, the project manager
may wish to ensure that all contingency is allocated and, under the ∆0 Model, contingency
might be left on the table at the end of the project. The particular conditions of different
projects and the inclinations of different project managers will lead to different preferences
in this regard. Some may wish to reserve some contingency, others may allocate as much as
possible. Therefore, an optimal, implementable plan is one that can achieve both desires.
The trade-off between the CA and D0 Models can be evaluated by modifying the
objective function of the
to include a penalty term that is defined as the difference
 D0 Model

between y t and EQt xt (ω̃)t ) , generating the Trade-Off (TO) Model. This formulation


ensures that y t does not get too far away from the expected value solution EQt xt (ω̃)t )
while at the same time, maximizes the amount of contingency that can be allocated in each
period t. This formulation can be written as:
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TO Model: Ψλ1 = max
xt , z t

T
X





EQt xt (ω̃ t ) − λ y t − EQt xt (ω̃ t )

(3.40)

t=1

Subject to:
U t y t = ht (ζ̃ t ) − V t y t−1

(3.41)

U t xt (ω̃ t ) = ht (ζ̃ t ) − V t xt−1 (ω̃ t−1 )
Gt (ω̃ t )z t (ω̃ t ) = g(ω̃ t ), ω̃ t ∈ Qt , ζ˜t ∈ Ξt

(3.42)

t

x ≥ 0,

t
zij

binary, t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(3.43)
(3.44)

Here, λ is a non-negative scalar assigned by the decision maker. When λ = 0, the
optimal solution to the TO Model equals that of the CA Model (since the penalty term
has no impact on the solution). When λ = ∞, the optimal solution to the TO Model
equals that of the D0 Model (since y t − EQt xt (ω̃)t ) → 0). Hence, if Ψλ1 is the objective
function value of the TO Model, then
λ
0
Ψ∆
1 ≤ Ψ1 ≤ Ψ1

(3.45)

and the magnitude of the difference between these solutions is a measure of the conservatism of the ∆0 policy. The range of solutions of the Trade-Off policy represents the
difference in objective function values between adaptive and nonadaptive policies. During
implementation, the project manager can chose the value of λ most appropriate to his or
her project. In a sense, λ can be viewed as a ‘pessimism coefficient’. When one has a high
degree of confidence in the scenarios used to represent the uncertain future, λ can be low.
However, when the decision maker is not convinced that the future has been adequately
portrayed by the scenarios, λ can be high.

3.3.3

Constraints

In this section, the specific constraints used in the model are detailed. These were represented, generically, in the above formulations. In all cases, they are developed here with
respect to a single period t.
• Zero-One Decisions
As per Equation 3.15, a request for contingency cannot be partially funded.
• Prioritization Rule
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An optimal decision policy ensures that requests are approved in an order consistent
with their priority. In the models thus far, this requirement has been represented
by its generalized form of Gt (ω̃ t )z t (ω̃ t ) = g(ω̃ t ). This prioritization rule allows a
priority 2 request to be approved only if there are no ‘unapproved’ priority 1 requests
in the system at time t. Thus, for a single period t, the following prioritization rule
is employed.
t
t
t
z1m
(ω̃ t ) ≥ z2n
(ω̃ t ) ≥ z3o
(ω̃ t ), for all m ≤ f˜1t (ω̃ t ), n ≤ f˜2t (ω̃ t ), o ≤ f˜3t (ω̃ t )

(3.46)

• Annual Budget Constraint
Approval of contingency requests cannot result in the situation in which the cost
of the work that remains to be accomplished before the next increment of funding
arrives exceeds the amount of funding that is available.
Within DOE, project authorization does not mean that the project receives full
funding (all the cash it is authorized) on day one. The appropriation of funding by
the government occurs annually at set amounts that, over the project’s duration,
equal the total authorized. Funding arrives in fiscal year increments; each year is
comprised of 12 periods (months). The work in each year is limited by the cash
available in that year; the project cannot obligate amounts greater than the cash
(funding) balance available. Therefore, at all times, the project must ensure that the
funding available at the end of period t is sufficient to cover the work remaining for
the rest of the current fiscal year (that is until the next installment arrives) plus an
estimated value of financial obligations at the end of the year.
The annual budget constraint requires the results from several other calculations; one
that evaluates the amount of funding available, one that calculates the amount of
work remaining on the project and one that calculates the amount of work remaining
in the current fiscal year. These equations are described first and then the annual
budget constraint is presented.
– Funding
If D0 denotes the amount of cash (funding) on hand at time t = 0, (the initial
conditions of the model) then the amount of funding that has not been consumed
(via actual costs) or obligated (via commitments) at the end of period t can be
represented by Dt (ω̃ t ) as follows:
t

t

0

D (ω̃ ) = D −

t
X
j=1
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Ãj (ω̃ t ) − C̃ t (ω̃ t ).

(3.47)

Additionally, the amount of funding that is available at the end of any period t
cannot be negative and hence,
Dt (ω̃ t ) ≥ 0.

(3.48)

– Total Remaining Work
When a request for contingency is approved, dollars move from unallocated contingency to the baseline. Both the work remaining (W) and the project baseline
(BAC) increase by the amount of the approved request (Figure 3.1). Let BAC 0
represent the BAC at time t = 0. Denote the value of the work accomplished
in period t as Ãt (ω̃ t ) (remembering that it is assumed that P̃ t (ω̃ t ) = Ãt (ω̃ t )).
Then the work remaining at the end of period t can be represented as

t

t

0

W (ω̃ ) = BAC +

t
X

j

t

x (ω̃ ) −

j=1

t
X

Ãj (ω̃ t )

(3.49)

j=1

where xj (ω̃ t ) represents the total dollar value of contingency requests approved
in period j (Equation 3.17).
– Remaining Work in the Fiscal Year
Equation 3.49 calculates the total remaining work for the entire project. However, due to the annual funding situation, the amount of work that is remaining
in a particular fiscal year must be determined. Suppose the current period is
t and the current fiscal year (which includes t) ends in period v. The last period in the scenario set is period T where T > v; that is, the time span of the
scenario set crosses the fiscal year. For the sake of convenience, assume that
we are dealing only with two fiscal years. Let v represent the last period in the
first fiscal year and T represent the last period in the second fiscal year. Then
the periods in Fiscal Year 1 (F Y 1) can be represented by F Y 1 = (1, 2, . . . , v)
and the periods in Fiscal Year 2 (F Y 2) by F Y 2 = (v + 1, v + 2, . . . , T ). The
incremental BCWS values (see Section 3.1.3) of the original project plan are
known at period t = 0. Recall that the sum of all BCWS values (over the life
of the project) equals the project’s BAC. Therefore, the work remaining from
the end of period t to the end of F Y 1 (if there are no approved contingency
requests) is calculated by:
v

K =

v
X
j=t+1
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BCW S j

(3.50)

. However, in this calculation, one must also include approved requests for
contingency. Due to the assumption that approved contingency requests will
occur some fixed t̄ periods after their approval date (see Section 3.2), one can
modify Equation 3.50 as follows:

v
v−t̄

X
X

j


BCW S +
xj (ω̃ t ) if t ≥ v − t̄


j=t+1
j=1
K v (ω̃ t ) =
(3.51)
v
t

X
X



BCW S j +
xj (ω̃ t ) if t < v − t̄


j=t+1

j=1

As per Equation 3.51, denote the remaining work at the end of period t through
the end of the current fiscal year as K v (ω̃ t ). The remaining funding at the
end of period t was described in Equation 3.47 as Dt (ω̃ t ). Denote the amount
of outstanding commitments at the end of period v as C̃ v (ω̃ t ) and finally, the
annual funding constraints (for a project spanning 2 fiscal years) are described
by:
Dt (ω̃ t ) + C̃ t (ω̃ t ) − K v (ω̃ t ) − C̃ v (ω̃ t ) ≥ 0 for FY1

(3.52)

DT (ω̃ t ) ≥ 0 for FY2.

(3.53)

and

Notice that the commitments at the end of period t, C̃ t (ω̃ t ) have been replaced
in Equation 3.52 by the anticipated commitments at the end of the current year
(period v). The only commitments that matter in these constraints are those
that are on hand at the end of the fiscal years (periods v and T ); commitments
that occur during intermediate periods, e.g. between t and v and between v + 1
and T , have no direct impact on these year-end funding calculations. Since the
end of the second fiscal year is period T , there should be no remaining work
and thus, for only this year-end period T , the annual funding constraint and the
current period funding constraint (Equation 3.48) are the same.
• Unallocated Contingency Balance
DOE policy requires that the available contingency (contingency dollars not yet allocated) does not fall below 20% of the value of the work still to be completed (less
the amount of commitments on hand). In this particular model, awarded contracts
(commitments) are counted as completed work and are therefore deducted from the
remaining work.
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Let M 0 be the amount of unallocated contingency on hand at period t = 0. As
contingency requests are approved, this reserve is depleted. Therefore, the amount
of unallocated contingency on hand at the end of period t is
M t (ω̃ t ) = M 0 −

t
X

xj (ω̃ t ).

(3.54)

j=1

Let M t−1 (ω̃ t ) represent the amount of unallocated contingency available at the beginning of period t. Then the DOE policy of requiring 20% contingency on the remaining
work can be enforced by the following constraint.
M t−1 (ω̃ t ) − xt (ω̃ t )
≥ 20%.
W t (ω̃ t ) − C̃ t (ω̃ t )

(3.55)

This can be converted to a linear constraint of the form
M t−1 (ω̃ t ) − xt (ω̃ t ) − 0.2W t (ω̃ t ) + 0.2C̃ t (ω̃ t ) ≥ 0.

3.4

(3.56)

Application of the Model

As a particular case study, the TO Model (Equations 3.40-3.44), is applied to actual data
from an ongoing Department of Energy project which, at period t = 0, was approximately
62% complete. The historical data that was available served as the basis from which
forecasted values of the random variables were generated. In this section, the results of
this case study are presented. Not only will the optimal solutions of the T0 Model be
reviewed, the performance of the model is compared to that of a myopic period-by-period
allocation strategy in which each period is viewed as the last. In actual practice, this latter
approach is the one that occurs most frequently in projects.
This section begins with a description of the scenario paths that are the means by which
uncertainty is represented in this specific application. This is followed by a description of
the scenario-generation process. While uncertainty can be captured in the TO Model in a
number of ways (such as decision trees), in this particular case, distribution information is
not known and a scenario path approach is selected. The forecasted scenario components
are generated using Excel VBA and Frontline Systems Premium Solver c is used to generate the solutions. The scope and objectives of this case analysis will be specified and the
experimental results presented.

3.4.1

Scenario Paths and Scenario Sets

Each scenario path represents a possible realization of its uncertain, random components.
Each path is unique and the entire sequence of steps in each individual scenario is followed

50

Figure 3.2: Scenarios and Segments
with no branching of scenario paths at decision points. In that sense, the scenario paths
in this case study are decision trees that have no branching beyond the initial (root)
node. Each path is divided into segments with each segment representing one period. This
approach is not unique and other researchers have also used scenarios to represent the
uncertain future in multi-stage problems (see, for example, [39, 62, 67, 90]). Each scenario
path can be viewed as one potential future state of the project over the time periods being
evaluated (where state was described at the beginning of Section 3.2). The S individual
scenario paths are collected in a set Ω called the complete scenario set. That is, ω(s) ∈ Ω
where ω(s) is a generic scenario path and Ω is the universe of all scenario paths. The initial
conditions at period t = 0 are entirely known and all paths emanate from that same state.
No decision is made at t = 0 and the state of the project at period t = 1 is different on
each scenario path. An example of the scenario paths and segments is shown graphically
in Figure 3.2.
For each ω(s) ∈ Ω, for s = (1, 2, . . . , S), the underlying realizations are denoted by

ω(s) = α1t (s), α2t (s), . . . , C t (s) : t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
(3.57)

3.4.2

Scenario Generation

The temporal and relational dependence of the random variables in this particular case
study complicates the generation of scenario paths. Since the distribution of the historical
data is not known, random sampling techniques are not utilized. The specific methodologies
used to generate the realizations of the random variables for these scenario paths are
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discussed in this section. Saaty and Vargas [132] identify four general types of approaches
to prediction (or forecasting). These are:
1. Systematic generation of alternative paths to the future
2. Extrapolative trend examination
3. Historical analysis and analogy
4. Collective opinion techniques
The random variables that comprise the scenario paths used in this analysis are generated using the first two approaches, the systems and trend approaches. In the systems
approach, relations between variables allow the generation of credible alternatives. The
dependence between Ãt and C̃ t is an example of one type of relationship. Historical performance of the project in terms of the cost and schedule variance provides another relationship. As an example, is the cost variance increasing or decreasing? As stated earlier, if
it is increasing, then possibly one might expect to see a contingency request of some type.
In the trend approach, moving average techniques are utilized. A moving average
method finds the forecast for a particular time period by averaging the n most recent data
values in the time series (creating an n-period moving average). The moving average approach ‘smooths out’ the variance of the individual time series observations, thus identifying
a trend in the data from which projections of the future can be generated. The forecasting
strategies utilized for the various components of the scenario paths are summarized below.
In all cases, historical data provides the input for these forecasts. The forecasting strategies
are tailored to the (historical) variability of the different random variables and the length
of the moving average horizon utilized reflects that variability (such that the more stable
components utilized longer horizons).
Forecasting Primary Random Variable Realizations
As discussed in Section 3.2, requests for contingency result from a number of causes. Errors
in the initial project estimate are one such cause. These errors are discovered as progress
is made on the project and the design matures. Hence, the frequency and magnitude of
the contingency requests that are received is related to the percent complete of a project.
Typically, this percent complete increases over time and, for this reason, realizations of the
primary random variables, α̃it and f˜it , are forecasted using the most recent 2 and 3 months
of project data. The mean, standard deviation and range of the historical data for the
cost of the different priority contingency requests are shown in Table 3.2. The average,
standard deviation and range for the number of the different priority contingency requests
are shown in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Contingency
Mean
Variable All data Most recent
3 months
1
α1
543.11
750.10
α21
165.43
30.28
1
α3
123.83
76.00
Standard Deviation
Variable All data Most recent
3 months
1
α1
460.77
444.86
α21
62.85
51.35
1
α3
78.86
66.24
Range
Variable All data Most recent
3 months
α11
3,711
780
1
α2
507
41
α31
582
230

Request Amounts ($K)
Most recent
2 months
694.90
30.28
76.00
Most recent
2 months
369.33
51.35
66.24
Most recent
2 months
1,073
28
230

Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of the Number of Contingency Requests Received per Period
Average
Variable All data Most recent Most recent
3 months
2 months
1
f1
3.17
4.33 ≈ 4
2.30 ≈ 2
f21
1.17
1.33 ≈ 1
1.25 ≈ 1
f31
3.08
3.33 ≈ 3
3.00
Standard Deviation
Variable All data Most recent Most recent
3 months
2 months
1
f1
2.28
3.52
2.12
f21
1.85
0.58
0.71
f31
3.41
0.58
0
Range
Variable All data Most recent Most recent
3 months
2 months
f11
15
7
3
1
f2
4
1
1
f31
12
1
0
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Figure 3.3: Historical and Forecasted Numbers of Contingency Requests
Note that the mean value of both the number and magnitude of priority 1 contingency
requests over the most recent 2 months is distinctly different from those values generated
over the most recent 3 months of data. Hence, the priority 1 requests are generated using
forecasts based on both the most recent 2 and 3 months of project data to maintain this
variability in the forecasts across different scenarios. This is not true for the priority 2
and priority 3 requests and, therefore only data from the most recent 3 months forms
the basis from which the realizations of these variables are generated. Due to the short
planning horizon of T = 7 used in this case study of the TO Model (Equations 3.40-3.44),
αit and fit are assumed to be stationary such that, along a particular scenario path across
different time periods, the pair αit , fit is assumed to be constant. Examples of this are
shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 which depict historical data through period t = 0 and then
forecasted values through period T for both the number of contingency requests of the
different priorities (Figure 3.3) as well as the amounts of priority 1 contingency requests
(Figure 3.4).
These forecasting strategies for the primary random variables are summarized in Table 3.4 where, due to their stationarity, the variables are only referenced for period 1. The
last column in Table 3.4 indicates the notation used to identify the realizations that result
from the different forecasting strategies.
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Figure 3.4: Historical and Forecasted Amounts of Priority 1 Requests

Table 3.4: Forecasting Strategies for the Primary Random
Variable Number of Months
Type
2
Average of minimum values
2
Average of maximum values
2
Moving average
α11
3
Average of minimum values
3
Average of maximum values
3
Moving average
3
Average of minimum values
α21
3
Average of maximum values
3
Moving average
3
Average of minimum values
3
Average of maximum values
α31
3
Moving average
2
Average
f11
3
Average
f21
3
Average
f31
3
Average
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Variables
Notation
α11 , min(2)
α11 , max(2)
α11 , ave(2)
α11 , min(3)
α11 , max(3)
α11 , ave(3)
α11 , min(3)
α11 , max(3)
α11 , ave(3)
α11 , min(3)
α11 , max(3)
α11 , ave(3)
f11 , ave(2)
f11 , ave(3)
f21 , ave(3)
f31 , ave(3)


From Table 3.4, one can see that there are 6 joint outcomes for the pair α11 , f11 which
are
α11 , min(τ ), f11 , ave(τ )
α11 , max(τ ), f11 , ave(τ )
α11 , ave(τ ), f11 , ave(τ )
τ = 2, 3.

The 3 joint outcomes for the α21 , f21 are shown as
α21 , min(3), f21 , ave(3)
α21 , max(3), f21 , ave(3)
α21 , ave(3), f21 , ave(3)

and those for the α31 , f31 pairs are shown as
α31 , min(3), f31 , ave(3)
α31 , max(3), f31 , ave(3)
α31 , ave(3), f31 , ave(3).
Thus, there are a total of 54 possible combinations of the primary random variables as there
are 6 outcomes (for the priority 1 requests) times 3 outcomes for the priority 2 requests
times 3 outcomes for the priority 3 requests. The set of all possible outcomes for the
primary random variables at period t is given by
{(α1∗ , f1∗ )k , (α2∗ , f2∗ )k , (α3∗ , f3∗ )k | k = 1, 2, . . . , 54}

(3.58)

Forecasting Secondary Random Variable Realizations
Generation of the secondary random variables, Ãt and C̃ t is discussed in this section. Customized forecasting strategies that depend on the specific characteristics of this project are
utilized for these two components. These strategies combine the systems and extrapolative
approaches described at the beginning of this section. The two secondary random variables
at a given period are forecasted independently and, unlike the primary random variables,
the secondary random variables are not assumed to be stationary.
Four different methodologies are utilized to forecast actual total cost values. The first
two methods utilize moving averages, the third and fourth processes incorporate project
plan and performance data. These approaches are described below.
A1 The first method generates actual cost values for the first 3 periods using a 3 month
moving average on the historical project data. The remaining T − 3 period values
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are the incremental values from the project plan. In other words, this strategy says
that, for the next 3 months, the project will spend as it has been for the the last 3
months and then, get back onto plan.
A2 The second method is much like the first however, it utilizes 6 (versus 3) month moving
average data.
A3 The third method involves the project performance data. Recall that a ‘cost variance’
occurs when the costs that are spent to accomplish some amount of work are not
equal to the value of that work (note that variance in this context does not refer
to the statistical definition of variance by rather is synonymous with difference). A
negative ‘cost variance’ occurs when the cost of the work exceeds the value of that
work. Experience has shown that if a project has had a negative ‘cost variance’
for several months, this overrun will not abruptly disappear. To incorporate this
information in a forecasting technique, one needs to assume that the existing cost
variance at time t = 0 will be continued for some number of j periods into the future
before it is resolved (where j is based upon how long this cost variance had already
been in existence). In this particular analysis, it is assumed that the cost variance will
not be resolved within the T period planning horizon and the actual cost values are
generated by multiplying the Cost Performance Index (CPI) (Equation 3.8) at t = 0
by the project’s planned values for all T periods. In other words, this forecasting
strategy assumes that the inefficiencies that are in place at t = 0 will continue to
exist over the duration of the planning horizon.
A4 The fourth method assumes no efficiencies or inefficiencies and assumes that the actual
costs that will be spent in each period are equal to those values estimated in the
project plan.
Each of these 4 strategies generates T distinct cost realizations. Denote the cost re T
alization of Ãt , under strategy i, (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) by ati . Then, the sequence ati t=1 is a
scenario path of cost realizations for actual costs over T periods, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. The mean
and standard deviation for this cost realization sequence are shown in Table 3.5, for each i.
Since retrospective information is available, the last row of Table 3.5 indicates the observed
values of what actually was spent during the T period planning horizon. Not surprisingly,
the 3 month period moving average strategy most closely represented what actually occurred (within 4%). Strategies i = 2 and i = 4 predict values that were within 10% of
what actually occured. Strategy i = 3 values are within 33%. From Table 3.5, one can see
that the variability of the forecasted values is close (and in most cases exceeds) that of the
historical data (as well as that which actually occurred).
Four strategies are also used to forecast realizations for commitments (C̃ t ). As with
the approaches used for Ãt , these methods unite information associated with the project
with historical trend information. Since commitment values exhibit greater variability
57

Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of Ãt , t = 1, . . . , 7 ($K)
Historical Data
Period
Mean Standard Deviation
All project data
20,082
5,037
Most recent 6 months 24,887
5,037
Most recent 3 months 24,431
5,376
Forecasted Cost, t = 1, . . . , 7
Strategy
Mean Standard Deviation
i=1
23,058
4,095
i=2
24,465
5,685
i=3
28,068
8,142
i=4
24,708
5,899
Observed Values, t = 1, . . . , 7
23,141
2,778
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than actual cost values, shorter moving average horizons are utilized. Actual costs for
this project are dominated by staffing costs (which are relatively stable). Commitments,
however, reflect the award of contracts and these awards can be made almost at any time
(given that the funding is available to do so) and hence, are more variable. When equipment
is received, the commitment is zeroed-out and actual costs are increased. The length of
time that a commitment stays ‘on the books’ is representative of the lead time for that
procurement. In this particular project, the commitments on hand at period t = 0 were
dominated by contracts that would not be completed within the T period planning horizon.
Many of these contracts, however, were for conventional facilities construction and thus,
decreased from month to month. The techniques used are described as follows.
C1 The first method generates commitment values for t = 1 and t = 2 from the project’s 2
month moving average data, similar to the previous idea. The remaining T −2 period
values are set equal to the value forecasted for period t = 2. In other words, this
says that, for the next two months, commitments will continue to grow (or decrease)
at the same rate as they have for the last two months. After this, they will stabilize
and not change.
C2 The second method similar to C1, except a 3 month moving average method is used.
C3 The third method requires detailed knowledge of the project data. Recall that when
equipment is received, the commitment value becomes zero and the actual cost values
increase by the value of this commitment. By analyzing historical actual cost and
commitment data, the amount that actual costs increase and commitment values
decrease (for specific purchase orders) can be determined. In this project, a large
fraction of the total commitments on hand at t = 0 could be described by this ratio.
This third forecasting strategy decreases the value of commitments on hand at t = 0
by the rate described by the project’s historical data to generate the t = 1 value.
This t = 1 value is again decreased by this rate to generate a value for t = 2. This
process is repeated for all T periods.
C4 The fourth method also utilizes detailed knowledge of the project data. A commitment
on hand at t = 0 is for work that is planned some time in the future. This is where
long lead procurements come into play. The project plan defines when equipment
must be received; the lead time required by a vendor to fabricate (or construct) a
particular component defines when the contract is awarded. In this project, many
long lead procurements were on hand at t = 0. This last strategy uses this knowledge
to determine the ratio between commitments on hand and work in the future (that
was represented by these commitments). In this approach, the commitment value at
t = 0 is decreased by this ratio (for the most recent 3 months of project data) to
generate the t = 1 value. This t = 1 value is decreased by this same ratio to generate
the t = 2 value. This process is repeated for all T periods.
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics of C̃ t , t = 1, . . . , 7 ($K)
Historical Data
Period
Mean
Standard Deviation
All project data
107,770
24,196
Most recent 6 months 105,706
10,320
Most recent 3 months 99,634
7,796
Most recent 2 months 95,678
5,256
Forecasted Commitments, t = 1, . . . , 7
Strategy
Mean
Standard Deviation
j=1
113,108
2,257
j=2
55,804
22,984
j=3
69,437
22,829
j=4
90,891
32,412
Observed Values, t = 1, . . . , 7
102,469
19,421
The first 2 strategies generate distinct values only for the first 2 or 3 periods. The third
and fourth strategies generate distinct values for each period. Denote the commitment
n oT
realization of C̃ t , under strategy j, (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) by ctj . Then, the sequence ctj
is a
t=1
scenario path of cost realizations for commitments over T periods, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. The mean
and standard deviation for this commitment realization sequence are shown in Table 3.6.
Again, since retrospective information is available, the last row of Table 3.6 indicates the
observed values of what actually was committed during the T period planning horizon.
Strategy j = 1 is accurate within 2%, Strategy j = 4 is within 8% and Strategy j = 3 is
within 28%.
As with the primary random variables, the secondary random variables
can

 be viewed in
t
t
terms of pairs where, for a single period t, they can be described by ai , cj , i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
n
oT
j = 1, 2, 3, 4. The forecasted sequence ati , ctj
must satisfy the funding constraint
t=1

(Equation 3.48). Four of the total possible 4 × 4 pairs violated this constraint. Thus, there
are 16 − 4 = 12 distinct, feasible realizations for the secondary random variables.
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Scenario Paths of Primary/Secondary Random Variables
Using this information, all possible realizations for the random variable ζ̃ t in period t can
be described by ζ t (s)

ζ t (s) = (α1∗ , f1∗ )k , (α2∗ , f2∗ )k , (α3∗ , f3∗ )k , atr , ctr
(3.59)
k = 1, 2, . . . , 54
r = 1, 2, . . . , 12
where s represents the joint indices {k, r}, i.e. s ≡ {k, r}; hence s = 1, 2, . . . , 648. Thus, a
T-period scenario can be represented as

ω(s) ≡ ζ t (s), t = 1, 2, . . . , T s = 1, 2, . . . , 648
(3.60)
The collection of the 648 scenarios is termed the ‘universe’ and is represented by ω ∈ Ω.

3.4.3

Case Study Objectives

The scenario paths generated by the techniques described in Section 3.4.2 are used to
answer the following questions:
1. Is it necessary to include the complete universe of scenarios in solving the TO Model?
Using the complete universe results in a large model that is difficult to solve. By
sampling from the universe, is it possible to get a solution as good as the one obtained
by using the entire universe? How do different scenario samples impact the stochastic
allocation model output?
2. Does the multiperiod model have value?

3.4.4

Mitigation of End-Effects

This specific case study spanned a short planning horizon (7 periods) which did not cover
the entire amount of time still remaining on the project. This is because the purpose of this
model is to provide a near-term (less than a year) plan. Imagine that the last period in the
project is M where M > 7. Due to the dynamic nature of the decisions (where a decision
now impacts all future decisions), the periods 8, 9, . . . , M needed to be represented in the
constraint set in order to ensure that the optimal solution was not degraded by the loss in
realism that results from this short planning horizon. Grinold [55] suggests four methods
by which these ‘end effects’ can be mitigated: truncation, salvage value, and primal and
dual equilibrium. An additional method is the use of an ‘infinite’ last period. Truncation
ignores everything that happens after the planning horizon. This is not appropriate to
this application since the decisions made in period t affect the available funding. When
these decisions are added to actual cost and commitment values for the remainder of the
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project, the cumulative values could exceed the amount of funding that is available. Salvage
value assigns a value to resources that are carried beyond the planning horizon. In this
application, the resource that is carried forward is available funding and thus this approach
is inappropriate. Grinold [55] claims that the dual equilibrium method is the best way to
mitigate end effects. However, he admits that this approach is complex and difficult to
understand and thus, he recommends that it be used only when the initial models are being
established. For on-going models, he suggests judicious use of the salvage approach.
In many other planning applications, it is not clear how much time beyond the planning
horizon should be considered for these end effects. In this particular application, it is clear
that the period from the end of the planning horizon to the end of the project (M − T )
should be included. Given this information, it was determined that the ‘infinite last period’
method is the most appropriate in this context. In this case, the final period of the model
represents the period of length M − T − 1 and the same decision applies throughout
this period. Not only is this approach computationally simple, it permits the cumulative
affect of the current period decisions to impact the model’s solution. This ‘infinite’ period
approach has also been utilized by other researchers [43]. The error associated with the
end-effects is also mitigated by the planned rolling-horizon implementation.

3.4.5

Specific Sample Spaces (Scenario Sets) Used in this Analysis

The solution strategy utilized in this analysis is as follows. Scenario samples comprised of
different numbers of individual scenario paths are randomly sampled (with replacement)
from the universe of all scenario paths. This process is repeated 5 times for each scenario
sample size, resulting in 5 scenario samples for each scenario sample size. The set of 5
scenario samples for a specific number of scenario paths is referred to as a scenario group.
Table 3.7 shows the scenario groups, identifiers for the scenario samples in each group and
the number of scenarios paths in each group.

3.4.6

Results

The TO Model (Equations 3.40-3.44) is solved for each of these scenario samples. The
average optimal objective function value for each scenario group is shown in Figure 3.5.
The range of values within 1 standard deviation of these objective function values is also
shown.
As the sample size increases, the objective function value becomes stable over the
different scenario groups. Hence, it is assumed that the optimal objective value solution of
the 100 scenario path group approximates the unknown objective value of the ‘true’ problem
comprised of all 648 scenario paths. This approach of utilizing a restricted sample space
is not unique to this work and other researchers have found that these restrictions do not
always have a detrimental impact on the optimal solutions. As an example, Høyland and
Wallace [67] show that if the relevant (statistical) properties are captured in the scenario
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Table
Scenario Group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

3.7: Scenario Set Composition
Scenario Set Number of Scenario Paths
S11 . . . S15
10
S21 . . . S25
20
S31 . . . S35
30
S41 . . . S45
40
S51 . . . S55
50
S61 . . . S65
60
S71 . . . S75
70
S81 . . . S85
80
S91 . . . S95
90
S101 . . . S105
100

Figure 3.5: Average Objective Function Values
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Table 3.8: Standard Deviation of Forecasted Contingency Request Costs
Variable 2 Month Strategy 3 Month Strategy
α11
379.4
492.33
1
α2
N/A
55
α31
N/A
71.8
(trees), then all scenario trees that possess these properties will produce approximately the
same objective function value. They show that stability in the objective function value is
a measure of the quality of the scenario trees that were generated and that this indicates
that all relevant properties have been incorporated into the scenarios. The variability of
the forecasted secondary random variables used in this case study were shown in Tables 3.5
and 3.6. The standard deviation of the forecasted costs for the contingency requests for
both the 2 month and 3 month forecasting strategies are shown in Table 3.8. Recall that
the 2 month forecasting horizon is only applicable to priority 1 contingency requests. In
all cases, these statistics are very close to those of the historical data, suggesting that the
relevant properties have been incorporated into the forecasted scenario paths.
In Figure 3.6, the probability-weighted optimal decision vectors from scenario group
10 are compared to those from the other 9 scenario groups (for λ = 0). This comparison
uses the Euclidean norm of the difference as the measure of distance between the decision
vectors. The asterisk superscript in (100∗ ) refers to the scenario sample in scenario group
10 that has the objective function value closest to the average objective function value
for scenario group 10. Similarly, the asterisk superscript in (s∗ ) indicates the scenario
sample in each of the other 9 scenario groups that has the objective function value that is
closest to the average objective function value for scenario group 10, where, for example,
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
X(100∗ ) = (X 1 (100∗ ), . . . , X T (100∗ ))

(3.61)

100
X
1
X t (100∗ ).
100 i

(3.62)

X t (100∗ ) =

i=1

The decision vectors indicated by X(100) and X(S) represent the average of all probabilityweighted optimal decision vectors in the specific scenario group where, for example, X(100) =
P5
X t (100)
1
T
t
where k represents the number of
(X (100), . . . , X (100)) and X (100) = k=1 k
5
samples in each group. From Figure 3.6, one can see that, for λ = 0, as the number of
scenario paths in a scenario sample increases, the optimal solutions of the different scenario
samples tend to move ‘closer’ to each other.

64

Figure 3.6: Euclidean Norm Between Probability-weighted Optimal X Decision Vectors
from Scenario Group 10 and those from other Scenario Groups
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Figure 3.7: Model Solution Values as a Function of λ
To address the second objective of this data analysis, the TO Model is solved on a
period-by-period basis. This is represented by the MO Model, yielding the formulation
shown in Equations 3.63-3.67 which is solved sequentially for each period t.




MO Model: ΨλM 1 = max EQt xt (ω̃ t ) − λ y t − EQt xt (ω̃)t )
xt , z t

(3.63)

Subject to:
U t y t = ht (ζ̃ t ) − V t y t−1
t t

t

t

t

t t−1

U x (ω̃ ) = h (ζ̃ ) − V x

(3.64)

)
Gt (ω̃ t )z t (ω̃ t ) = g(ω̃ t ), ω̃ t ∈ Qt , ζ˜t ∈ Ξt
t

x ≥ 0,

t
zij

(ω̃

t−1

binary

(3.65)
(3.66)
(3.67)



The y t − EQt xt (ω̃)t ) and objective function values for the MO and TO Models
are shown in Figure 3.7. The data plotted by dashed lines are those of the MO Model;
T
X


the solid lines depict TO Model results. As λ increases,
y t − EQt xt (ω̃)t ) → 0
t=1

for both models. The objective function value of the TO Model is greater than that
of the MO Model, indicating that the TO Model allocates more contingency and, as λ
increases, this difference increases. Additionally, as λ increases, the implementability of
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of the Implementability of the MO and TO Models
T
X


y t − EQt xt (ω̃)t ) → 0 which means that
both the MO and TO Models increase since
t=1


y t → EQt xt (ω̃)t . In the case of the TO model, as λ increases, the objective function
value of the TO Model tends towards the objective function value of the D0 Model. This
was discussed in Section 3.3.2.
Another method by which to measure of the value of the TO Model over the MO model
is to evaluate the distance (the Euclidean norm of the difference) between the y ∗ (TO Model)
and y ∗ (MO Model) decision vectors (where the optimal decision vector y ∗ = (y 1 , . . . , y T )).
Figure 3.8 shows that, as λ increases,
 the distance between these two decision vectors
increases. Recall that when y t → EQt xt (ω̃)t , the implementability of the optimal solution
increases. And, as λ increases, the optimal solution of the TO Model tends towards that of
the D0 Model. Therefore, as λ increases, the TO Model’s solution is more implementable
than that of the MO Model.
A third metric by which to compare these two models is to look at the percentage
of priority 1 contingency requests that are approved. Priority 1 contingency requests are
those that are the most important or most urgent. Therefore, the better model is the one
that approves the greatest number of priority 1 contingency requests. Table 3.9 shows that,
for all values of λ, the TO Model approves more priority 1 contingency requests.
The TO Model offers the decision maker a range of allocation decisions. When λ is
large, there is a greater likelihood that the optimal solution is implementable. However,
there is also some likelihood that contingency could be ‘left on the table’ (unallocated) at
the end of the project. Conversely, when λ is small, the probability of leaving contingency
unallocated is less. However, there is also a greater likelihood that the decision maker
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Table 3.9: Percentage of Priority 1 Contingency Requests Approved by TO and MO Models
λ
Model
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
MO Model 87.5% 92.4% 89.7% 71.9% 69.6%
TO Model 93.5% 93.5% 93.5% 78.1% 74.4%
might be unable to satisfy urgent contingency requests at some point in the future. Hence,
the TO Model offers the capability to customize solutions to different projects and different
project managers.

3.5

Conclusion

The multi-period stochastic models introduced in this chapter couple computational simplicity with the ability to represent a dynamic, changing environment. They provide a
means by which to model problems in which the choices at some potential future need not
be the same on all scenarios (or decision tree nodes). The TO Model offers a contingency
allocation plan that is superior to the myopic period-by-period plan currently in practice.
The fact that it can be customized to different projects and different managers enhances
its value as well as its practical utility.
A rolling horizon implementation allows the indirect capture of real world dynamics
into the decision policy generated. When the current ‘real’ project conditions at period t
diverge dramatically from the predictions of the current scenario set, new sets of scenarios
can be developed and a new decision policy established. This approach is ideal for the
project management arena as a project’s state is highly variable over time. As an example,
the portion of the project that is dominated by equipment design activities has a profile
that is very different from the same project during a peak construction period.
At the end of Chapter 2, five key attributes of a good model were articulated. An
evaluation of this linear utility model against those five criteria is as follows:
1. Address a real problem
In the past few chapters, it has been shown that, while the penalties associated with
improper contingency allocation could be severe, there is a paucity of research and
guidance when it comes to this particular decision problem. Therefore, this is a void
that should be addressed and this linear utility based approach is one way to do so.
2. Be understood by the Project Managers
The random variables are generated from actual project data using easy to understand forecasting techniques. Therefore, the data is familiar and easily interpreted.
This model is simple and straightforward. Its conclusions and recommendations are
sensible and credible.
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3. Not require information that is not available
The data that is required for this approach is the data that is commonly utilized in
routine project performance analysis. No additional work is required to generate this
information. Since the forecasts are generated utilizing Excel VBA, it is extremely
simple to maintain.
4. Minimize requirement for probability assignments
Probabilities need to be assigned to the scenario paths (or decision tree branches,
should that approach be utilized). In this particular application, all scenario paths
were assigned equal probability values, making this requirement easy to meet.
5. Provide a reasonable solution in a reasonable time
The solution time is dependent on the degree of information in the model and the
number of scenario paths (or decision tree branches) required to incorporate the
uncertainty. Since model size is largely determined by the number of periods and
the number of contingency requests (the prioritization constraints), the number of
time periods that can reasonably be assessed using this approach is limited. This
limitation can be offset by a rolling-horizon implementation.
In summary, this chapter fares quite well against these five criteria. The linear utility
scenario-based model successfully maximizes the benefit of contingency allocations. This
scenario-based multi-period static model couples computational simplicity with the ability
to represent a dynamic, changing environment. It provides a means by which to model
problems in which the choices at some potential future need not be the same on all scenarios
(or decision tree nodes). By providing the ability to allocate scarce resources in an uncertain
environment that requires that an irrevocable decision be made now, this model could
benefit a myriad of diverse applications, from project management to telecommunication
to marketing. Linear programming techniques can be utilized to provide project managers
with the information necessary to make prudent current period decisions that are based
on predicted future requirements.
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Chapter 4

Chapter 2: A Long-Term
Convex-Concave Utility Model
The basic premise of this chapter involves establishing the concave and convex aspects
of a project’s utility function which correlate to risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviors
that occur in distinct project phases. Using this information, a project utility function
that maps contingency allocation decisions to the three key characteristics of a successful
project is generated. This utility function can be decomposed into two three-dimensional
utility functions, one for each phase. The utility-based contingency allocation model proposed incorporates both the risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviors that are present as a
project progresses through its life-cycle and provides a contingency allocation strategy that
maximizes the expected utility of those decisions.

4.1

Introduction

All projects follow a similar sequence of activities. The project begins with feasibility or
conceptual design studies. These are followed by detailed design efforts. Once the designs
are finalized, fabrication or construction commences. The project finishes with installation, testing, commissioning or operations activities [103]. These can be separated into
two distinct stages, the ‘creativity’ stage and the ‘execution’ stage. The ‘creativity’ stage
is characterized by innovative, risk-seeking behavior. Since the project is just beginning,
there have been very few draws against the contingency reserve and typically, requests
for contingency that arrive during this stage are approved. Once the designs have been
finalized, the project is required to ‘freeze’ the existing configuration and proceed with construction activities. After this point, the designs must be adhered to, not improved; this is
considered the execution phase of a project. This phase is characterized by increased competition for the remaining contingency reserve. Errors in the estimates are being uncovered
and anticipated (or unanticipated) risks are being realized.
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In Section 1.3, scope creep and finalization of requirements were discussed as contributors to project failures. When these occur, the duration of the ‘creativity’ stage is increased
and the start of the ‘execution’ stage is delayed. In practice, it is difficult to change the
focus and behavior of a project team from a free-thinking, exploratory organization to
one that is focused on execution of the project (as it stands in the current design). This
chapter is motivated by the observation that failure to transition from a risk-seeking to a
risk-averse organization at the appropriate time can result in an inappropriate allocation
of project contingency (too much too early in the project). Contingency allocation decisions that may have been appropriate in the risk-seeking phase are no longer appropriate
in the risk-averse phase. An allocation model that provides only risk-averse decisions in
the risk-averse phase can prohibit risk-seeking behavior when it is no longer appropriate
for the project.
Utility theory attempts to capture the behaviors of individuals in terms of the ways
in which they make decisions. In general, decision making under uncertainty has been
approached via expected utility theory [154] and Morgan and Henrion [102] claim that
“A decision analysis must use some model of human preferences such as a
multi-attribute utility function, to select among alternative choices.”
Management of the contingency reserve is a time-phased decision problem. If this decision
process is coupled with the uncertainty inherent in the project management environment,
then it is not so hard to see that utility theory may serve as a good vantage point from
which to view project decisions.
In Chapter 3, those current practices that are most similar to development of a contingency allocation plan were discussed. Typically, a long term contingency allocation profile
is established from a project’s time-phased risk data (see Section 2.3.5). One way of developing a project’s time-phased risk data is to assess the uncertainty of each activity in the
project’s schedule. In this process, a weight equivalent to the degree of risk or uncertainty
is assigned to each activity and, when this weight is multiplied by the value of the activity,
a time-phased cost risk profile is created. This risk profile, however, is not an allocation
plan since, if there is insufficient contingency or funding available, it does not recommend
one particular course of action over another. While Riggs [124] has observed that a project
can be described in terms of a utility function, no known research relates expected utility
theory to a project’s contingency allocation decisions. Hence, as with the CA, D0 and TO
Models (which can be referred to as linear utility (LU) models), nothing in the literature
nor in current practice is comparable to the long term contingency allocation plan proposed
in this chapter.
This chapter begins with an introduction to utility theory. Since expected utility theory
is violated under certain conditions, the basic theory as well as some alternative proposals
that allow for these violations are covered. This is followed by the development of a utility
function for a typical project. In Section 4.4, a generic form of a suitable utility function
that incorporates the multiple attributes of a project’s utility is presented. Analysis of
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actual project data in Section 4.5 demonstrates that this utility possesses convexity and
concavity and establishes the relationship between contingency allocation and a project’s
utility. A project utility is introduced in Section 4.6 and the convex-concave utility model
is introduced in Section 4.7. In Section 4.8, two methods by which a project specific
utility function can be elicited are introduced and this chapter closes with the generation
of a contingency allocation plan based upon the utility function specified in Section 4.8.2.
Existing research, as it relates to the application of utility theory to project management,
was covered in Section 2.3.3.

4.2

Utility Theory

Modern utility theory for decision-making under uncertainty was developed, independently,
by von Neumann and Morgenstern. They postulated a set of axioms about ordering and
preferences so that, if the axioms are obeyed, a decision maker will select the alternative
that provides the highest expected utility [77, 134]. These axioms explore the preferences
associated with different opportunities (or gambles) and highlight the mathematical properties that couple these preferences. The order axiom observes that, for any two lotteries,
L1 and L2, there are only three options: 1) L1 is preferred over L2; 2) L2 is preferred over
L1 or; 3) there is no difference between the two lotteries. Moreover, transitivity must exist
such that, if L1 is preferred to L2 and L2 is preferred to L3, then L1 must be preferred
to L3. Independence requires that if the decision maker prefers outcome x to outcome y,
then he prefers a lottery that, with probabilities p and (1 − p), offers x and z over a lottery
that, with probabilities p and (1 − p), offers y and z as outcomes, for any values of p and
z. Formally, this can be stated as
x  y ⇒ px + (1 − p)z  py + (1 − p)z for all 0 < p < 1

(4.1)

von Neumann and Morgenstern’s third major axiom, continuity, requires that, if x is
preferred to y and y is preferred to z, then there exists some probability, p > 0, where
the decision maker prefers px + (1 − p)z over y and another probability, q > 0, where y
is preferred to qx + (1 − q)z. This axiom prohibits one alternative from being infinitely
more preferable than another and introduces the concept of a ‘sure thing’. There is some
point at which the decision maker is indifferent between y and a lottery that offers x and
z with probabilities p and (1 − p). Given these axioms, the individual’s attitudes toward
risk can then determined by examining the utility of the expected value of the gamble and
the expected utility of the value of the gamble [48, 134, 152].
Kahneman and Tversky [72] discuss three basic conditions under which expected utility
theory can be expected to hold. In their discussion, (x1 , p1 ; x2 , p2 ; . . . ; xn , pn ) describe
prospects (or gambles) which, with probability pi yield outcome xi . These conditions are:
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Expectation: For a finite set of outcomes (corresponding to a discrete distribution), the
expected value of the utility is given by:
E[U(x1 , p1 ; x2 , p2 ; . . . ; xn , pn ) =
p1 U(x1 ) + p2 U(x2 ) + . . . + pn U(xn ) =

n
X

pi U(xi )

(4.2)

i=1

where U(xi ) is the utility assigned to the gamble where the outcome is xi and its
probability is pi . This differs from the utility of the expected value of the gamble. In
a discrete case, the expected value of a gamble whose outcome is xi is defined as:
E[X] = p1 x1 + p2 x2 + . . . + pn xn =

n
X

pi xi

(4.3)

i=1

The utility associated with this expected value is:
n
X
U(E[X]) = U(p1 x1 + p2 x2 + . . . + pn xn ) = U(
pi xi )

(4.4)

i=1

Risk Aversion: An individual is considered risk–averse if an individual’s utility function
is concave, that is if the second derivative of the utility is less than 0. A risk-averse
decision maker prefers a sure thing to a gamble (or a certain prospect (x) to a risky
prospect with an expected value of x). This can be stated as U(E[X]) > E[U(X)].
Conversely, a risk–seeking individual corresponds to a convex utility function and
U(E[X]) < E[U(X)]. A risk neutral individual shows no preference either way with
U(E[X]) = E[U(X)]. The relationship between the shape of the utility function and
attitudes toward risk can be attributed to the results of Jensen’s inequality which
states that, for any random variable X, if f (X) is a strictly concave function of X,
then E[f (X)] < f (E[X]). Figure 4.1 provides graphic representations of this concept.
Asset Integration: The third component Kahneman and Tversky identify is that of asset
integration which states that (x1 , p1 ; x2 , p2 ; . . . ; xn , pn ) is acceptable at some asset
position ϕ if and only if
U(ϕ + x1 , p1 , ; ϕ + x2 , p2 ; . . . ; ϕ + xn , pn ) > U(ϕ)

(4.5)

That is, an option is preferable if the utility resulting from combining that option
with existing assets is greater than that of the existing assets when valued alone.
In utility theory, a ‘sure thing’ is viewed in terms of a certainty equivalent where the
certainty equivalent is the amount of money that a gambler would rather have for certain,
instead of taking some risk. This represents the maximum amount that individuals are
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.1: (a) Concave Utility Function (b) Convex Utility Function
willing to pay for a particular gamble and has been described as the amount at which an
individual is indifferent to a gamble. Alternatively, it can viewed as the minimum premium
one is willing to pay to insure against some risk. Referring once again to Figure 4.1, in
which these certainty equivalents are indicated, one can see that, in the convex case, the
worth of a gamble to an individual exceeds the expected value of the gamble. Conversely,
in the concave case, the gamble is worth far less than its expected value. For an equivalent
utility (equivalent y axis value), the certainty equivalent in the concave case is much less
than that of the convex case.

4.3
4.3.1

Violations and Alternatives
Observed Violations

Empirical studies have shown that the independence axiom is often violated when decision
makers are asked to make intuitive judgments (see, for example [15, 48, 72, 95, 107]). The
Allais Paradox is a frequently cited example. In this paradox, individual indifference curves
are not linear, showing that individuals do not consistently make choices in the same way.
The Allais Paradox can be described by the following example. Given the two pairs of
gambles shown below, individuals are asked to select one preferred lottery from each pair.
Pair 1:

100% chance of $1, 000, 000
a1 =

a2 =





10% chance of $5, 000, 000
89% chance of $1, 000, 000
1% chance of $0
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Pair 2:



10% chance of $5, 000, 000
90% chance of $0



11% chance of $1, 000, 000
89% chance of $0

a3 =
a4 =

Under the expected utility theory, a choice of a1 in the first pair would suggest a
preference for a4 in the second pair and a choice of a2 would suggest that a3 would also
be preferred. This is because, in expected utility, all gambles are judged relative to the
utilities of their outcomes. However, in tests of these two pairs, a number of researchers
found that a1 and a3 were the gambles that were selected, indicating that the indifference
curves are not linear [96].
Kahneman and Tversky [72] explore a number of cases in which observed behavior contradicts expected utility theory. They argue that these violations occur because individuals
tend to view events in a relative sense, overweighting those they consider certain relative
to those they consider only probable. They also demonstrate that certainty is preferable
only in the domain of positive outcomes. They show that a risk-averse individual, when
offered choices with positive outcomes, will behave in a risk-averse manner. However, when
faced with a choice of negative outcomes, that same individual will behave in a risk-seeking
manner. As an example, when given the choice between the two positive outcomes (a) and
(b) (as shown below)
(a) win $6,000 with 45% probability
(b) win $3,000 with 90% probability
the individual will choose (b). When offered the negative choices (c) and (d) (as shown
below)
(c) lose $6,000 with 0.1% probability
(d) lose $3,000 with 0.2% probability
that same individual will choose (c). That is, in the positive domain, the certainty effect
contributes to a risk–averse preference for a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely
probable. In the negative domain, this same effect leads to a risk–seeking desire for a loss
that is merely probable over a smaller loss that is certain. Hull and Thomas [68] also
comment on the idea of a negative domain, noting that there is a tendency for some people
to have a utility function that is discontinuous at the origin. They attribute this to the
adverse emotional reaction people have to the idea of negative cash flow.

4.3.2

Multiple Utility Functions

Other researchers point to the existence of multiple utility functions as a way to explain the
observed violations of expected utility theory. Rabin [121] highlights a calibration problem
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within the theory. According to expected utility theory, if an individual is averse to a single,
arbitrarily small risk at every wealth level, then he must be ridiculously averse to large
risks. As an example, if the decision maker, at every wealth level, is unwilling to gamble
on a 50-50 chance to lose $10/gain $10.10, then that person will refuse a 50-50 gamble in
which one could lose $1,000 or win ∞. This observation supports the notion that more
than one utility function is involved in the decision process. Nielson and Winter [104] use
data from Viscusi and Moore to show that the utility function used to evaluate large risks
(e.g. risks with potentially large gains or losses) must be less risk-averse than the utility
function used to evaluate small or moderate ones. They claim that it is not possible to
use a single utility function to describe preferences over both small or moderate stake risks
(which could result in small or moderate changes in wealth) and large stake risks (which
could have a dramatic impact on wealth).
Hull and Thomas [68] note that, in general, utility theory assumes the existence of one
decision-maker with a single utility function. However, in many cases, this assumption is
unrealistic and they recognize that it is often groups that make a decision, not individuals.
They also note that a corporate utility function is far less conservative than the average
of the individual utility functions associated with the people involved in the corporate
decision-making process. Friedman and Savage [50] suggest that the apparent ‘irrationality’
of decisions can be explained by the existence of a utility curve with more than one point of
inflection. Machina [96] observes that a probability bet is viewed differently from a dollar
bet. He proposes expected regret/rejoice functions that would replace the standard utility
function.

4.3.3

Escalation

Escalating situations also tend to result in seemingly inconsistent decisions. Staw and
Ross [146] discuss the ‘decision pathology’ that arises when individuals or organizations
are trapped in a course of action. They address four classes of determinants that contribute
to this escalation and argue that the decision to persist is based on all these determinants.
Endeavors such as R&D and construction projects often foster commitment because there is
a long delay between expenditures and economic benefits and losses are not unexpected. It
is possible for the project to become so large that it literally ‘traps’ the organization, forcing
continuation in spite of indicators that may recommend project termination. They point
to data that clearly indicates that sunk costs are not sunk psychologically and that these
sunk costs continue to influence decisions. Not only do escalation situations involve sunk
costs in terms of money, time and effort, they are also framed as losing situations in which
one might turn ones fortunes around. This is precisely the behavior shown by Kahneman
and Tvesky. People become more risk–seeking in the domain of losses, which implies
that individuals responsible for previous losses could try to justify (or save) their earlier
decisions by committing additional resources toward them. An aggressive contingency
allocation strategy could be a manifestation of this type of behavior. Additionally, large
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public projects are likely to fall into an institutionalized or politicized category in which
withdrawal is an ‘unthinkable’ proposition. DOE’s NIF project in Livermore and the Big
Dig in Boston are two examples which might, in the decision-makers minds, have fallen
into this category.

4.4

A Multi-Attribute Project Utility Function

Project completion is defined by the on time and within budget delivery of a final product.
It makes sense, then, to propose a project utility function that incorporates technical
superiority (the degree to which the project delivers state-of-the-art capabilities) as well
as successful delivery of that technology (the degree to which the project is completed, on
time and within budget). This proposed utility function incorporates the characteristics
of a successful project that were detailed in Chapter 1 and is consistent with the ideas put
forth by Riggs et al [124] (see Section 2.3.3).
Given the existence of a project utility function, a meaningful contingency allocation
decision strategy is one that maximizes this utility. Each contingency decision is evaluated
in terms of its contribution to the technical, cost and schedule dimensions of the project
and hence, this problem falls in the category of complex value problems in which the
consequences of a particular act cannot be described objectively by a single attribute [78].
In this situation, the decision maker is evaluating ‘value’ trade-offs that result from a
particular choice rather than determining an explicit change in wealth or net worth. A
similar problem occurs in classical cost-benefit analysis when benefits, such as aesthetic or
psychological benefits, cannot be ‘priced out’.
Trade-offs can be measured in terms of utility. Even though attributes may not be comparable, a decision maker wants to chose the particular combination of these attributes that
maximizes his or her utility. As an example, suppose contingency request r1 is submitted.
This request affects the technical attribute T and results in a consequence t1 , affects the
cost attribute C with a consequence of c1 and affects the schedule attribute S with a consequence of s1 . The decision maker wants to be sure that, if request r1 is approved, that the
utility gained from this request exceeds the utility gained from all other n choices. Suppose
that there is no uncertainty regarding any of the n requests or their impacts, then, using
Riggs’ notation, the decision maker wants to be sure that
U(t1 , c1 , r1 ) ≥ U(ti , ci , ri ) where i = 2, 3, . . . , n

(4.6)

In order to evaluate a project in terms of its technical, cost and schedule attributes,
a multi-attribute utility function must be generated that captures preferences and risk
attitudes for these three attributes simultaneously. Multi-attribute utility theory is used
to evaluate preferences in those cases where multiple attributes are involved [48, 76, 78,
168]. Typically, additive and multiplicative forms that decompose the higher dimensional
utility functions into a series of single attribute utilities are used in these cases. However,
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two conditions must be true for either of these approaches to be valid. Both utility and
preference independence must exist. Preference independence can be viewed in terms
of ordinal preferences amongst attributes while utility independence is associated with
the cardinal preferences of the decision maker. Preferential independence means that the
trade-offs one is willing to make between two attributes does not depend on the level of the
other attributes. Utility independence involves the comparison of lotteries. Attribute X
is said to be utility independent of attribute Y when conditional preferences for lotteries
on X are independent of the level of Y . The existence of utility independence implies
that preferential independence also exists. Keeney and Raiffa [78] and Zeleny [168] both
articulate methods by which to ascertain that these conditions are satisfied. These methods
require that the decision maker answer a series of questions about lotteries involving the
attributes of the problem. Zeleny [168] notes that this is a difficult process and comments
that, “in practice, many analysts simply assume that a particular utility decomposition is
correct for a given situation”.
Recall that there are two types of contingency, cost contingency (measured in dollars)
and schedule contingency (measured in days). Hence, there are two types of contingency
decisions, those that call upon cost contingency and those that draw down the schedule
contingency reserve. Requests for contingency originate in response to conditions that
impact a project’s cost, technical or schedule baselines. These impacts can be positive or
negative. In this chapter, these conditions arise from ‘risk sources’ and three types of risk
sources (which can be used to categorize every project risk) are considered in this chapter:
technical risks, new opportunities and unforeseen events. Typically, risks are viewed only
in terms of their negative impact; opportunities, however, can be viewed as risks that have
a positive impact. As an example, a schedule activity has a risk of finishing late; it also
has some (possibly very small) chance (or risk) of finishing early.
An additive utility function that explicitly considers responses to these three risk sources
is the desired vehicle for the contingency allocation model. Therefore, one must be able to
translate decisions related to these risk sources to quantifiable utility functions that satisfy
the independence conditions. To do so, a novel form of a project’s utility is introduced.
This utility is comprised of a performance component (that represents the technological
superiority), a schedule component (that represents on time completion) and a scope component (that represents the degree to which the original project specifications are adhered
to over the life of the project). This latter component represents the within budget completion criteria of a successful project. Since the amount of contingency allocated cannot
exceed the amount that is available, over-budget completion is reflected by a reduction in
the project scope (caused by a lack of available contingency). This will be explained later
in greater detail.
The relationships between these contingency types, risk sources and component utility
functions are shown in Figure 4.2. Risk sources are further partitioned into realized risks
and opportunities. The schematic shown in Figure 4.2 forms the basis for the specific
instance that is used this chapter.
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Figure 4.2: Contributions of Contingency and Risk Sources to Project Utilities
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The project utility components that will be used in this chapter can be defined as
follows:
Performance Utility (U1 )
A project’s performance utility is defined by the degree to which it exceeds the technical parameters promised to the sponsor. This includes performance improvements
due to inclusion of new technology or enhanced reliability due to actions such as
the purchase of additional spares or incorporation of redundant systems. Decisions
which enhance U1 arise from new opportunities and every new opportunity decision
increases U1 .
Schedule Utility (U2 )
A project’s schedule utility is defined by the degree to which it finishes on time.
Schedule utility can be impacted by both unforeseen events and new opportunities. Contingency allocation decisions increase U2 by averting the impacts of realized
schedule risks and exercising opportunities.
Scope Utility (U3 )
A project’s scope utility is defined as the degree to which the promised baseline
scope is delivered to the sponsor. If a project has insufficient cost contingency to
respond to all realized risks, then one alternative is to reduce the scope of work that is
delivered. As an example, one could omit or reduce originally planned activities (such
as testing or even installation), descope non-essential items that would have enhanced
the project but are not critical to its completion (such as redundant systems) or
substitute lower cost alternatives that meet specifications but are not those originally
included in the project plan (such as using polished concrete in lieu of granite or using
gravel in lieu of pavement). Decisions which threaten U3 arise in response to realized
risks and, if the realized risks are not mitigated by contingency allocation decisions,
then U3 decreases. As with schedule utility, contingency allocation decisions increase
scope utility by averting the impacts of realized risks.
Total Project Utility (UP )
A project’s total utility is defined in terms of the cost and schedule contingency decisions that represent the project’s response to risks that are realized and opportunities
that arise and is represented by the sum of the component utilities described above.
Schedule contingency can only be used for schedule risks and schedule opportunities.
Cost contingency can be used for cost and technical risks as well as both schedule
and non-schedule related opportunities. Let the cost contingency dollars allocated in
period t towards type i risks and type j opportunities be represented by xti , i = 1, 2, 3
and yjt , j = 1, 2, 3 respectively. Thus, a project’s utility at period t can be described
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Figure 4.3: Contingency Allocation Decision Hierarchy
by
UP (xt1 , xt2 , xt3 , y1t , y2t , y3t ) = w1 U1 (y1t , y2t ) + w2 U2 (y3t , xt3 ) + w3 U3 (xt1 , xt2 )

(4.7)

where
P3 w1 , w2 and w3 are scaling constants assigned to the individual utilities (with
i=1 wi = 1 and wi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, 3). These scaling constants ensure internal
consistency of the multiattribute utility function. As an example, if the preferences for
two attributes a1 and a2 are the same, then u(a1 ) = u(a2 ) and the scaling constants
assigned to u(a1 ) and u(a2 ) are equal. These constants are dependent on the possible
consequences of the problem and methods by which to determine them can be found
in literature (see, for example [78, 168]).
A typical project instance of these contingency decisions and utility functions is shown in
Table 4.1 which considers three types of risks and three types of opportunities.
Utility independence for these utilities must be confirmed before Equation 4.7 has
any valid interpretation. The objective of any allocation of contingency is to maximize the
benefit that the project derives from each decision. A graphic representation of the decision
hierarchy for this objective, for the instance described by Table 4.1, is shown in Figure 4.3.
Since utility independence is affected by the conditions of the particular problem (see, for
example [78, 168]), it would not be appropriate to assume, a priori, that these conditions
are always met. In Figure 4.3, the lower level attributes (of risk and opportunity types)
are partitioned into schedule, performance and scope groups such that knowledge of the
uncertain values in one group does not affect the judgments about uncertain quantities in
another. This decomposition technique is one of the methods proposed by Raiffa [122] and
Keeney and Raiffa [78] in those cases where independence does not initially exist. One
can observe that preferences (over lotteries) on schedule, performance and scope depend
only on the marginal probability distributions for these attributes and not on their joint
probability distribution. This is a sufficient condition for the use of an additive utility
function. If a decision maker prefers scope to schedule and a positive change is one that
moves the level of an attribute to a ‘better’ level, then the utility of a positive change in
the attributes that affect scope (xt1 and xt2 ) is greater that the utility that results from a
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Source
Cost
Contingency
Cost
Contingency

Cost
Contingency
Cost
Contingency
Cost
Contingency

Schedule
Contingency

Table 4.1: Project Contingency Allocation Decisions
Decision
Consequence
Utility
Respond to realized
Maintain existing project
Scope
technical risks (e.g.
scope in baseline
equipment failure)
Respond to realized
Maintain existing project
Scope
cost risks (e.g. cost
scope in baseline
increases due to poor
quality estimates
or unforeseen events)
Incorporate new
Enhance performance of
Performance
technology
project by improving
project baseline
Exercise of options or
Enhance reliability
Performance
economy of scale
(by providing spares,
procurements
flexibility)
Procure schedule
Maintain project finish
Schedule
float
date by working additional
shifts, outsourcing or
hiring additional staff
Respond to realized
Maintain project finish date
Schedule
schedule risks
by using schedule float
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Variable
xt1
xt2

y1t
y2t
y3t

xt3

change in the attributes that affect schedule (xt3 and y3t ). One can validate, with specific
data and specific forms of the component utilities (see Section 4.8.2) that these conditions
are satisfied and that the use of an additive utility function is appropriate for this instance.
As indicated previously, multiplicative utility functions are also used in this multiattribute context. While the same independence conditions are required for both additive
and multiplicative utility functions, the latter requires the calculation of an additional
scaling factor [76, 78]. Not only is the multiplicative form more complicated, numerical
experiments have shown that there is little difference between multiplicative and additive
utility functions in terms of their rankings [63, 168]. In the context of the contingency
allocation problem, the additive form is more appropriate. It is simpler and more easily
understood by the project manager who, in order to accept the validity of the plan, must
be able to understand and accept the assumptions on which the plan is based. Raiffa [122]
notes that
“a key ingredient that determines whether or not management will ever implement an analysis is the quality of the involvement of the decision maker in the
analytical process.”
Consequently, a multiplicative utility function will not be explored in this chapter.

4.5

Actual Project Data Viewed from Utility Perspective

In this section, actual project data is reviewed in the context of utility theory. The convexconcave features are described in more detail, qualitatively as well as quantitatively and
the relationship of contingency allocation to a project’s utility is demonstrated.

4.5.1

Convex-Concave

Since approved contingency requests consume contingency reserve dollars, it is desirable
that a project’s utility function be described in terms of dollars. All projects have a similar
spending (or baseline) plan. During the ‘creativity’ stage, most of the expenses incurred are
associated with labor costs. Therefore, the plan for this period is relatively stable. Once
the ‘execution’ stage begins, contracts are being awarded and subcontractor effort is being
added to the project. It is in the beginning of this phase that one sees large increases in
costs from period to period. Towards the end of this phase, only testing or commissioning
or operations activities remain and the costs per period once again stabilize. This creates
a cumulative profile which is ‘S’ shaped.
Cumulative plan data from an ongoing project is plotted in Figure 4.4. The baseline
(spending plan) is shown in Figure 4.4(a). At inception, zero dollars have been expended
and at project completion, all dollars have been expended. The planned progress (percent
complete), as a function of time, is shown in Figure 4.4(b) where the project is 0% complete
at the start and 100% complete at the finish date.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.4: (a) Cumulative Project Funding Profile (b) Cumulative Project Planned Percent Complete
In Figure 4.5, the convex and concave features of Figure 4.4(b) are highlighted. While
this profile has been described by a Weibull distribution in literature [21], the model proposed in this chapter does not assume a Weibull distribution. Figure 4.6 views the same
data from a slightly different perspective. In this view, project percent complete is evaluated against total project dollars. From this approach, one can view a project’s progress
(the percent complete) as a measure of the utility of the dollars (d) spent on a project
(U(d)). If one calculates the Arrow-Pratt [68,95,118,119] measure of risk aversion denoted
by r(d) for the profile in Figure 4.6, one finds that, for d ≤ $0.831M , r(d) < 0 (the utility
function is risk-seeking) and for d ≥ $0.853M , r(d) > 0, signaling risk-averse behavior. The
fact that risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior exist in a utility function is not unheard of
and Hull and Thomas [68] mention utility functions which, using the Arrow-Pratt criteria,
are both risk-seeking and risk-averse.
Researchers have commented on the convex and concave nature of project activities.
Falk and Horowitz [45] point out that cost-time curves are normally considered to be
convex due to the need to hire increasing expensive resources (e.g. overtime labor) as task
durations are shortened; concave curves occur when the unit cost per time of performing
an activity decreases. This can occur in cases where an equipment rental rate decreases as
the duration of the rental increases or in situations of economies of scale. Concave curves
can also reflect efficiencies gained as a result of experience (learning curves). However, the
convex and concave nature of the project itself has not been addressed in research.
From the utility perspective, convex functions represent risk-seeking behavior and concave functions signal risk-averseness. Therefore, the profiles shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5
suggest that risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviors are both present in a project and that
these behaviors occur during different project phases (that is, over time). The ‘creativity’
stage is convex while the ‘execution’ stage is concave. The ‘creativity’ phase is focused on
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Figure 4.5: Cumulative Project Plan

Figure 4.6: Cumulative Project Percent Complete as a Function of Total Project Dollars
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the quest for technical superiority and hence is naturally risk-seeking. The decisions that
are made in this phase are those that extend the state-of-the-art frontier. The ‘execution’
phase focuses on within budget and on-time completion and is more conservative. A conservative allocation strategy can be interpreted as one that approves only those requests
for contingency that are focused on project completion (those requests that contribute to a
project’s scope and schedule utility) and elects to preserve contingency as a hedge against
the future rather than approve ‘discretionary’ requests. The decisions that are made in
this phase are those that do not extend the project, add costs or add uncertainty, hence,
are risk-averse.
These observations are consistent with demonstrated project behavior. The initial
phases of a project are largely comprised of design activities. Enthusiasm is high, the
contingency pool appears unlimited and the project finish date is many years into the
future. While in the risk-seeking phase, innovation and exploration are not only desired,
they are encouraged. During this period, the conceptual designs that formed the basis
of the original project proposal are ‘fleshed out’ in more detail. Numerous (and possibly
parallel) paths are explored to ensure the the project is comprised of only the ‘latest and
greatest’ technology and can offer ‘state of the art’ performance. In fact, it is not unfair to
say that all of the technical creativity and innovation of a project occurs while the design
is being generated. Karlsen [73] remarks that the possibility to influence and change the
project is highest at the early stages because conceptual decisions have not been made
or taken effect. From a technological perspective, the remainder of the project is just
execution of the decisions made in the design phase. In general, requests for contingency
to support pursuit of these new and innovative concepts are rarely rejected.
As the detailed design is completed, procurement of equipment components and physical construction commences. Several important issues now arise. Uncertainty and flexibility
diminish. Actual costs for equipment and construction (v.s. the estimated value) become
known. A request for contingency is likely if the actual cost is greater than the estimated
value in the baseline and cost offsets are not readily identifiable. Bowers [19] comments
on this evolution from uncertainty to known values, noting that, as project definition progresses, estimates of the activity durations (and their associated costs) should become more
reliable.
Flexibility (and the ability to respond to design changes) decreases once construction
and/or production has begun. This marks the transition to the risk-averse phase. This
transition is highlighted at the intersection of the convex and concave curves (the shaded
area) in Figure 4.5. Changes or modifications to designs become more costly and mitigation
strategies that could have provided alternative solutions (that is, provided an alternative
that did not require a call upon contingency) tend to diminish with time. Incorporation
of newer, possibly even greater, technology will never occur, regardless of potential gain,
unless that technology can be incorporated at no additional cost and in the existing time
frame. One distinguishing characteristic of this second phase is an increasing demand for
a decreasing supply of contingency. Once a project enters this phase, there is not enough
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.7: (a) Cumulative Contingency Allocation (b) Rate of Cumulative Contingency
Allocation
time to explore lower cost alternatives if the project is to finish on time and hence, all
changes have a cost impact since only two feasible alternatives remain: 1) add resources
(money) to resolve the issue or 2) eliminate a portion of the project scope. The latter is
a politically dangerous option that could jeopardize the entire project (and diminish the
contribution of scope utility to a total project’s utility).

4.5.2

Actual Allocation of the Contingency Reserve in the Utility Context

Data from the same project shows that this qualitative discussion of contingency allocation
can be validated by actual project data. It will be shown that contingency allocation
decisions are correlated with the state of the project (how much has been completed).
These data support the suggestion that failure to transition (in behavior and in action)
from risk–seeking to risk–averse soon enough in a project could result in an insufficient
contingency reserve to cover the uncertainties associated with the project’s remaining work.
The percent of the contingency reserve that was allocated, relative to the progress on
the project, is shown in Figure 4.7(a). By the time the project was 25% complete, 44% of its
contingency had been allocated. At the point when 50% of the project had been completed,
only 25% of the original contingency reserve was still available. At the 93% completion
mark, only 3% of the original contingency reserve is remaining. After the project was
approximately 80% complete, the contingency allocation rate stabilized to approximately
3.5% of contingency dollars for each 5% of work. If one assumes that this rate will be
continued for the remainder of the project, then it is likely that the contingency reserve
will be unable to meet this particular project’s requirements at some point in the future.
The rate of contingency allocation, relative to work completed is shown in Figure 4.7(b).
Three different slopes (rates of contingency allocation) are highlighted by the straight
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lines. The first segment represents the greatest rate of change and occurs during the
project start up and preliminary design phases. In this period, the project’s utility is
measured by technical superiority and the allocation of contingency dollars to state-of-theart technologies can make a huge difference on the project’s ultimate capabilities. This is
consistent with the characteristic of convex utility functions in which small changes have
little impact on the utility but large changes make substantial differences. The second
segment represents the detailed design effort as well as the beginning of construction and
procurement activities. This is the transition phase. The last segment represents the
completion of construction and installation efforts. In this phase, utility is defined in terms
of project completion (delivery of the chosen technology, on time and on budget). One
will note that, in this concave period, the allocation of large dollars no longer makes large
differences and the project is more interested in ensuring success than pursuing additional
technologies.
From these observations, one might expect to have seen a change in rate of contingency
allocation in Figure 4.5 during the transition period from July 02 and July 03 when the
project was approximately 50% complete. From Figure 4.7(b), one can see that this rate
did not change until nearly the 60% point.

4.6

A Utility Based Contingency Allocation Model

The utility based contingency allocation model presented in this chapter links those behavioral attributes of a project described in Sections 4.5 with the allocation of contingency
dollars. Specifically, as a project moves through its life cycle, preferences for choices change.
During the early phases of a project, contingency requests that enhance the project’s performance utility are highly valued. Since flexibility diminishes once the design has been
finalized and procurement and construction activities have begun, performance utility has
little value in the later phases of a project. During those later phases, contingency requests
that improve the project’s likelihood of finishing on time become increasingly important.
Scope preservation is important in both phases and it is the only utility that has the same
form throughout the life of the project. If one designates the convex, risk-seeking phase of
a project as Phase 1 and the concave, risk-averse stage as Phase 2, then these utilities will
have different forms in the different phases. Detailed generation of the performance, scope
and schedule component utilities will be covered in a subsequent section. In this section,
the impact of contingency allocation decisions on the different utilities is described in a
qualitative way, again, in the context of the instance described by Table 4.1.
The impact of a contingency allocation decision on performance utility can be determined in a number of ways. One approach is to assign a weight to each technical component
of the project based upon some qualitative criteria (e.g. performance or criticality) and
then use those weights to select the option that offers the greatest impact on the overall performance utility. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) provides one method of
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assigning these weights (see Section 4.8.1). In the AHP context, performance utility is
written as the weighted sum of the utilities of the project’s different technical components.
A more general approach assumes that the impact can be determined solely in terms of
the magnitude of the contingency dollars allocated, where the adage ‘you get what you
pay for’ is true. This correlates to ‘more expensive is better’. Imagine that one is buying a
computer. For a low price, one gets standard RAM and standard performance. For a much
higher price (such as for a computer cluster), one gets exponentially more performance.
Accepting these assumptions as valid, then allocation of contingency dollars in Phase 1
to technical opportunities will substantially (nonlinearly) increase a project’s performance
utility. When in Phase 2, the project has lost most of the flexibility required to incorporate technical innovations into the baseline and hence, allocation of contingency dollars to
technical opportunities will have no impact on the performance utility. Performance utility
is also influenced (to a lesser degree) by decisions that add reliability. In Phase 1, new
technology decisions dominate the performance utility and U1 is convex. In Phase 2, only
decisions that increase reliability result in an increase in U1 . This impact is linear.
While in Phase 1, the precise details of a project’s schedule have not been specified
because the project design has not yet been finalized. The project finish date appears
to be infinitely far into the future and the allocation of contingency days to a multi-year
schedule that is based on estimated components and a preliminary design has little to no
utility. Conversely, in Phase 2, additional days of schedule float have a great deal of value,
however only up to some upper bound. While it is theoretically possible for one to use all
of a project’s contingency to purchase schedule days, practical realities such as the number
of shifts in a day and the duration over which project personnel can continue to work
safely and productively in a multiple shift scenario, impose an upper bound on this utility.
Additionally, in the extreme case, if only one month remains until the project’s published
finish date, then the project cannot finish more than one month early, regardless of the
number of schedule contingency days purchased. After this maximum number of days have
been allocated, infusion of additional schedule contingency has no impact on the utility.
Consequently, one can observe that U2 is linear in Phase 1 and concave in Phase 2. Scope
utility is a linear function in which each contingency dollar allocated retains one dollar’s
worth of original scope.
These qualitative observations regarding the forms of the different project utility components are depicted graphically in Figure 4.8. Parsing of a project into distinct phases
(in which preferences for the different component utilities are easily discerned), provides a
straightforward mechanism by which to ascertain the utility independence condition discussed earlier.

4.6.1

Comparison with the Linear Utility Model

The convex-concave (CC) model that will be introduced in Section 4.7 captures the same
basic framework used by the CA, D0 and TO Models presented in Chapter 3. For the
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Figure 4.8: Utility Functions by Project Phase
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rest of this thesis, the LU Model will refer, generically, to these three linear utility models.
Both the CC and LU models are stochastic, multi-period contingency allocation decision
models, subject to the same sources of stochasticity. However, the multi-period horizons
are different. The objectives of the two models are also different. The LU model provides
a short term, detailed contingency allocation plan while this chapter’s CC model offers a
summarized long range allocation plan. Hence, the differences between them are the level
of detail that is included, the duration of the planning horizon, the assumptions that are
made and the way in which uncertainty is represented. These differences are described
below.
Planning Horizon
In the LU model, the planning horizon is short (less than a year) and the solutions
offered are at the detailed contingency request basis. In this CC model, the planning
horizon spans the life of the project, and summarized solutions are desired. The
discrete time intervals in the CC model are years (or multiple years) while the LU
model provides a detailed strategy in monthly increments of time.
Decision Variables
The LU model requires detail in terms of the contingency requests (number (or count)
as well as magnitude) in order to provide a detailed plan. Contingency requests are
approved according to priority and a binary decision variable is assigned to each
priority. The aggregate CC model does not trace individual requests but rather
accumulates them under the risk source categories of realized technical risks, new
opportunities and unforeseen events. This higher level formulation does not seek
approval for individual requests and offers a solution at the risk source level. One
might note that the impact of a contingency request on a project’s utility is one way
of determining the priority levels that were assigned to the individual requests in the
LU model.
Additionally, the CC model considers schedule (or time) contingency which was omitted entirely from the LU model. Use of schedule (time contingency) in the short term
is accurately managed by critical path analysis (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2) of the
project schedule and hence, it was not necessary to include this dimension in the
LU model. In the long term, critical path analysis is much less effective and it is
not appropriate to omit schedule risk from a comprehensive contingency allocation
formulation.
The LU model required that individual requests be either fully funded in the current
period or forwarded to a subsequent period for further consideration. In the CC
model, there are no individual requests and it is assumed that the total contingency
dollars that are allocated in a particular period can be used productively.
91

Assumptions
In the LU model, one could not assume that actual performance (in terms of actual costs and commitments) equaled the original baseline plan. This assumption,
however, is valid in a longer range problem. This is because, in the near term, perturbations that result from these variances impact the amount of funding that can
be allocated to contingency requests. However, not only does one lack a basis from
which to inject variances into a longer term model, in the long run, these perturbations tend to be resolved. As an example, a cost variance now can be resolved,
in the future by activities that end up costing less than originally planned or by a
contingency allocation in response to realized cost risks. Therefore, the CC model
assumes that the dollar value of actual costs and commitments on hand at any period
t is equal to the planned work for that period.
Representation of Uncertainty
In the application of the LU model, the random components of the scenario paths
were generated by a discrete set of forecasting strategies unique to the project (as
well as to the status of the project at time t = 0). In the CC model, the only source
of uncertainty is the cost of the technical risks and the unforeseen events (that is, the
realized risks). These values are drawn, with replacement, from a specific distribution
that describes the project’s risks. In general, project risks relate to project activities.
Since project activities occur in specific time spans, the random risk variables are
period-specific; hence, they are are ‘source and time’ independent. This means that
not only are the risk variables in one period independent of those in a subsequent
or prior period, the risk variables of risk source i are independent of those of risk
source j for all periods. This is consistent with the independence of the individual
contingency requests (Property 3) that was articulated in Chapter 3. Realization of
a particular risk in period t does not suggest that a similar (or the same) risk will
occur in period t + 1. As with the LU model, and, for the same reasons, no branching
structure (with respect to history) is employed in the implementation of the model.
These two models are complementary and can be brought together during implementation.
The LU model can provide a detailed plan for one of the periods in the CC plan. A rollinghorizon implementation for both plans minimizes the difference between the uncertainty
portrayed in the model and the actual realizations experienced.

4.7

The Convex-Concave Uncertainty Model

A contingency allocation model must provide an optimal allocation for each period t in the
T period planning horizon. Hence, the decision vectors and the random parameters that
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describe the uncertain future for each period t, t = 1, 2 . . . , T are distinct. In this section,
the random parameters and the decision variables that were referenced in Section 4.6.1 and
were described in the specific instance illustrated by Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3 are explained
in more detail.

4.7.1

Random Variables

Unless action is taken to avert or mitigate potential risks, they are likely to occur. Risks
that occur are called realized risks. Once these risks are realized, then there are only two
courses of action- do something to recover from the impact of the risk or do nothing and
accept whatever consequence has occurred. If one choses to do something, then it is likely
that costs will be incurred. These costs were not anticipated in the baseline and frequently,
the only alternative is to cover this additional effort by a call on the contingency reserve.
The risk management process includes the identification of potential risks, as well as mitigation strategies. Typically, these risks are categorized by type. In the specific instance
described in this chapter, the risks are categorized to be consistent with the different components of a project’s utility function. Therefore, there are three types of realized risks,
technical (1), cost (2) and schedule (3). In the model shown in Figure 4.2, cost and schedule risks were represented by the realized risk identified as ‘Unforeseen events’. Technical
and cost risks impact a project’s scope utility while schedule risk impacts the project’s
schedule utility. The random cost of contingency dollars of risk type i requested in period t
is c̃ti for i = 1, 2, 3 and t = 1, 2 . . . , T . The distribution of these random variables is known
and, as stated earlier, c̃ti is independent of c̃t+1
as well as of both c̃tj and c̃t+1
for all i, j
i
j
pairs for t = 1, 2 . . . , T . Additionally, as with the LU model, it is assumed that c̃ti > 0
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T and i = 1, 2, 3. While it is true that, on actual projects, contingency
requests do arrive that return contingency to the contingency reserve, these are rare events
and thus, are ignored in this model.
action is taken to avert or mitigate potential risks, they are likely to occur. Risks that
occur are called realized risks. Once these risks are realized, then there are only two courses
of action- do something to recover from the impact of the risk or do nothing and accept
whatever consequence has occurred. If one choses to do something, then it is likely that
costs will be incurred. These costs were not anticipated in the baseline and frequently, the
only alternative is to cover this additional effort by a call on the contingency reserve. The
risk management process includes the identification of potential risks, as well as mitigation
strategies. Typically, these risks are categorized by type. In the specific instance described
in this chapter, the risks are categorized to be consistent with the different components
of a project’s utility function. Therefore, there are three types of realized risks, technical
(1), cost (2) and schedule (3). In the model shown in Figure 4.2, cost and schedule risks
were represented by the realized risk identified as ‘Unforeseen events’. Technical and cost
risks impact a project’s scope utility while schedule risk impacts the project’s schedule
utility. The random cost of contingency dollars of risk type i requested in period t is c̃ti
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for i = 1, 2, 3 and t = 1, 2 . . . , T . The distribution of these random variables is known
and, as stated earlier, c̃ti is independent of c̃t+1
as well as of both c̃tj and c̃t+1
for all i, j
i
j
pairs for t = 1, 2 . . . , T . Additionally, as with the LU model, it is assumed that c̃ti > 0
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T and i = 1, 2, 3. While it is true that, on actual projects, contingency
requests do arrive that return contingency to the contingency reserve, these are rare events
and thus, are ignored in this model.
Opportunities are not random variables in this formulation. The costs of opportunities can neither be forecasted from historical data nor drawn from a specific distribution.
Hence, unlike realized risks, there is no random cost component for opportunities and
opportunities are represented in the model only via the use of continuous, non-negative
decision variables. The decision variables are described in Section 4.7.2.
The collection of random variables over a T period planning horizon is

ξ˜ = c̃t1 , c̃t2 , c̃t3 ; t = 1, 2 . . . , T

(4.8)

If the vector of realized risk contingency costs at time t is described by ζ̃ t , then, for
t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,

ζ̃ t = c̃t1 , c̃t2 , c̃t3
n
o
ξ˜t = ζ̃ 1 , . . . , ζ̃ t

(4.10)

ζ̃ t ∈ <3 and ξ˜t ∈ <3t

(4.11)

(4.9)

where the t period evolution of random variables is denoted by ξ˜t and that for the complete
˜ This vector
T period planning horizon is ξ˜T = {ζ̃ 1 , . . . , ζ̃ T } where ξ˜T ∈ <3T and ξ˜T ≡ ξ.
of requested contingency dollars, ξ˜t , belongs to the probability space (Ω, F, P ) where F t
is the domain of all possible realizations of ξ˜t up to period t and P (Ω) = 1.

4.7.2

Decision Variables

The decision variables distinguish between the two major classes of risk sources that were
identified in Figure 4.2. These are realized risk responses (1) and decisions that exercise
opportunities (2). The particular instance represented in this chapter considers three types
of realized risks and three types of opportunities.
Realized Risks
Realized Risks that use Cost Contingency
There are two types of realized risk decisions that call upon cost contingency, technical
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risks (1) and cost risks (2) and the decision xti represents the fraction of contingency
dollars of type i that is allocated in period t for i = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2 . . . , T . The
decision variable xti , is a continuous variable between 0 and 1.
However, notice that the decision xti depends on the t observed realizations (ζ 1 , . . . , ζ t )
thus far and must account for the uncertainties of contingency requests of the future.
This allocation decision is non-anticipative, i.e., xti ≡ xti (ζ 1 , ζ 2 , . . . , ζ t ) and it is not
adapted to any specific set of realizations of the future, (ζ t+1 , ζ t+2 , . . . , ζ T ). The
total realized technical and cost risk contingency dollars allocated in period t under
historical scenario ξ˜t is Rt (ξ˜t ) where
R (ξ˜t ) =
t

2
X

cti (ζ̃ t )xti (ξ˜t )

(4.12)

i=1

Realized Risks that use Schedule Contingency
The third realized risk decision variable, xt3 , represents the fraction of realized schedule risk days that are utilized in period t; xt3 is also continuous between 0 and 1.
Let γ represent the average daily cost (or premium cost) of one project day (γ can
be determined by the project manager from the current project plan). Like xti (ξ˜t ),
xt3 (ξ˜t ) is non-anticipative. The total schedule days allocated to realized schedule risks
in period t under historical scenario ξ˜t is E t (ξ˜t ) where
ct (ζ̃ t ) t ˜t
E t (ξ˜t ) = 3
x3 (ξ )
γ

(4.13)

The total schedule contingency dollars allocated to realized schedule risks in period
t under historical scenario ξ˜t is Dt (ξ˜t ) where
Dt (ξ˜t ) = ct3 (ζ̃ t )xt3 (ξ˜t ).

(4.14)

New Opportunities
The second risk source classification identified in Figure 4.2 is opportunities. The opportunity decision variable, yjt , is non-negative and continuous and represents the total
contingency dollars allocated to type j opportunities in period t where opportunities contribute to two of the three component utilities, performance (U1 ) and schedule (U2 ). There
are no scope opportunities, only scope risks. However, as per Table 4.1, there are two
distinct types of opportunities that contribute to performance utility, new technology and
economies of scale. Since they do not have equal influence the performance utility, this
distinction is important. As per Section 4.4, Phase 1 decisions that result in incorporation of new technology have a greater impact on performance utility than those that
increase reliability. Let the variables y1t and y2t refer to new technology (1) and economy of
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scale (2) decisions and y3t refer to schedule opportunities, for all t = 1, 2 . . . , T . The nonanticipativity requirement also applies to yjt such that yjt cannot depend on any specific
sequence of future events (ζ t+1 , ζ t+2 , . . . , ζ T ) or decisions (yjt+1 , yjt+2 , . . . , yjT ). The total
contingency dollars allocated to opportunities in period t under historical scenario ξ˜t is
Ot (ξ˜t ) where
Ot (ξ˜t ) =

3
X

yjt (ξ˜t )

(4.15)

j=1

and the total dollar contribution to schedule utility in period t under historical scenario ξ˜t
is F t (ξ˜t ) where
F t (ξ˜t ) = Dt (ξ˜t ) + y3t (ξ˜t ).

(4.16)

The decisions y3t and xt3 are not independent. If a project has used all of its schedule float
via xt3 decisions, then the only additional source of schedule float is via the cost contingency
reserve through y3t decisions (which effectively ‘buy’ time). In general, one would not choose
to use cost contingency for schedule days if schedule float was still available. While schedule
days can be purchased, the concept of selling schedule days has no meaning. In other words,
one can transform money into time by buying additional people, resources and the like.
However, one can only transform time into money by being efficient (or, by not doing the
task or activity at all). Hence, schedule float cannot be used to address cost or technical
risks or to take advantage of technical opportunities. Therefore, y3t decisions are influenced
by the current
schedule allocation decision xt3 as well as those made in prior periods,
Pt−1 jperiod
t
that is j=1 x3 + x3 .
From a project execution standpoint, it is more important for the project manager
to make decisions that mitigate risks that have been realized than to take advantage of
opportunities. As an example, if power supplies were damaged as they were offloaded from
a truck, repair or replacement of those power supplies is more important than exercising
an opportunity to buy spare power supplies. In this example, working power supplies are
essential for project completion; spare power supplies simply enhance reliability. To ensure
that the model’s optimal decision strategy mimics this real-life preference between risks
and opportunities, a penalty term that indicates the degree to which these realized risks
have been satisfied will be included in the objective function of the convex-concave model.

4.7.3

Decision Strategy

The total contingency dollars allocated in period t under historical scenario ξ˜t is B t (ξ˜t )
where
B t (ξ˜t ) = Rt (ξ˜t ) + Ot (ξ˜t ) + Dt (ξ˜t )
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(4.17)

and B t (ξ˜t ), Rt (ξ˜t ), Ot (ξ˜t ) and Dt (ξ˜t ) are all random variables. Recall that the project span
can be separated into two phases, Phase 1 (risk-seeking) and Phase 2 (risk-averse) and that
the utilities in each phase are different. Let τ be the first period of Phase 2. Then, the
project’s utility in period t as a result of the allocation decisions made under historical
scenario ξ˜t , for t < τ is




UPt 1 xt1 (ξ˜t ), xt2 (ξ˜t ), xt3 (ξ˜t ), y1t (ξ˜t ), y2t (ξ˜t ), y3t (ξ˜t ) = w11 U1P 1 y1t (ξ˜t ), y2t (ξ˜t )




(4.18)
+w21 U2P 1 y3t (ξ˜t ), xt3 (ξ˜t ) + w31 U3P 1 xt1 (ξ˜t ), xt2 (ξ˜t )
where the subscript P1 indicates Phase 1 and w11 , w21 and w31 are the non-negative scaling
3
X
constants applied to the different utility components, where
wi1 = 1. The Phase 2
i=1

(t ≥ τ ) utility for period t under historical scenario ξ˜t is




UPt 2 xt1 (ξ˜t ), xt2 (ξ˜t ), xt3 (ξ˜t ), y1t (ξ˜t ), y2t (ξ˜t ), y3t (ξ˜t ) = w12 U1P 2 y1t (ξ˜t ), y2t (ξ˜t )




+ w22 U2P 2 y3t (ξ˜t ), xt3 (ξ˜t ) + w32 U3P 2 xt1 (ξ˜t ), xt2 (ξ˜t )
(4.19)
where, again, phase is identified by the subscript P2 and w12 , w22 and w32 indicate the
corresponding Phase 2 non-negative scaling constants (which also sum to 1). Note that
UPt 1 and UPt 2 : <6 → <1
Let the vectors of realized technical, cost and schedule risk allocation decisions though
period t be denoted by
X1t (ξ˜t ) = (x11 (ξ˜t ), x21 (ξ˜t ), . . . , xt1 (ξ˜t ))
X t (ξ˜t ) = (x1 (ξ˜t ), x2 (ξ˜t ), . . . , xt (ξ˜t ))

2
t ˜t
X3 (ξ )

=

2
2
2
1 ˜t
2 ˜t
t ˜t
(x3 (ξ ), x3 (ξ ), . . . , x3 (ξ )).

(4.20)
(4.21)
(4.22)

Following this same symmetry for Yj (ξ˜t ), j = 1, 2, 3, let the realized risk and opportunity
decision vectors be identified as


Xt (ξ˜t ) = X1t (ξ˜t ), X2t (ξ˜t ), X3t (ξ˜t )
(4.23)


Yt (ξ˜t ) = Y1t (ξ˜t ), Y2t (ξ˜t ), Y3t (ξ˜t )
(4.24)
˜
Additionally, let XT (ξ˜T ) ≡ X(ξ).
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Hence, one can describe the total project utility through the end of the T period
planning horizon by


X
UPt 1 xt1 (ξ˜t ), xt2 (ξ˜t ), xt3 (ξ˜t ), y1t (ξ˜t ), y2t (ξ˜t ), y3t (ξ˜t )
(4.25)
UP =
t<τ

+

X



UPt 2 xt1 (ξ˜t ), xt2 (ξ˜t ), xt3 (ξ˜t ), y1t (ξ˜t ), y2t (ξ˜t ), y3t (ξ˜t )

t≥τ

where


˜ Y(ξ)
˜
UP ≡ UP X(ξ),

(4.26)

These incremental allocation decisions must satisfy certain budget and policy constraints period-by-period. Let the vector of realized risk allocation decisions in period t be
described as v t = (xt1 , xt2 , xt3 ) and let the vector of realized risk allocation decisions through
period t be represented by Vt = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v t ). Let S 0 represent the number of days of
schedule float available at period t = 0. The current period decisions xti (for i = 1, 2, 3)
and yjt (for j = 1, 2, 3) are dependent on all prior allocation decisions through period t − 1
as well as the current random variable ζ̃ t . The dynamics of these decisions can then be
generically represented by the following system of constraints at period t.

ζ̃ t




t−1 X
3
3

0 X
0 X


yij (ξ˜t−1 )
v t (ξ˜t ) +
yjt (ξ˜t ) = ht − ξ˜t−1 Vt−1 (ξ˜t−1 ) +




j=1 i=1
j=1




t

0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2, 3




t

yj ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2



t
X

 0 if S 0 −


S 0 xk3 > 0

t

y3 =


k=1






≥ 0 otherwise.




t
t
t
t

v = (x1 , x2 , x3 )




t
1 2
t
V = (v , v . . . , v )

A

where ht is a generic representation of the deterministic right hand side vector at period t.
As discussed in Section 4.4, the specification of y3t forces the use of schedule contingency
before cost contingency is used to purchase schedule days.
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The objective is to maximize the total utility of the contingency allocation decisions
and hence, the CC model can be written as
h 

i
CC Model: Φt (ξ˜t−1 ) = max Eζ̃ t |ξ̃t−1 UPt Xt (ξ˜t ), Yt (ξ˜t ) + Φt+1 (ξ˜t )
(4.27)
xti ,yjt

Subject to: A

(4.28)

where Eζ̃ t |ξ̃t−1 [ · ] is the conditional expectation operator and the expectation is taken
with respect to the probability domain of ξ˜ denoted by the measurable probability space
(Ω, F, P ).
The CC Model represented by Equations 4.27 and 4.28 is a multi-period stochastic
programming model. These types of models have been vastly addressed in literature (see,
for example [12, 18, 32, 39, 40, 136, 138] as well as Chapter 3). As in Chapter 3, the problem
can be represented by a series of single stage problems [13].
The first period formulation is
"

!

Φ0 = maxEξ̃1 UP X1 (ξ˜1 ), Y1 (ξ˜1 )
xti ,yjt

#
+ Φ2 (ξ˜1 )

(4.29)

Subject to:
ζ̃

1



3
0 X
1
˜
v (ξ ) +
yj1 (ξ˜1 ) = h1
1

(4.30)

j=1

0 ≤ x1i ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2, 3

(4.31)

yj1

≥ 0 for j = 1, 2
(
0 if S 0 − S 0 x13 > 0
1
y3 =
≥ 0 otherwise.

(4.32)

v 1 = (x11 , x12 , x13 )

(4.34)

(4.33)

As in Chapter 3, there is no decision at t = 0. Modeling the uncertainty space is not only
difficult but also suffers from Bellman’s ‘Curse of Dimensionality’. Hence, as in Chapter 3,
by assuming knowledge of the entire scenario, this multi-period stochastic model will be
collapsed to a static multi-period model in which the allocation decisions can be determined
at time t = 0. This approach couples computational simplicity with the ability to represent
the dynamic environment. Using the Phase 1 and Phase 2 distinctions articulated in
Section 4.7.3, an equivalent, deterministic, path dependent formulation for the model in
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Equations 4.29 to 4.34 can be written as
" M
#
X

D
t
t
t
DCC Model: Φ = max
pm UP 2 X (ξm ), Y (ξm )
xti ,yjt
t<τ

m=1
M
X

"
+ max
xti ,yjt
t≥τ

#
qm UPt 2

t

t


X (ξm ), Y (ξm )

(4.35)

m=1

Subject to:
3
t−1 X
3
0 X
0 X
t
t
t
t−1
t−1
t−1
ζm
v t (ξm
) +
yjt (ξm
) = ht − ξm
Vt−1 (ξm
) +
yij (ξm
)
j=1

(4.36)

j=1 i=1

for m = 1, 2, . . . , M
0 ≤ xti ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2, 3 , t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(4.37)

yjt

(4.38)

≥ 0 for j = 1, 2 , t = 1, 2, . . . , T

t
X

 0 if S 0 −
S 0 xk3 > 0 , t = 1, 2, . . . , T
y3t =
k=1


≥ 0 otherwise.
v t = (xt1 , xt2 , xt3 ) , t = 1, 2, . . . , T
t

1

2

t

V = (v , v . . . , v ) , t = 1, 2, . . . , T
M
X
m=1
M
X

(4.39)
(4.40)
(4.41)

pm = 1

(4.42)

qm = 1

(4.43)

m=1
t is a generic representation of one of the discrete number of M potential futures
where ξm
at period t. However, as in Chapter 3, there is no guarantee that the optimal solution
to the DCC Model in Equations 4.35 to 4.43 will be feasible, let alone optimal, in a
specific realization of the future. In the LU model, this was addressed by requiring that
the optimal solution under the ∆0 -policy (Equations 3.28 to 3.33) be feasible under all
realizations. However, this solution could be considered ‘overly conservative’ and run the
risk of leaving unallocated contingency on the table at the end of the project. The TO
Model (Equations 3.40-3.44) responds to this concern by providing a range of solutions,
one of which is precisely the optimal ∆0 policy solution.
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As with the LU model, implementation of this model will require inclusion of an ‘appropriate’ number of potential futures that ensure that the solution is representative of the
sample space. In this case, however, the number of futures is not bounded. As with the LU
model, stability of the objective function value will demonstrate the fact that the sample
space has been appropriately represented in the model. And, as with the LU model, incorporating a rolling-horizon implementation allows the most current information to form
the basis for generation of the uncertain futures.
In Section 4.5, a project’s utility was shown to be both convex and concave and that
these features occur in different phases. This convexity of the objective function and
constraints in the models represented by the CC and DCC Models Equations 4.29 to 4.34
and Equations 4.35 to 4.43 allows the use of KKT optimality conditions to ensure a global
optimal solution has been attained [66, 138].

4.8

Specifying a Project Specific Utility Function

Pidd [111] comments that the first assumption in a utility-based approach is that it is
possible to measure the utility of any outcome. Many authors [10, 47, 54, 68, 74, 76, 78, 111]
have commented on the difficulties associated with eliciting appropriate utility functions
and have recommended methods by which to do so. These methods all involve elicitation
of the preferences of the decision maker. In this section, two slightly different methods are
described. One method has been used by Riggs et al [124] in the project context; the other
is a new approach that has not been found in existing literature nor in practice. This latter
method is called the Project Characteristics approach.

4.8.1

Analytic Hierarchy Process

Accorsi et al [2] combined Saaty’s Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) with concepts of
fuzzy set theory to elicit utility functions from stakeholders in an environmental restoration project. After determining key performance measures for this particular project, they
determined membership functions for each measure for the qualities of Best, Moderate
and Worst. The consequence of each particular decision was assigned a membership value.
Using the AHP, they determined appropriate weights for Best, Moderate and Worst which
defined the utility of each outcome. Using both of these pieces of information, they generated a utility function which, for a particular decision x, is expressed as
P
(utility of an outcome) × (membership)
P
U(x) =
(4.44)
(membership)
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [126,127,129–132] is way to handle quantifiable
and/or intangible criteria in the decision making process. It is a multi-objective multicriteria decision-making approach that is based on the idea of pairwise comparisons of
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alternatives with respect to a given criterion (e.g., which alternative, A or B, is preferred
and by how much more is it preferred) or with respect to a goal (e.g., which is more
important, A or B, and how much more important is it). In these examples, importance
and preferences are different. By employing pairwise comparisons, the relative importance
of one criteria over another can be easily assessed. This concept was pioneered by Thomas
Saaty in the late 70’s and has risen in popularity over the last 20 years.
AHP is easy to use and its results are generally accepted [126]. By elicitation, a series of
decision matrices can be generated that set the weights for the different project attributes
and can be used to establish the corresponding utility functions.

4.8.2

Project Characteristics

In this section, the new method is introduced. This proposed Project Characteristics
approach utilizes some fundamental characteristics exhibited by all projects to develop the
utility functions. The characteristics identified are those that have repeatedly appeared
during my 10-plus years of ‘real world’ experience with projects. The proposed technical,
performance and scope utility functions, as described in terms of these characteristics, are
introduced in the following paragraphs. A brief justification to support these concepts is
also provided. In all cases, Phase 1 refers to the convex utility function and Phase 2 refers
to the concave utility function.
Performance Utility. It is assumed, as stated earlier, that ‘bigger is better’. Recall the
example of a computer purchase in which the purchase of a computer cluster is much
more expensive than that of a regular PC but offers exponentially better performance.
In this approach, this same assumption is applied to approved contingency requests
for new technology. Consequently, U1 will be considered to be nonlinear with respect
to new technology (y1t ). Recall that it is difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate
new technology once a project has entered Phase 2. This is because, once a project
is in Phase 2, the designs have been ‘frozen’, many procurements have been awarded
and construction has begun. Hence it is assumed that, in Phase 2, U1 increases at
most linearly when contingency requests for new technology are approved.
Contingency allocation decisions that take advantage of economy of scale procurements or enhance reliability have a smaller impact on a project than those decisions
that add new technology. While reliability is an important (sometimes critical) aspect
of the finished project, typically, it is overshadowed by the capability to deliver stateof-the-art performance. As a result, it is assumed that a project’s utility increases
linearly with respect to contingency allocation decisions that enhance reliability (y2t );
this is true in both project phases.
Schedule Utility. As stated earlier, at the beginning of a project, time is infinite and
a contingency allocation decision that increases schedule float (to ensure on-time
or ahead of schedule completion) has little impact on a project’s utility. Conversely,
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when time is scarce (the project is in Phase 2), decisions that increase the probability
that a project will meet its finish date have a large impact on a project’s utility.
Scope Utility. Scope utility is a measure of the value that the project earns by making
decisions that retain all the original scope promised to the project sponsor. In this
chapter, it is assumed that all decisions that impact scope impact a project’s scope
utility in a linear fashion. The scope definition of a project can be viewed as a
contract with the sponsor [113]. A failure to deliver this scope is a violation of that
contract. In this sense there is no distinction between a ‘small’ violation and a ‘large’
violation and this is the argument on which the assumption that scope utility is linear
(or risk neutral) is based.
Using these characteristics, the component utilities of a project can be developed. Suggested component utilities based on these concepts are introduced below. These are described with respect to ξ t , a particular generic realization of ξ˜t through period t. In all
cases, it is assumed that the utility functions within each phase are twice continuously
differentiable.
In this approach, it is desired that all utilities be measured using a [0, 1] scale. This
permits a straightforward way of understanding the value (or meaning) of the
 component
utilities. As an example, in the case of performance utility, U1t y1t (ξ t ), y2t (ξ t ) = 0 suggests

that there have been no improvements in a project’s performance while U1t y1t (ξ t ), y2t (ξ t ) =
1 indicates the maximum potential
improvement. In the case of the scope or schedule

utilities, when U2t y3t (ξ t ), xt3 (ξ t ) = 1 or U3t xt1 (ξ t ), xt2 (ξ t ) = 1, contingency allocation

t y t (ξ t ), xt (ξ t ) =
decisions have preserved
all
the
project’s
scope
or
schedule
float.
When
U
2
3
3

0 or U3t xt1 (ξ t ), xt2 (ξ t ) = 0, then no contingency allocation decisions were made to avert
realized risks and retain the project’s schedule float or scope.
All of the component utilities are assumed to be additively separable in terms of the
respective decision vectors. That is, for example,



U1T y11 (ξ T ), y21 (ξ T ), . . . , y1T (ξ T ), y21 (ξ T ) =U1T y11 (ξ T ) + U1T y21 (ξ T )


+ . . . + U1T y1T (ξ T ) + U1T y2T (ξ T )
(4.45)

Performance Utility: U1t y1t (ξ t ), y2t (ξ t )
Performance utility is impacted only by contingency decisions for new technology (y1t )
and economy of scale procurements or improvements in reliability (y2t ). It is assumed
that no contingency request will reduce technical capability; approved contingency
requests can only increase technical utility. As per the generalized characteristics
described above, a small increase in the project’s total cost (a small request for contingency) will result in a small increase in technical capability while a large increase
in cost will result in a much much larger increase in capability. Therefore, one way
of describing the performance utility of a project through period t (where t < τ ) for
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future ξ t (a generic realization of ξ˜t ) is by the quadratic
U1tP 1

y1t (ξ t ), y2t (ξ t )



=

t h
X

i2

y1k (ξ k )



+

y2k (ξ k )

(4.46)

k=1

In Phase 2, incorporation of new technology is not a feasible option. However, improvement of existing systems and/or reliability through additional equipment, the
purchase of spares, additional testing and other similar activities is still of value. As
per the Project Characteristics, for t ≥ τ (the project is in Phase 2)
U1tP 2

y1t (ξ t ), y2t (ξ t )



=

t 
X


y2k (ξ k )

(4.47)

k=τ

The project’s total performance utility can be written as
X
X



U1t Y1t (ξ), Y2t (ξ) = b1
U1P 1 y1t (ξ t ), y2t (ξ t ) + b2
U1P 2 y1t (ξ t ), y2t (ξ t ) (4.48)
t<τ

t≥τ


where b1 and b2 are non-negative constants that normalize U1t Y1t (ξ), Y2t (ξ) to [0, 1].

Schedule Utility: U2t y3t (ξ t ), xt3 (ξ t )

Schedule utility, U2t y3t (ξ t ), xt3 (ξ t ) , is also phase dependent. The schedule utility, for
t < τ , through period t on a particular realized future ξ t is
!
t
t
X
X

1
U2tP 1 y3t (ξ t ), xt3 (ξ t ) =
xk3 (ξ k ) +
y3k (ξ k )
(4.49)
d
k=1

k=1

where d is the maximum amount of cost contingency that can be used to purchase
schedule days. This is set a priori by the project manager based upon the particular
project conditions (see Section 4.6). If the demands are met (the risks are averted),
then schedule utility is high. In Phase 2, it is assumed that schedule utility assumes
a concave shape and one way of defining the schedule utility is by

U2tP 2

v
!
u t
t
u X

1X k k
t t
t t
k k
t
y3 (ξ ), x3 (ξ ) =
x3 (ξ ) +
y3 (ξ )
d
k=τ
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k=τ

(4.50)

The total schedule utility, over both phases, can be written as
X
X



U2P 2 y3t (ξ t ), xt3 (ξ t )
U2P 1 y3t (ξ t ), xt3 (ξ t ) + b4
U2t Y3t (ξ t ), Xt3 (ξ t ) = b3
t<τ

t≥τ

(4.51)

where b3 and b4 are non-negative scalars that normalize U2t Y3t (ξ t ), Xt3 (ξ t ) to [0, 1].

Scope Utility: U3t xt1 (ξ t ), xt2 (ξ t )

U3t xt1 (ξ t ), xt2 (ξ t ) is linear with respect to approved realized risk contingency requests
xt1 and xt2 and is the measure
of how much of the original scope is preserved on the

project. U3t xt1 (ξ), xt2 (ξ t ) is not phase dependent and, for a particular realization of
the future, ξ t through period t, for all t ≤ T
t X
2
X

U3t Xt1 (ξ t )), Xt2 (ξ t ) = b5
xki (ξ k )

(4.52)

k=1 i=1

where b5 is the non-negative normalizing constant. Note that, in a case where
1
xki (ξ k ) ∈ [0, 1] and i = 2, it follows that b5 = 2t
. U3 xt1 (ξ), xt2 (ξ t ) is described
by the same function in each period t and represents the fraction of original scope
that is still remaining at the end of period t.
The total project utility can then be expressed as
UPt


X 

2
X (ξ ), Y (ξ ) =b1
y1t (ξ t ) + y2t (ξ t ) + b3
t

t

t

t

t<τ

t<τ

+ b5

2
XX
t≤T i=1

X

xt3 (ξ t )

!
1X t t
+
y (ξ )
d t<τ 3

v

u
u X
X
X
1
u
xti (ξ t ) + b2
y2t (ξ t ) + b4 t
y3t (ξ t )
xt3 (ξ t ) +
d
t≥τ

t≥τ

t≥τ

(4.53)
In Section 4.5.1, risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviors were supported by calculation of
the Arrow-Pratt local risk aversion measures. These, however, are defined in terms of a
single attribute. Keeney [75] observed that a conditional risk aversion measure for multiattribute utility functions can be viewed in terms of partial derivatives, resulting in an
attribute-specific risk measure. He notes that this is a reasonable assumption in that, if
the risk is associated with one attribute and all other attributes remain constant, then the
decision maker’s attitude towards risk depends only on that one attribute. Applying this
partial derivative approach to the project utility function in Equation 4.53 for any period
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t < τ (the project is in Phase 1) and omitting the scaling constants, one can see that
0
with respect to x1 , r(x1 ) = − = 0
1
0
with respect to x2 , r(x2 ) = − = 0
1
0
with respect to x3 , r(x3 ) = − = 0
1
2
<0
with respect to y1 , r(y1 ) = −
2y1
0
with respect to y2 , r(y2 ) = − = 0
1
0
=0
with respect to y3 , r(y3 ) = −
1/d

(4.54)
(4.55)
(4.56)
(4.57)
(4.58)
(4.59)

which thus confirm that, in Phase 1, a project’s utility is risk-seeking with respect
to new technology decisions and risk-neutral with respect to all others. In Phase 2, the
project’s utility is risk averse with respect to contingency allocations that impact schedule
utility and risk neutral with respect to all others.

4.9

Constraints

In Section 4.7, the constraints were represented in a generalized form. The constraints
in this convex-concave contingency allocation problem are similar to those that apply to
the linear utility models presented in Chapter 3. These constraints are associated with
available funding and maintenance of an adequate contingency reserve. Again, these are
depicted with reference to ξ t , a particular generic realization of the random variables. The
decision variables were described in Section 4.7.2.
Remaining Contingency Reserve
Designate the amount of contingency available at period t = 0 (the amount of contingency brought forth into the model) as χ0 . The total amount of contingency allocated
in period t on future ξ t has been described as B t (ξ t ) (Equation 4.17). The available
contingency reserve at the end of period t, χt is given by
χt (ξ t ) = χ0 −

t
X

B k (ξ k ).

(4.60)

k=1

Contingency Reserve Relative to Remaining Work
The remaining work at the end of period t, H t (ξ t ) is comprised of the originally
planned work (as per the incremental BCWS values that defined the project’s baseline
profile) and the amount of work represented by the contingency requests that were
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approved in period t but were not accomplished in period t. Let υ, where 0 ≤ υ ≤ 1,
represent the fraction of approved contingency request work that is accomplished in
period t. Then, the work remaining at the end of period t is described by
H t (ξ t ) =

T
X

BCW S j + (1 − υ)B t (ξ t ).

(4.61)

j=t+1

Note that H t (ξ t ) ≥ 0. Let pt denote the percentage of remaining contingency, relative
to the remaining work, that is required at the end of period t. The constraint that
ensures that the minimum required amount of contingency is still in reserve at the
end of each period t is given by
χt (ξ t )
≥ pt
H t (ξ t )

(4.62)

which, is equivalent to the linear constraint
χt (ξ t ) − pt H t (ξ t ) ≥ 0.

(4.63)

Available Funding
Let Gt designate the cumulative amount of funding available through period t and
let W t represent the amount of original baseline project work accomplished through
period t where
t
X
t
W =
BCW S j .
(4.64)
j=1

One can ensure that the amount of funding that is available is not exceeded by
requiring that
t
X
t
t
G −W −
B k (ξ k ) ≥ 0.
(4.65)
k=1

Note that aligning the periods in the CC model with the fiscal years of the project
eliminates the need for fiscal year funding constraints. Since funding for government
sponsored projects arrives in fiscal year increments, typically, government projects
are already aligned in this way. Since these projects are planned with respect to fiscal
year boundaries, aligning periods with fiscal years has practical benefits.
Schedule Contingency
Schedule contingency is defined as the number of days of float in a project; that is,
it is the number of days that a project can lose over time (due to delays or unanticipated additional effort) without finishing late. Contingency requests for realized
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schedule risks consume schedule float. This utility based model offers the opportunity to recover this loss by ‘purchasing’ schedule float. In order to ensure that the
decisions made regarding contingency requests do not jeopardize the project’s finish
date, schedule contingency constraints are incorporated into the formulation. Let S 0
represent the number of days of float at period t = 0, the start of the model and recall
that γ represents the average (or premium) daily cost of the project. The number of
days of float that have been consumed through period t, by approved realized schedt
X
ule risk contingency requests, has been defined (in Section 4.7.2) as
E k (ξ k ) and
k=1

the number of days of float that have been ‘purchased’ by exercising opportunities
t
X
through period t is γ1
y3k (ξ k ). Thus, to ensure that the project will finish on time
k=1

for each period t, one must enforce
0

S −

t
X
k=1

4.10

t
1X k k
y3 (ξ ) ≥ 0.
E (ξ ) +
γ
k

k

(4.66)

k=1

Empirical Analysis

In this section, the convex-concave (CC) utility model is evaluated using actual data from
an ongoing project. At the time of this analysis, this project was just beginning and 4
(of a total of 5) years remain to project completion. Thus, the planning horizon spans
four periods. From the original project plan data (the planned BCWS), the project is
planned to be 22.4%, 59.6%, 97.7% and 100% complete at the end of each period. Thus, 2
periods are in Phase 1 and 2 periods are in Phase 2. The periods coincide with fiscal year
boundaries.

4.10.1

Generation of Random Variables

The realizations of the random contingency cost variables are generated from the project’s
risk register. A risk register includes a description of the risks as well as a quantified
potential impact to the project (in terms of dollars and in terms of time (schedule)). This
particular risk register provides a detailed list of 1,212 potential contingency requests,
by type and by period, over the life of the project (that is, until project completion).
Additionally, in this particular case, all the risks are valued in terms of dollars. Hence,
there is a cost for a cost risk, a cost for a schedule risk and a cost for a technical risk.
These values are fitted with triangular distributions. The triangular distribution is one
of the distributions recommended for project activities. Existing research related to the
distributions of project activities was discussed in Section 2.3.2. Crystal Ball c Monte
Carlo simulation is used to generate 80 sets of these parameters for each specific risk
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element in the risk register. As an example, the parameters that are assigned to a sample
of the 1,212 individual risk items, along with the specific activity to which these risks are
associated in the risk register, are shown in Table 4.2. In this table, there are no technical
risks for period period 4 because there were no technical risks in the risk register for that
period.
Once these values are generated, a multiplier from 0 to 1 is drawn randomly from a
uniform distribution. This value represents the probability of occurrence of the particular
risk (that is, it could occur, it could not occur or some fraction of it could occur). These
probability values are multiplied by the cost values of the individual risk elements that
were generated from the triangular distribution to yield probability weighted cost impacts
for each risk element.
These detailed values are then aggregated by type and by period, providing the total
dollar value of contingency requested by each type of realized risk for each period t in the
planning horizon. That is, 80 sets of the three cost parameters, cti , for each period t are
generated.
This process can be explained symbolically. Let the costs of the cost, schedule and
technical risks associated with risk item i in period t be identified as ct1i , ct2i and ct3i respectively. Let the nth realization of these values (the nth draw of the Monte Carlo simulation)
be identified as ct1i (n), ct2i (n) and ct3i (n), n = 1, 2, . . . , 80, t = 1, 2, 3, 4. Let the j th random
realization of the uniform random variable for the nth draw be identified as unj .
The procedure for generating the values is as follows:
j=1
For i = 1 to 1, 212 (total number of risk items)
For n = 1 to 80 (total number of desired realizations)
For t = 1 to 4 (total number of periods in the planning horizon)
v1ti (n) = (unj × ct1i (n))
j =j+1
v2ti (n) = (unj × ct2i (n))
j =j+1
v3ti (n) = (unj × ct3i (n))
next t
next n
next i
end
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Table 4.2: Triangular Distribution Cost Parameters for Selected Risk Elements ($)
Risk

Period

1

2
Technical

3

1

2

Schedule

3
4

1

2

Cost

3

4

Min

Mid

Max

Activity Name

257.32
257.41

285.91

314.5

Bid and Review -Vacuum System

286.02

314.62

3,163.74

3,515.26

3,866.79

16,196.62

17,996.24

19,795.87

63.71

70.78

77.86

Review and Bid - Front End Shielding
Design Front End Shielding
5 Channel Bender on site
Accept Sample Lifting Device

163.37

181.53

199.68

5,450.14

6,055.71

6,661.28

154,733.25

171,925.84

189,118.42

884.6

982.89

1,081.18

30,928.96

34,365.51

37,802.06

442.41

491.57

540.72

67.73

75.25

82.78

Accept Sample Environment
Write Focusing Optics Spec

261

295.02

319

128.95

146.44

157.61

19.98

22.54

24.42

Complete Neutron Guide - On Site
Install Detector Mounts
Detectors On Site
Install Test Jaws/Slits
Sample Positioning Assembly - On Site
Install beam stop

Review and Bid - Inst. Encl. Shielding
Accept - Shutter Drive System

28.96

32.18

35.4

20.49

22.76

25.04

Accept - Radial Collimator
Bid and Review - Instrument Platform

55.27

61.7

67.56

224.36

271.51

298.66

64.51

72.2

78.84

Accept - Instrument Enclosure (shield)

Bandwidth Choppers-Pretesting
Instrument Platform - Pre-Testing

171.42

191.35

209.51

Instrument Control Room - Pre-Testing

1,671.63

1,869.75

2,043.1

Install DAS

170.89

189.88

208.86

Install and test beam monitors

1,287.41

1,458.10

1,573.50

Install Stacked Shielding

37.64

41.82

46

Remove Concrete Shutter

126.03

141.99

154.04

Shielding/Seismic Analysis for IE

458.1

517.49

559.91

Design Bandwidth Choppers and Support

49.81

55.82

60.88

132.24

151.63

161.62

Write Get Lost Tube spec

214.1

240.27

261.68

Bid and Review - Detector Array and Mount

152,487.36

171,802.43

186,373.44

64.51

72.2

78.84

Instrument Platform - Pretesting

411.4

457.11

502.83

Install Sample Positioning System

1,623.13

1,803.48

1,983.83

Instrument Platform - On Site

1,744.7

1,938.56

2,132.42

PPS and Beamline Interlocks - On Site

147.32

163.69

180.06

840.39

941.24

1,027.12
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Bid and Review - Instrument Platform

Detectors On Site

Install and test beam monitors
Install Stacked Shielding

Table 4.3: Technical Component Weights and Variable Designators
Component
Weight New Technology Economy of Scale
Variable
Variable
(1) Detectors
0.3187
y11
y21
(2) Optical Components
0.1947
y12
y22
(3) Choppers
0.1601
y13
y23
(4) Sample Environment
0.1223
y14
y24
(5) Shielding
0.0268
y15
y25
(6) Data Acquisition
0.1275
y16
y26
(7) Instrument Specific
0.0250
y17
y27
(8) Instrument Infrastructure 0.0250
y18
y28
These values are then aggregated by type to provide forecasted values for the total
amount of cost, technical and schedule contingency requests for each period t in the planning horizon. This aggregation process can be described symbolically as follows.
For n = 1 to 80
For t = 1 to 4
z1t (n)

=

z2t (n) =
z3t (n) =

1,212
X
i=1
1,212
X
i=1
1,212
X

v1ti (n) (Summarized cost risks by period)
v2ti (n) (Summarized schedule risks by period)
v3ti (n) (Summarized technical risk by period)

i=1

next t
next n
end

4.10.2

Generation of Utility Functions

As presented in Sections 4.6 and 4.8.1, AHP is used to derive the relative weights of the
technical components of the project and the Project Characteristics (Section 4.8.2) are
used to generate the utility functions. The 8 major technical components that comprise
this particular project, along with their AHP weights, are shown in Table 4.3. Hence,
in this analysis, performance utility is itself an additive function comprised of 8 weighted
sub-utilities.

111

4.10.3

Determination of Normalizing and Scaling Constants

The purpose of the normalizing constants is to ensure that one utility is not over-weighted
with respect to another by ensuring their maximum values are on an equivalent measure1
ment scale. The constants for the schedule utility are calculated as follows: b3 = 2t
for
1
t < τ and b4 = √2t for t ≥ τ . Similarly, the constant for scope utility is also based on
the number of periods in the planning horizon. However, it is difficult to determine the
appropriate normalization constant that should be used for the performance utility. In this
particular analysis, the following process is utilized.
1. The average sum of all realized risk dollars (c̄) is calculated from the 80 random
samples mentioned above.
2. The maximum amount of contingency that could be allocated to performance utility
is calculated by subtracting (c̄) from the contingency reserve amount at time t = 0,
(χ0 ). This difference is an estimate of the amount of contingency that would be left
if the average value of realized risks (c̄) is completely covered by draws against the
contingency reserve.
3. Since technological opportunities (in Phase 1) increase performance utility by the
2
square of the contingency dollars allocated, the square of this number ( χ0 − c̄ =
M ) is used as the normalization constant such that b1 = M12 t for t < τ . Performance
utility in Phase 2 is linear and hence, b2 = M1 t for t ≥ τ .
Preferences for the component utilities are assumed to be equal. Thus, the total project
utility scaling constants, wi (Equation 4.7), were defined such that wi = 1/3, i = 1, 2, 3.

4.10.4

Determination of Other Constants

In the linear utility models presented in Chapter 3, there was a fixed offset t̄ that represented
the time lag between approval of the individual contingency request and accomplishment of
that new work. In this convex-concave model, υ (in Equation 4.61) serves a similar purpose.
From hand’s-on experience with other similar projects, the majority of contingency requests
that occur in these types of projects are associated with large procurements which span
several years. Therefore, as an example, a contingency request that is approved in period
t may not get completed until period t + 2. For this particular case study, it is assumed
that 50% of the contingency requests approved in a particular period will be accomplished
in that period and therefore, the value of υ used in the remaining contingency constraint
is set at 0.5.
The premium cost of one project day, γ = $839, was determined from the project schedule and d, the maximum number of schedule contingency days that could be purchased,
was set equal to the total float in the current project schedule, 210 days. When there is a
large amount of float on a project, as in this case, it is reasonable to assume that it cannot
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more than double. When there is only a small amount of float, this assumption may not
be valid. As an example, if a project has 1 month of float remaining, it is possible that the
project can, through re-ordering the schedule and double shifting, increase that float by
more than one month. However, if a project has 1 year of float, it is not likely that actions
can be taken to increase that amount by more than one year.

4.10.5

Benchmarking Model

In order to benchmark the results of the concave-convex utility model, a simple, linear
decision model was developed. This model mimics typical project behavior in regards to
contingency allocation by seeking to allocate the maximum allowable contingency in each
period. This is similar to the myopic policy described in Chapter 3. The allocation decisions for new technologies are weighted in the same way as they are weighted in the
convex-concave model as per Table 4.3. This benchmarking model must satisfy the same
constraints as the DCC model formulated in Equations 4.35 to 4.43. Let the set of DCC
t repModel constraints (Equations 4.36 to 4.43) be referred to as B. As per Table 4.3, y1q
t
resents the contingency dollars allocated to new technologies in period t and y2q represents
the contingency dollars allocated to economies of scale in period t for technical component q, where q = 1, 2 . . . , 8 and s1 , s2 , . . . , s8 are the weights of the different technological
components (as per Table 4.3). Then the benchmarking model can be formulated, for a
particular realization ξnt , as
LDF = max

4
X

t ...,y t
y11
28 t=1
xt1 ...,xt3
y3t

LDF t

(4.67)

Subject to:


t
t
t
t
LDF t = s1 y11
(ξnt ) + y21
(ξnt ) + . . . + s8 y18
(ξnt ) + y28
(ξnt )
+ ct1 (ξnt )xt1 (ξnt ) + ct2 (ξnt )xt2 (ξnt ) + ct3 (ξnt )xt3 (ξnt ) + y3t (ξnt )
t
y1q
≥
t
y2q ≥
8
X

(4.68)

0, q = 1, 2, . . . , 8, t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(4.69)

0, q = 1, 2, . . . , 8, t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(4.70)

si = 1

(4.71)

i=1

Constraint set B ≡ {(4.36)-(4.43)}

(4.72)

Equation 4.68 is the total amount of contingency that is allocated in period t. It is the
weighted sum of the contingency allocation decisions for opportunities plus the sum of the
products of the contingency allocation decisions for realized risks and the costs of those
risks.
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4.10.6

Solution Methodology

In lieu of solving the DCC Model (Equations 4.35 to 4.43) for all possible scenarios, the
sample average approximation (SAA) solution technique is utilized. In the SAA approach,
the expected value function is approximated by a corresponding sample average function [18, 66, 83, 138, 139]. As the sample size increases, the SAA solution converges to the
optimal solution in the expected sense. Since the number of futures in multi-stage problems grows exponentially fast with the dimension of the data, this methodology provides
an efficient solution procedure.
The general form of the true (or exact) problem addressed by the SAA method is
written as
min {g(x) ≡ EP [G(x, W )]}
x∈S

(4.73)

with a corresponding generalized sample average problem of
ĝN (x) ≡

N
1 X
G(x, W n )
N

(4.74)

n=1

where W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W N is a random sample of N realization of the random vector W . In
this chapter, the exact problem is described by the CC Model (Equations 4.29 to 4.34).
The SAA approach assigns equal probability values to all the N futures being evaluated.
This is consistent with the discussion in Section 2.3.5 in which it was claimed that, in
the absence of other information, it is only appropriate to treat all outcomes with equal
likelihood.
Researchers have shown that, with a ‘sufficient’ sample size, the solution of the sample
average approximation problem provides an exact solution to the ‘true’ problem. Let the
optimal solution to the exact problem be denoted by x∗ and that of the SAA problem
as x̂N . Shapiro [137] shows that the sample size that is required to achieve a specific
probability that x∗ = x̂N is proportional to the condition number of the problem. Shapiro
and Homem-de-Mello [139] show that, for a problem of 31000 scenarios, an approximating
problem using N = 150 scenarios yields the exact solution of the problem 95% of the
time. Linderoth et al [87] study numerous empirical examples and show that it is possible
to compute a good solution, with a proven accuracy, of the true problem using the SAA
approach.
By the Law of Large Numbers, ĝN (x) converges to g(x) with probability 1 as N →
∞. Shapiro [137, 139]
shows that the optimal value of the SAA problem converges at a

−1/2
rate of OP N
where P is the distribution of the sample. Shapiro as well as other
researchers have shown that SAA estimators converge exponentially fast to their exact
1
counterpart [83,137,139]. They typically denote this rate as β = 2κ
where κ is the condition
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number of the problem. β [87, 137, 139] can be quantified as follows:
lim N −1 log[1 − P (x∗ = x̂)] ≤ −β

(4.75)

N →∞

The sample average approximation problem is solved and the procedure is repeated
until stopping rules are satisfied. Homem-de-Mello [65] recommends that, when solving
Equation 4.74, paired t-tests be utilized to determine when it is no longer necessary to
increase the sample size. Shapiro [137, 139] suggests that suitable stopping criteria are
analysis of the optimality gap or verification of the KKT optimality conditions.
The sample average approximation problem solved in this case study, henceforth referred to as the DCC SAA model, is written as

DCCSAA Model: ΦSAA = max
xti ,yjt

4
X

t

ΦSAA

(4.76)

t=1

Subject to:
Φ

SAAt

"
N

1 X
=
max UPt 1 Xt (ξnt ), Yt (ξnt )
t
t
N
xi ,yj
n=1

(4.77)

t<τ

#
+ max UPt 2
xti ,yjt
t≥τ

θt =

3−

t
y1t = y11
t
y2t = y21
t
y1q
≥ 0,
t
y2q ≥ 0,


Xt (ξnt ), Yt (ξnt ) − θt

3
X
ct (ξ t ) − ct (ξ t )xt (ξ t )

i=1
t
+ y12
t
+ y22

i

n

i

n

i

!

n

cti (ξnt )

(4.78)

t
+ . . . + y18

(4.79)

t
y28

(4.80)

q = 1, 2, . . . , 8, t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(4.81)

q = 1, 2, . . . , 8, t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(4.82)

+ ... +

Constraint set B ≡ {(4.36)-(4.43)}

(4.83)

where θt is the normalized penalty assigned for not meeting realized risks in each period
t. This penalty term was discussed in Section 4.7.2. Its purpose is to encourage the model
to address realized risks before it allocates contingency to opportunities. Using Homemde-Mello’s [65] recommendation, paired t-tests are used as the stopping criterion. The
results of paired t-tests on the iterates of the DCC SAA formulation (with this particular
set of project data for an α value of 0.05), show that, when N ≥ 42, the optimal solutions
attained for each decision variable at each subsequent iteration are no longer statistically
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Table 4.4: DCC SAA and B SAA Objective Function Values
DCC SAA
B SAA
Contingency Type
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=1 t=2 t=3
New Technology
1.7
97.2
0.0
0.0
56.0
31.5
34.8
Optional Technical
0.0
0.0
32.8
1.1
0.0
0.0
4.3
Technical Risk
3.9
15.6
5.7
0.0
3.9
15.6
5.7
Cost Risk
6.8
17.7
4.2
1.3
6.8
17.7
4.2
Schedule Risk
2.7
8.0
2.5
1.6
2.7
11.6
2.5
Optional Schedule
0.6
0.0
9.4
0.0
9.8
0.0
0.2

t=4
4.1
0.2
0.0
1.3
1.6
0.0

SAA +  where  is random noise. This is consistent
different, that is, that ΦSAA
n+1 = Φn
with the findings of Listes and Dekker [90]. They explored the use of the SAA approach
in the determination of the composition of an airline fleet. While they initially thought
that increasing the number of scenarios would produce significantly better results, they
found that (when evaluating 9 aircraft types), 20-50 independently generated scenarios
were sufficient and that no significant change in the solution occurred after increasing the
number of scenarios over 50.
The optimal objective function values generated using the DCC SAA Model are compared to those obtained from an equivalently averaged benchmarking model (Equations 4.67
to 4.83) to which a penalty has also been applied. This model will be referred to as the
SAA benchmarking model, B SAA . While it is subject to the same constraints as above
(Equations 4.68 to 4.83), its objective function is modified as follows:
(N 4
)
XX

1
BSAA Model: LDF SAA =
LDF t (ξnt ) − Lt
(4.84)
N
n=1 t=1

where the penalty term, Lt is defined as
Lt =

3
X


cti (ξnt ) − cti (ξnt )xti (ξnt )

(4.85)

i=1

In this case, since the objective function value of Equation 4.84 is in dollars, the penalty
term is not normalized. The results of these two formulations, averaged over 42 sets of
random samples, are shown in Table 4.4.
While both models allocate the same amount of contingency dollars over this 4 period
planning horizon, the distribution of the dollars over period and over type are, in general,
different. Both models allocate the same amount of contingency dollars to optional schedule
contingency (the purchase of float). However, the B SAA model allocates these earlier than
the DCC SAA Model. This result is not surprising in that, in the DCC SAA model, schedule
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utility has greater influence on the total project’s utility in Phase 2 while, in the linear
model, all periods are weighted equally for all types of contingency allocation decisions.
One will also note that the benchmarking model allocated contingency dollars for new
technology in periods 3 and 4. As per previous discussions, these dollars cannot be used
for this purpose that late in the project. The realized risk requests are completely satisfied
in both formulations, for all periods.
In order to determine which formulation is better, the two different allocation plans are
compared using a different set of simulated futures. The degree to which the allocation
plans satisfy (or meet) the realized risks in these simulated plans is used to evaluate the
quality of each plan. The better plan is the one that is able to address more of the
project’s realized risks. To perform this comparison, an additional 50 random sets of
parameters (drawn from the same risk register and generated from the same triangular
distributions using Crystal Ball c as before) provide the random realized risk demands. In
this case, however, they are not multiplied by the random uniform variable; the assumption
is that all risks in the risk register would occur with 100% probability. Recall that the
DCC SAA and B SAA plans are generated using parameter sets that, in general, could have
had less exposure to realized risks (due to multiplication by the random uniform variable).
Performing the comparison in this way then allows the allocation plans to be tested against
worst case scenarios (where all possible risks in the risk register actually occur).
The CC SAA and B SAA allocation plans specify the total amount of contingency that
can (optimally) be allocated in a particular period t towards a particular type of risk or
opportunity. In this long-range planning problem, however, t is a summary representation
of much smaller time increments (e.g. years which are comprised of months). During
implementation of the plan, the allocations will not be made at the beginning of period
t but rather, a reservation for the allocations in the specified amounts will be placed.
The contingency dollars designated for opportunities will be allocated as the opportunities
arise. However, if realized risks occur that exceed those anticipated by the plan, then the
remaining contingency dollars planned (but not allocated) for opportunities will be pooled
with those specifically designated for risk responses in an effort to mitigate the risks.
Due to this effect, the allocation of risk and opportunity contingency dollars of DCC SAA
and B SAA are summarized to coincide with the technical, cost and schedule risks in the
following way. Contingency dollars for new technology, exercising options and technological
risks in period t are combined to comprise the technical allocation (e.g. y1t + y2t + ct1 xt1 ),
those for responding to realized schedule risks in period t are combined with those allocated
towards the procurement of schedule float in period t (e.g. ct3 xt3 + y3t ) and contingency
dollars allocated to realized costs risks in period t (ct2 xt2 ) are categorized alone. At the
end of period t, it is assumed that the manager has allocated all of the contingency dollars
that the plan recommended. Therefore, the plans cannot be compared in a cumulative
sense (due to this ‘no carryover’ assumption). The contingency dollars allocated by these
3 groupings for the 4 period DCC SAA and B SAA models are shown in Table 4.5. The
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Table 4.5: DCC SAA and B SAA Optimal Allocations Categorized by Risk Type ($K)
DCC SAA
B SAA
Period
Technical Cost Schedule Total
Technical Cost Schedule Total
t=1
5.69
6.84
3.33
15.85
59.9
6.8
12.5
79.2
t=2
112.65
17.51
7.97
138.13
47.0
17.5
11.7
76.2
t=3
38.62
4.16
11.92
54.70
43.3
4.2
2.7
50.2
t=4
1.11
1.29
1.61
4.01
4.2
1.3
1.6
7.1
percentage of realized risks of each type that are satisfied by the DCC SAA and B SAA
allocation plans, when tested against the 50 different futures, is shown Table 4.6.
The degree to which risks are averted (satisfied by the model) is the measure of performance that is used to compare the two models. Both plans perform the same with respect
to the cost risks. Hence, these data are not included in Table 4.6. However, they perform
differently in the technical and schedule risk areas. all the realized cost risks and both
satisfied some (or all) of the realized technical and schedule risks. On an average basis over
the 4 period planning horizon, the performance of the two formulations is approximately
the same (with that of the B SAA being slightly better). The B SAA plan is superior in
the first period. However, its performance is not as good as DCC SAA in all subsequent
periods. If one compares the average performance over the only the last three periods (the
last column in Table 4.6), one can see that DCC SAA ’s performance far exceeds that of
B SAA . This has some very practical implications.
Recall that if a realized risk occurs towards the end of a project and it cannot be
resolved via the use of contingency dollars, then the only option is to reduce project scope
or increase the total project cost. The latter alternative is more or less equivalent to
professional suicide as it requires the project manager to request additional funds from
the project sponsor. In the case of public projects, the sponsor is the tax payer and any
action to increase the total cost of a project once it is approved is guaranteed to engender
unfavorable publicity and unwanted attention. Hence, if funding and other constraints
limit the amount of contingency that can be allocated, the best decision may be one that
reserves some contingency in earlier periods so that it can be called upon in the future.
Conversely, when a realized risk occurs at the beginning of a project, then, even if
there are insufficient contingency dollars in that period, there remains sufficient time on
the project which one can use to pursue other methods by which to respond to and recover
from this realized risk. The B SAA model optimizes the total contingency allocation from
period to period without viewing one period as more important than another. Hence,
as long as there is contingency available in a particular period, B SAA allocates it while
DCC SAA may reserve it for a period when the utility has a greater impact on the model’s
objective function value. This can be seen from Table 4.7 in which the plans are compared
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Table 4.6: Performance of Allocation Plans Against Realized Risks
Average
Average
Risk Type
Model
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
(t = 1 to) (t = 2 to
t = 4)
t = 4)
SAA
DCC
72.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
93.2%
100.0%
Technical
B SAA
100.0% 73.5% 100.0% 100.0%
93.4%
91.2%
DCC SAA 58.2%
32.3% 100.0% 49.9%
60.1%
60.7%
Schedule
B SAA
100.0% 47.3%
56.0%
49.9%
63.3%
51.1%
DCC SAA 59.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
89.8%
100.0%
All Risks
B SAA
100.0% 61.7% 100.0% 100.0%
90.4%
87.2%
Table 4.7: Unallocated Contingency at the End of Each Period for DCC SAA and B SAA
($)
Model
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
DCC SAA $1,951,440 $593,091 $40,442
$0
SAA
B
$1,326,872 $564,148 $73,264
$0
relative to the amount of unallocated contingency dollars that were remaining at the end
of each period t.
Over all 80 different parameter sets evaluated, the average amount of contingency
left unallocated at the end of period 1 by B SAA is approximately 31% less than that of
DCC SAA while in period 3, B SAA leaves approximately 5% more unallocated contingency
than DCC SAA . The B SAA reserve in period 3 is used to fund technological contingency
requests in period 4. Both models allocate all of the contingency by the end of the planning
horizon (period 4).
Recall that an ideal allocation plan allocates all the cost contingency and allows the
project to finish ahead of schedule. Both DCC SAA and B SAA had the same opportunity
to purchase schedule float (up to some maximum number of days as determined by the
project manager). Some of those days can be used to respond to realized schedule risk
while other days can be used to allow the project to finish early. On the average (over the
first 80 random parameter sets evaluated), the DCC SAA plan finished 154 days early while
the LDF SAA plan anticipated that the project would finish 110 days early. This difference
is an indication of the influence that schedule utility exerts during the latter periods in
DCC SAA .
From these data, one can observe that the DCC SAA formulation is no worse that the
B SAA formulation and outperforms B SAA in the last 3 periods of this 4 period plan. Thus,
one can conclude that a contingency allocation plan based on maximizing the expected
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utility of a project is at least as good as a plan that focuses only on maximizing the allocation of contingency in each period. One can also conclude that the DCC SAA approach
provides a focused allocation plan that supports the project manager’s objectives by enabling on time and within budget completion and does so in a way that is superior to a
plan (at least 75% of the time) generated from a linear decision formulation.

4.11

Conclusion

In this chapter, a project was described in terms of the behavioral attributes associated
with expected utility theory. Using the risk-seeking and risk-averse characteristics of convex
and concave functions, utility functions were developed for the three core metrics of project
success: technological excellence delivered on time and within budget. By recognizing that
project behavior is dependent on the stage of the project, and that risk-seeking and riskaverse behaviors occur at different times, distinct utility functions were defined for both
project phases. By maximizing the expected project utility, subject to business rules and
policy constraints, a long range contingency allocation plan was generated which is optimal,
in an expected sense, over all uncertain futures envisioned. This provides the project
manager with a detailed plan on which to base the irreversible contingency allocation
decisions.
At the end of Chapter 2, five key attributes of a good model were articulated. In
Chapter 3, the linear utility model was evaluated against those criteria. This chapter will
close with a similar assessment of the convex-concave utility model.
1. Address a real problem
At the present time, the only quantitative methods by which to develop a long range
contingency allocation plan are those associated with risk management. While these
approaches provide some basic guidance, they are not specific in terms of how contingency dollars should be allocated such that the project derives the maximum benefit.
Not only does a project manager desire to have a long range plan of how contingency should be allocated, he or she wants a plan that directly contributes to the
on time and within budget completion of the project. A contingency allocation plan
that simply maximizes the contingency dollars allocated over each period does not
accomplish both of these objectives.
2. Be understood by the Project Managers
The expected utility concept is straightforward. In fact, the application of expected
utility theory to project management appears so obvious that it is surprising that
there is not more research on this topic. Elicitation of the utility functions is not
difficult and the plan provided is consistent with a project manager’s intuition. Hence,
the approach and the plan have credibility, the key attributes necessary for acceptance
by a project manager.
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3. Not require information that is not available
The random cost parameters are generated from the project’s risk register. Typically,
the risk register is populated in a rigorous, quantitative way (Section 2.3.5) and therefore, the quality of the data is the best it could possibly be (given the uncertainties
of the future). The SAA approach results in a simple solution methodology.
4. Minimize requirement for probability assignments
The use of the SAA approach eliminates the requirement to assign probabilities to
different futures. The only probabilities assignments involved are those used to generate the random parameters. In this analysis, those were assigned randomly from a
uniform distribution. These probability assignments are not critical to the formulation and were utilized in order to generate a realistic (versus an entirely pessimistic)
realized risk profile.
5. Provide a reasonable solution in a reasonable time
If the SAA approach is utilized, the solution time is dependent on the number of
iterations that are solved.
In summary, this chapter fares quite well against these five criteria. The convex-concave
utility model successfully maximizes the benefit of contingency allocations. Additionally,
it provides a bridge between expected utility theory and the field of project management
which can be the springboard for other research and applications.
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Chapter 5

Conclusions
This dissertation has focused on the project management challenge of contingency allocation. At time ‘now’, the project manager must make a contingency allocation decision.
Not only is the future uncertain, this decision impacts all subsequent decisions. Additionally, the decision is irreversible; once allocated, contingency cannot be recovered. Hoarding
contingency as a hedge against the uncertain future is nearly as bad as free allocation of
the contingency reserve until the entire balance has been depleted. The former represents
the failure to improve the project, the latter jeopardizes project completion by leaving the
project unprotected in the face of technical, cost and schedule risks.
In Chapters 1 and 2, the context in which the contingency allocation problem exists
was established. Existing research, as it relates to the work in this thesis, was summarized.
In Chapters 3 and 4, stochastic programming techniques were used to generate both short
term and long term allocation plans. These techniques drew upon the work of the Management Science and Decision Science communities to the benefit of the Project Management
community. The contingency allocation plans that were developed were evaluated against
empirical data. In both cases, these analyses showed that the formulations proposed produce results that are superior to those of current practices. Hence, the contributions from
this work are practical as well as academic.
The Project Management community is provided with methods by which to generate
credible contingency allocation plans. The Management Science community is introduced,
not only to new sources of stochastic problems, but also to new ways in which these
stochastic problems can be approached. No existing research has been found which utilizes
the techniques proposed for the linear utility model and defining a convex-concave project
utility function in terms of the three parameters of performance, scope and schedule is
entirely unique and original. As Hull and Thomas [68] observed, the linear utility model
implies a constant rate of trade-off between the allocation of contingency and the benefit
derived by the project. The convex-concave model incorporates the fact (observed by
other researchers) that people to do not always make decisions in the same way and that
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preferences can be dependent on the context in which the decision is made. A secondary
contribution lies solely in the uniqueness of the work in this thesis, from the application to
the solution methodology. Saaty [128], in discussing the ways in which creativity could be
improved in OR/MS, describes the nature of this secondary contribution in the following
way:
“excitement should be more about the search for important problems, how to
define them, and how they fit in the general scheme of our system and less
about how we solve them.”
He claims that both colleagues and students are less interested in clever MS techniques
than in the description of our problems and how they fit in the life of society and he goes
on to say
“Mathematics itself has for many practitioners become the sole criterion to
justify the significance of an OR/MS contribution. It is primarily rigor, not
relevance, that seems to be the major concern.”
In this thesis, both rigor and relevance have been combined. The models presented in this
thesis are practical and implementable, largely due to the fact that requirements for probability assignments are minimized. Many stochastic formulations assume that distributions
are known and that probability assignments can be made. In actual practice, knowledge
of probability values and ‘true’ distribution information is difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain and models that rely heavily on this input may be mathematically sound yet have
little practical value.
Not only is this work a prelude to continuing research along the same lines, it raises
some interesting questions that can lead to other avenues of research. As immediate followon research, the difference between conservative and aggressive allocation plans of the TO
Model should be explored against different project data. The ramifications of risk (in
either over or under-allocating contingency) that are suggested should be vetted empirically.
Similarly, the convex-concave allocation plan should be evaluated against the actual events
that will occur. The particular project used in the analysis is forecasted to complete
in March 2009 and it will be useful to monitor the performance of the allocation plan
that was developed throughout the life of this project. Methods of eliciting technical
utility functions should be explored in order to identify a more appropriate normalization
mechanism, particularly for the performance utility component.
Other potential avenues of research include the application of expected utility theory
to other resource constrained stochastic problems. As an example, it is possible that, in
stochastic supply and demand problems for customer service industries, failure to meet
customer demand does not carry the same weight (or importance) across all customers.
This condition already exists in practice. As an example, a utility provider, when faced
with a scarce supply, will reduce or cut off support to residential customers before shutting
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down critical service providers such as hospitals, fire and police departments. A utilitybased formulation might provide interesting solutions to these types of problems. These
techniques are utilized in capacity planning problems but typically, are profit oriented.
Both the linear and convex-concave utility models applied a penalty to the objective
function. One might explore the impact of different penalty functions on the optimal
contingency allocation plans. As an example, in the convex-concave utility formulation,
the penalty was associated with the satisfaction of realized risks that occurred. Would
a different penalty function, such as one similar to the used in the linear utility model,
produce a better solution?
Academic research in the project management area has been isolated to the areas of
risk and schedule management (see, for example [53, 61, 165]). In the latter, research has
been focused on establishing a realistic project finish date. Elmaghraby [41] notes that
“It is universally recognized that the scheduling of activities and the timing
of resource acquisition and allocation are among the most important functions
of management. Technically speaking, the scheduling of activities related by
arbitrary precedence relations subject to resource availabilities is an NP-hard
problem. This means that the prospect of finding an algorithm that resolves
the problem optimally (under any criterion) and runs in ‘reasonable’ time is
almost nil.”
These schedule problems can be interpreted as management of the schedule contingency.
While the cost contingency allocation models proposed in this thesis are not complicated
by the dependencies that exist in a stochastic project schedule, it is possible that the
approaches utilized could be applied to the schedule problem, potentially even proving
Elmaghraby wrong by providing, as with the cost contingency allocation problem, a reasonable solution in a reasonable time.
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